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Toward the Spiral of Questioning:

A Manner of Thinking and Writing for Philosophers of Education after 3.11

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Abstract

This paper investigates a manner of thinking and writing toward the future for philosophers of education to adopt after huge catastrophes such as the Great East Japan Earthquake. The earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan on March 11th, 2011 (hereafter called 3.11), followed by the nuclear disaster in Fukushima, exposed the crucial problems of homelessness and human alienation in modern society more vividly than ever before. This paper explores the ways in which philosophers of education can think and write toward the future in such critical situations. This investigation is inspired by Otto Friedrich Bollnow's philosophy of education and Martin Heidegger's ontology of technology as they illustrate the existence of hope and a savior in an age of homelessness and human alienation. This paper takes into account Bollnow's theory on trust in the world and the future, alongside Heidegger's theory on technology and releasement. This paper reveals that Bollnow's and Heidegger's works contain several impossible-to-ignore twists in their arguments and that these twists are the key devices in the theory of each philosopher. The twists prevent the readers from representing the trust in the being and the state of releasement as convenient ideals of human life, leading them to walk along a spiral way of questioning on the essence of the world and humans. The essential ambiguity between the feeling of security and insecurity in the world, hope and despair toward the future, and yes and no to a world dominated by technology manifests itself from the spiral way of questioning as the depth of the essence of the world and humans. This paper concludes that philosophers of education today are expected to keep walking on the spiral way of questioning, wherein twists in the arguments inevitably originate, so as to listen and respond to the depth of the essence of the world and humans that is forcibly exposed during critical situations such as that after 3.11.

Keywords

twists in philosophical arguments, trust in the world and the future, modern technology and releasement, need for thinking and questioning

How is it possible for philosophers of education to think and write toward the future after huge catastrophes such as the Great East Japan Earthquake? We are confronted with this critical question about the possibility of thinking and writing by philosophers of education after the disaster in East Japan on March 11th, 2011 (hereafter called 3.11). The serious damage caused by the earthquake and tsunami and the aftermath of the nuclear disaster tore us apart: whatever anyone writes about after the big catastrophe, for example, his/her words are inevitably evaluated by who he/she is, where he/she is from, where he/she was on 3.11, and how he/she experienced the disaster. In addition, we are faced with the sensitive problem of clarifying which area we are referring to when we say "stricken area" and whom we are referring to when we say "we." One of the most serious difficulties for each researcher in the field of human science today is that thoughts and words after 3.11 always become carelessly linked and tightly bound to his/her individual experience of the catastrophe. Thus, we need to confront a critical question: how is it possible for philosophers of education to think and write toward the future, while constantly reconsidering the range of "the stricken area" and the classification of "we," without withdrawing into their own experiences when facing such a crucial situation? This paper investigates a manner of thinking and writing toward the future for philosophers of education to adopt after such huge catastrophes that upset the foundation of human activities such as education.

1. Homelessness and Human Alienation

Many houses and school buildings completely destroyed by the earthquake and tsunami, extensive city areas reduced to rubble and debris, reactor pressure vessels with lost bottoms, and reactor buildings with outer walls blown to bits—these are the tragic symbols of the experience of the loss of grounds and boundaries that has, at times, depressed people into silence and, at other times, prompted people to talk too much.

The 9.0-magnitude earthquake and enormous tsunami destroyed hundreds of thousands of buildings, including countless residences, and caused land subsidence and soil liquefaction in many places in East Japan. Lifelines to the stricken areas were seriously damaged and cut off. What made the situation so much worse was that the reactor buildings in the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant were damaged by the earthquake and tsunami and, subsequently, exploded one after another, scattering enormous quantities of radioactive material. People in areas that were expected to become seriously contaminated by the radioactive fallout were forced to evacuate their

houses. Over 15,000 people were killed in the disaster and more than 2,500 have been missing since 3.11. The total number of completely and partially destroyed buildings reached almost 400,000[1]. The number of refugees today, including those who lost their homes to the earthquake or tsunami and who left their hometowns to avoid radioactive contamination, is still over 180,000[2].

Otto Friedrich Bollnow once remarked on the importance of houses and hometowns for humans. We cannot live without building houses. A house must have walls and a roof. We can take root only when we are separated from the vast outside world and protected against threats such as strong winds, heavy rains, storms, wild animals, and enemies by our houses. Hometowns, like houses, are places that protect us and have certain boundaries that make us feel safe and calm, even though they do not have actual physical barriers. They are our original central places in the world, where we begin our journey and return to rest. Bollnow repeatedly outlined the importance of houses and hometowns—in other words, the construction of grounds and boundaries in our vast world. Here, we see that a philosopher writes thoughtfully and sincerely on a subject that seems self-evident in our everyday lives as if he were referring to something precious[3].

When you lose your own house, you do not simply lose your property but also the promise of safety and peace in your life. You lose the boundary that separates your space from that of others, your foundation, the center of the world you live in, the most important memorial of the history of your family, and even the order and rhythm of your everyday life. Bollnow insisted that we cannot live without dwelling in houses and that homelessness (*Heimatlosigkeit*) in modern society is a crucial problem for all people[4]. The 3.11 catastrophe deprived many people of their living places and forcibly reminded us of the significance of dwelling: the value of safety and peace derived from having a house and a hometown.

However, the destruction of houses and the radioactive contamination of hometowns were not the only reasons for the loss of grounds and boundaries that we experienced due to the catastrophe. As several thinkers have described, the nuclear disaster in Fukushima revealed the great uncertainty of such dichotomies that we usually take for granted:

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[1] Keisatsucho (2016.1.8) Heisei 23 Nen Touhoku Chihou Taiheiyou Oki Zishin no Higai Zyoukyou to Keisatsu Sochi (The damage of 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami and the police measures against it). https://www.npa.go.jp/archive/keibi/biki/higaijokyo.pdf (viewed on January 13th 2016).

[2] Fukkoucho (2015.12.25) Zenkoku Hinansya-tou no Kazu (The number of the refugees in Japan). http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/main-cat2/sub-cat2-1/20151225_hinansha.pdf (viewed on January 13th 2016).

[3] cf. Bollnow 1955: 168ff.

[4] cf. Bollnow 1955: 168ff.

natural disasters and man-made disasters, human and natural beings, stricken areas and unstricken areas, danger and safety, and present and future. Discrepancies among specialists' theories and opinions regarding the disaster demonstrate that modern science does not always offer a definitive basis for our decisions and behaviors in such critical situations. When we discuss the merits and demerits of nuclear power plants—one of the biggest fruits of modern science—we must consider the politics and economics that have been supporting the development of modern science and the principles and thoughts that have been operating within modern science, politics, and economics. In fact, this broadened range of consideration had already been adopted by the professionals of these fields as a matter of course, but the nuclear disaster forced even non-professional people to face the complicated relationships among these fields. This differentiates the discussion on the merits and demerits of nuclear power plants after 3.11 from that which took place prior to the catastrophe.

After World War II, Martin Heidegger clarified the essence of modern technology as "*Ge-stell*" (en-framing), which he insisted is the hidden principle of modern science, politics, and economics. Heidegger argued that modern technology tends to capture everything in the world from a rationalist and functionalist point of view and exploit it as a useful standing-reserve. Usually, we believe that modern technology is based on modern science and that developments in modern technology simply depend on developments in modern science. However, Heidegger added the insight that the tendency of modern technology to utilize everything in the world for the benefit of human beings has been driving the development of modern science and making use of it as the groundwork for technological development. The principle of technological exploitation that regards all beings as tools for the achievement of goals and attempts to maximize rationality and functionality was realized at the highest level in atomic bombs as weapons of mass destruction and in nuclear power plants with the myth of safety[5]. Heidegger's concept of en-framing has enabled us to see the core of the multitude of problems facing us after 3.11 more clearly by keeping a distance from the endless discussions about the merits and demerits of nuclear power plants and without being involved in the ongoing discrepancies among theories regarding the nuclear disaster and its aftermath.

Human beings, like natural resources, are captured for use as tools for the pursuit of goals by the essential principle of modern technology. Even though it is common practice to believe that humans are leading the development and utilization of modern technology, we, as human resources useful for its development, are also actually exploited by modern

[5] cf. Heidegger 2000: 5ff.

technology. The cruel working environment in the nuclear power plants in Fukushima, reported numerous times after 3.11, surprised many people, even though the issue had already been reported by several books and articles before the disaster. One of the greatest matters of concern for many companies today is how to hire employees who can work for longer hours and lower pay. The explosions at the nuclear power plants in Fukushima enlightened people to the fact that the insatiable pursuit of economic profit based on the ideas of rationality and functionality tends to reduce both human beings and natural beings to disposable materials. Here, we are confronted with a critical contradiction: the pursuit of rationality and functionality for the betterment of human life actually exploits and alienates human beings.

Many natural and man-made disasters that have deprived many people of their homes and hometowns have occurred throughout history. The nuclear disaster in Fukushima is not the only case of crisis caused by highly developed technology. World Wars I and II were two of the greatest catastrophes that killed many people and destroyed many homes, towns, and cities, employing weapons invented through modern technology. When humans invented atomic bombs and other nuclear weapons, they created weapons of mass destruction that can annihilate humanity. Bollnow's theory on the significance of dwelling and Heidegger's theory on the essence of modern technology were deeply influenced by the respective philosophers' experiences of surviving two world wars and witnessing the true menace of nuclear weapons.

Indeed, we are living in an age of homelessness and human alienation wherein safety and peace in human life are continually threatened by natural and man-made disasters. However, Bollnow outlined a ray of hope in human activities toward the future in such critical situations and insisted that hope is the ultimate foundation of human life. This reminds us that Heidegger also suggested that a savior grows where there is a danger that the being of all beings is veiled under the prosperity of the ideas of rationality and functionality. What is essential for the theme of this paper is the fact that Bollnow's theory on hope during crises and Heidegger's theory on salvation during times of danger both contain contradictions, or twists, in their arguments that violate the basic principles of traditional logic. The following sections aim to clarify that these contradictions in the arguments are not defects but key devices of Bollnow's and Heidegger's thought processes.

How is it possible for philosophers of education today to think and write toward the future? The following sections will focus on the twists in Bollnow's and Heidegger's arguments to answer this question. This paper primarily explores how philosophers can think and write on hope and salvation in an age of homelessness and human alienation

so as to investigate the manner of thinking and writing toward the future in such critical situations. This paper also unravels some clues for clarifying the responsibilities that present-day philosophers of education should assume in this historical age following 3.11 to ensure the future of subsequent generations.

2. The Twists in Bollnow's Arguments about Crises and Hope

(1) Trust in the World and the Future

The restoration of the areas stricken by the Great East Japan Earthquake, including the rebuilding of private and public housing, is still in progress today. Humans have constantly and indomitably built houses since ancient times, even though they have frequently faced the menace of natural and man-made disasters that have destroyed countless homes and hometowns. Bollnow discerned the moods (*Stimmung*) of security and hope as trust in the world and the future behind the human activities in such critical situations. Bollnow insisted that humans could not repeatedly build houses after experiences of irrepressible destruction if they did not have the moods of security and hope as vital foundations of human life[6]. He therefore declared that learning to trust in the world and the future is a primal task for humans and located the concepts of security and hope at the center of his philosophy[7].

The concept of security (*Geborgenheit*) in Bollnow's theory means a mood or feeling that we are protected by the space(s) surrounding us. He distinguished two dimensions of security: one is trust in specific spaces with clear border lines, such as houses and hometowns, and the other is trust in the whole space without any limits, that is, the world itself. Bollnow thought that it is especially important for humans to acquire security in the world. He insisted that they should not be content with security in specific spaces. Bollnow believed that humans can safely and peacefully dwell in houses and rebuild these houses even after monumental disasters as long as they are sustained by their absolute trust in the world in its entirety[8].

The concept of hope (*Hoffnung*) in Bollnow's theory signifies a mood or feeling that we will be mercifully accepted by the future. He clarified the characteristics of hope by contrasting it with a similar feeling of expectation: to expect something is to anticipate clearly with certain grounds that something specific will happen in the future, whereas to

[6] Bollnow 1963: 138f.
[7] cf. Bollnow 1964: 18ff. & 52ff.
[8] Bollnow 1955: 145ff. & Bollnow 1963: 306ff.

hope is to trust in an unpredictable future and open ourselves toward it without any certain grounds. Bollnow explained that hope is a kind of belief that we will never tumble down into the abyss and that a way out of difficulties will somehow be provided to us[9]. This type of hopeful attitude toward the future is sometimes referred to as releasement (*Gelassenheit*)[10]. He insisted that hope is a vital foundation of human life and that all human activities, including those of expectations and plans, would be entirely impossible without it[11].

What is especially important for the main topic of this paper is the point that Bollnow strongly related trust in the world and the future to experiences of crises (*Krise*), such as setbacks and ruin in human life. He insisted that the mood of security in the form of trust in the whole world must be clearly distinguished from a naïve belief in certain safety since the former originates from tensions between safety and danger and, as such, cannot sublate all threats to human life[12]. He also declared that only those people who have faced serious adversity can learn to resign themselves to their fate and accept the unpredictability of human life and thus acquire the mood of hope as the belief that all human activities will somehow be rewarded[13]. Here, one of the most important characteristics of Bollnow's theory regarding trust in the world and the future can be identified: he closely connected the moods of security and hope as the vital foundations of human life with serious crises that sometimes ruin it ruthlessly.

Therefore, it must be pointed out that Bollnow's theory provides its readers with two tasks incompatible with each other when it asks them to acquire the moods of security and hope. When we attempt to acquire trust in the world and the future, we must recognize, on the one hand, that the world and the future can easily ruin our life by way of crises, but on the other hand, we must believe that the world and the future can also mercifully protect and accept us. The world is felt to be simultaneously filled with both danger and safety for those people who have acquired the mood of security. The future involves great unpredictability alongside a promise of mercy for those people who have acquired the mood of hope. The moods of security and hope in Bollnow's theory are always in tension with desertion and despair and thus contain such indelible contradictions and conflicts. Bollnow perceived trust in the world and the future, which includes these lasting contradictions and conflicts, in human activities for restoration after

[9] cf. Bollnow 1955: 107ff.
[10] Bollnow 1972: 22f.
[11] cf. Bollnow 1955: 114ff.
[12] Bollnow 1955: 24, 156f., 163.
[13] Bollnow 1955: 122f. & Bollnow 1971: 143f.

crises.

Bollnow's theory on the significance of trust in the world and the future itself contains strange contradictions or twists in its arguments as it reflects contradictions and conflicts within the moods of security and hope. While, for example, he insisted in a book that we can never eliminate the dangerous nature of the world against human life, he also declared in another book that the world loses its dangerous character when we acquire trust in the whole space[14]. Although he emphatically stated in a section of the former book that we must build houses to protect ourselves, there is also a passage in his lecture (held in Japan) stating that the environment (*Umwelt*) is not primarily hostile[15]. In addition, he distinguished hope from expectation on the grounds that only the latter features the certainty of future incidents, but he sometimes described the essence of hope by the certainty that one's actions somehow have meaning or that one can somehow find their way out of difficulty[16]. It seems that when the mood of hope is evaluated as the vital foundation of all human activities, it is reduced to a kind of expectation by the functionalist way of thinking that is embedded in Bollnow's theory.

We can also find such twists in the arguments in Bollnow's theory on human maturation through crises. The next subsection will investigate this theory in detail.

(2) Human Maturation through Crises

The Great East Japan Earthquake is often referred to as an unprecedented catastrophe because of not only the enormous damage inflicted by the earthquake and tsunami but also the serious aftermath of the nuclear disaster. The great disaster in the Fukushima I Nuclear Power Plant destroyed the myth of safety promoted by the Japanese government and electric power companies and raised an outcry among people against nuclear power plants. Theorists from different fields began to claim that we should view the nuclear disaster as a kind of lesson that admonishes the arrogance of humans in terms of the exploitation of nuclear power and instructs us to moderate the endless development of modern science and technology. However, some insist that nuclear power plants are necessary in modern society, stressing on the importance of a steady supply of electricity and economic development. In any case, it is important to recognize that many people who had previously not taken part in the discussion on the merits and demerits of nuclear power plants have become very interested and deeply involved, regarding it as one of the

[14] Bollnow 1955: 23f. & Bollnow 1963: 310.
[15] cf. Bollnow 1955: 168ff. & Bollnow 1988: 48.
[16] cf. Bollnow 1964: 61 & Bollnow 1971: 143f. & Bollnow 1972: 108.

most important issues of national elections.

However, since 3.11, there is much confusion arising from discrepancies among specialists' theories and opinions about critical issues such as the state of the reactors and the level of danger due to radiation. To what extent were the reactors destroyed? How high are the risks of low-dose radiation? Is it true that we would not have enough electricity if we stopped using nuclear power plants? Which areas are seriously contaminated with radioactive fallout and which areas are not? Have the currently operating nuclear power plants really been proven to be safe? We have an endless list of such unanswered questions even today. The knowledge of modern science lost its foundation as the reactors lost their foundation, and the myth of the safety of nuclear power plants, which people believed in at least to some extent before 3.11, was debunked by the great disaster. We are now in a maelstrom of incoherent information and are being forced to take individual responsibility of judging the safety and danger of radiation and the merits and demerits of nuclear power plants without any firm evidence. Given that there are discrepancies between the information provided by the Japanese government and the serious doubts voiced against it by some specialists, we are compelled to make decisions on issues such as whether we should evacuate from East Japan to West Japan to escape any radioactive fallout and whether we can eat farm and marine produce from East Japan. These are decisions closely linked to the stability and safety of our lives.

Bollnow insisted that ruinous crises in human life present opportunities for people to question their submission to mass opinion and acquire the competence for independent judgment. Mass media, such as newspapers and television, as well as propaganda by national governments, tend to deprive people—who hardly notice such machinations in their daily lives—of the chance to judge anything on their own responsibility, encouraging more compliance to mass opinion. People can easily become embroiled in thinking collectively, even though the individual tends to look down on the masses; this simply implies that the masses dislike the masses in reality. Bollnow declared that the experience of crises, which makes it impossible for people to continue upholding their naïve common sense and can even drive them to critique trite opinions, is an opportunity for them to become independent of the masses. It is the fatal experience of crises in human life that awakens people from submission to the masses, urging them to develop the competence of independent judgment and take responsibility for this judgment[17]. The 3.11 catastrophe actually forced people to individually confront and reconsider crucial issues, such as the merits and demerits of the exploitation of nuclear power, the pros and

[17] Bollnow 1971: 168ff.

cons of modern science and technology, the relationship between human beings and all other beings, the conjunction between culture and civilization, and the ideal future for human society.

Some thinkers therefore regard 3.11 as a great turning point in human history when the modern conceptions of the world and humans were crucially altered. This notion reminds us of Bollnow's insight that crises present new beginnings and opportunities to restart with renewed vigor, discarding situations in which we are exhausted by monotonous daily lives and/or we cannot continue satisfactorily to develop further. Bollnow's theory on new beginnings refers to the renewal of human life through crises such as ruins, collapses, setbacks, and deadlocks. The theory also refers to the renewal of trends in a society, pointing out its close relationship with cultural criticism[18]. The 3.11 disaster aroused deep suspicions of many kinds of values that had been congealed and considered self-evident in modern society. For example, these values include the idea that humans can and should control nature for their own sake, the capitalist tendency to excessively promote the expansion of economic profit, and the concept of risk management that allows us to estimate any risk numerically. As such, we have good reason, based on Bollnow's theory, to think that we have now made a new beginning post-3.11, which is a great turning point in human history.

Bollnow evaluated human transformation through crises as a shift to a higher stage of maturity (*Reife*: perfection) and considered helping and supporting younger generations achieve such maturation to be an important responsibility of education[19]. However, his theory on maturation through crises, which considers transformation through crises to be a valuable shift, also contains strange contradictions or twists in the arguments, just as his theory on the moods of security and hope does. Bollnow's theory demands people to regard life after crises as a new beginning, wherein they must abandon the old concept of development on one hand and evaluate their new life as a higher stage of maturity on the basis of the accustomed concept of development on the other. The theory expects its readers to acquire the competence of independent judgment through crises and by criticizing old values held by the masses. At the same time, the theory suggests that we should preserve the accustomed idea of maturity—an idea that the masses favor and preach loudly—that places a high value on concepts such as criticism and independency.

[18] Bollnow 1971: 92ff.
[19] Bollnow 1959: 36ff. & Bollnow 1971: 88ff.

(3) Sitting between the Two Chairs

As shown above, Bollnow's discussions on trust in the world and the future and on the higher stage of human maturation are interwoven with the experience of crises and involve impossible-to-ignore contradictions or twists in their arguments. If we interpret and accept the contradictions in Bollnow's theory simply as contradictions and do not try to sublate them, we can conclude that the world and the future are full of critical threats and yet trustworthy enough to rely on at the same time. We can view crises as an opportunity to be reborn with new conceptions of the world and humans on one hand and to achieve a higher stage of maturity evaluated by the preserved concept of development on the other. Although Bollnow did not analyze the twists in his arguments in detail, we can find an important description of the contradiction between two aspects of human beings in his book that the investigation of meanings of each phenomenon must inevitably be confronted.

> The difficulty is in that the one [the existential aspect of humans] does not let itself simply be joined into the other [the hopeful aspect of humans] and that the balance between these two aspects does not let itself be established through any harmonizing synthesis. There remains an unsublatable contradiction. Humans must bear it in their lives and struggle with it over and over again. This may be unsatisfactory for formal systematic thinking but it is the necessary expression of our inevitably contradictive *Dasein* [being-there] that can never be captured in any logical system.[20]

Bollnow explained the unique characteristic of his own thoughts as being comparable to "sitting between the two chairs" in a dialogue with his disciples. The two chairs suggest two different fields of philosophy: the philosophy of life and existential philosophy. According to Bollnow's description, existential philosophy explores some aspects of the essence of human beings but overlooks other aspects clarified by the philosophy of life. The opposite is true for the philosophy of life. Bollnow insisted that existential philosophy focuses on the "dark" side of human life, symbolized by the moods of anxiety and despair, whereas the philosophy of life investigates the "light" side of human life, typically represented by the moods of security and hope. He declared that these two fields of

[20] Bollnow 1971: 106.

philosophy must complement each other[21]. Hence, the unique feature of Bollnow's theories is the way in which he attempted to clarify the essence of human beings more broadly and deeply by maintaining the tension between the two different fields of philosophy without deviating to one fixed viewpoint. Bollnow's theory on human life after crises is exactly the point where the philosophy of life and existential philosophy encounter each other, and it is here that we can recognize the characteristic comparable to "sitting between the two chairs" most distinctly.

"Sitting between the two chairs" is obviously the primal factor underlying the contradictions or twists in the arguments in Bollnow's theory. However, while he repeatedly insisted that the philosophy of life and existential philosophy must complement each other, he never explained the influence of the twists on the entire theory in detail. Therefore, it is quite natural to assume that Bollnow's theory on human life after crises can do nothing other than resign itself to such illogical twists so as to treat the two incoherent conceptions of the world and humans as equally as possible without prejudice.

To investigate the possibilities for thinking and writing toward the future after catastrophes, this paper must clarify the effects of the twists in the arguments in Bollnow's theory. The next section will explore Heidegger's works that also contain strange twists in their arguments with the intent to view the role of twists in philosophical thought. Heidegger's philosophy after World War II provided important inspiration for Bollnow's theory on security and dwelling and was the origin of the concept of releasement that Bollnow adopted as the central characteristic of the hopeful attitude. The subsequent section will investigate Heidegger's philosophy on the relationship between modern technology and human beings, focusing on both its contents and form, to clarify the origin and influence of twists in the philosopher's arguments.

3. Twists in Arguments and the Spiral of Questioning

(1) Thinking on Technology by Heidegger

The tendency of modern technology to reduce everything, including human beings, to mere tools for the achievement of goals is infiltrating modern society. Modern technology attempts to maximize rationality and functionality through the insatiable exploitation of resources and the development of technology itself. The tendency to pursue rationality and functionality drives not only modern science as the groundwork

[21] Göbbeler & Lessing 1983: 22, 28, 31, 43f.

for technological development but also almost all human activities, including political struggle and economic competition. Such extreme rationalism and functionalism has led to a strange conundrum in contemporary times: it is difficult for us to decide whether or not to abandon the profits from nuclear power even though we know that many people have been forced to abandon their houses and hometowns because of nuclear disasters and the serious threat of radioactive contamination is still spreading over the seas. The endless controversies regarding the suppressed information of nuclear disasters and the pros and cons of restarting nuclear power plants reveal the fact that our society and we are deeply controlled by the essence of modern technology that Heidegger once referred to as en-framing and that it is seriously difficult for us to change this rationalist and functionalist tendency. We are now living in a post-3.11 world wherein critical problems stemming from the tendency of en-framing that pervasively reigns over our everyday lives broadly and deeply are coming to light ever more clearly.

As the strong tendency to understand all beings as tools for goals permeates over society, everything in the world comes to be evaluated with a single criterion: "What is it useful for?" Heidegger admonished the danger of this essential tendency of modern technology by suggesting that it veils the possibility for beings to emerge as something beyond rationalist and functionalist conceptions[22]. He did not directly criticize individual products of modern technology, such as nuclear and other kinds of power plants, motor vehicles, long railroads, large airplanes, and super computers. What he did do was cast suspicion over the essential tendency of modern technology itself that drives technological innovation. Modern technology has been trying to maximize the rationality and functionality and thereby drive us further into the endless development of technology itself and exploitation of the world. Even if we abandoned all the nuclear power plants around the world, the danger of the continuous exploitation of all beings in the world, including humans, as standing-reserves would still remain, unless we commit to investigating and criticizing the essential tendency of en-framing in detail. Heidegger insisted that we must liberate ourselves from en-framing and become independent of technology to be open to the possibility for beings to emerge as something beyond rationalist and functionalist conceptions[23].

Heidegger coined the term *Gelassenheit* (releasement) to denote this free relationship with technology. While the German term *Gelassenheit* usually refers to composure or calmness, Heidegger suggested a different implication of this concept: "yes and no at the

[22] Heidegger 2000: 24ff.
[23] Heidegger 2000: 7.

same time" to a world dominated by technology. We have no choice but to accept the inevitable use of the products of modern technology—saying "yes" to it—as we live and exist in a modern technological society. However, we must deny the tendency of modern technology to evaluate all beings with the criterion of "What is it useful for?" and thus effectively say "no" to it[24]. Indeed, it sounds like an arbitrary idea at first glance if we miss the contradiction in the concept of releasement as "yes and no at the same time" to a world dominated by modern technology that may be too obvious to focus upon. The concept of releasement as the free relationship with technology assigns us the task of resigning ourselves to the absolutely inconsistent without insisting on a certain fixed representation[25]. Here, we must recognize the fact that Heidegger plainly marked out the self-contradiction in the concept of releasement as liberation from the control of modern technology.

Heidegger's theory on releasement also contains contradictions or twists in the arguments as it deals with self-contradiction in the concept of releasement and attempts to maintain it. In his dialogical essay entitled "Toward the Conversation on the Releasement," for example, much illogical discourse can be found, such as obvious self-contradictions, explanations with tautology, gaps between questions and answers, exaggerated praise for naïve remarks, dodging and glossing, and arguments that go round in circles. The dialogue written by Heidegger is full of irrationality. It seems that he was trying to destruct the ideas of logicality and objectivity as important bases of traditional philosophy[26]. He presented the irrational characteristics of the concept of releasement while retaining the contradiction between "yes" and "no," without reducing the concept to a convenient ideal. The essay therefore prevents its readers from glorifying the concept of releasement as a naïve objective of human life and education. A specialist in modern science in the dialogue (Researcher), who is at the nearest standing point to the readers, becomes confused by such an illogical conversation with the Teacher and Scholar and says candidly,

> Researcher: Then what are we to wait for? Where are we to wait? I hardly know anymore where and who I am.[27]

The Teacher responds significantly,

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[24] Heidegger 1959: 22f.
[25] Heidegger 1959:22.
[26] Heidegger 1959: 27ff. & cf. Itani 2013: 436ff.
[27] Heidegger 1959: 35.

> Teacher: We all do not know it anymore once we give up trying to trick ourselves into believing in something. [28]

Here, it is implied that the twists in the arguments on releasement as the free relationship with technology lead the readers to ask radical questions about releasement (What are we to wait for?) and the essence of the world and humans (Where and who are we?). Actually, the question of releasement as "yes and no at the same time" to a world dominated by modern technology naturally involves reconsideration about the present state of the world and human beings: the world as the object of insatiable exploitation by technology and human beings as the subjects working for the development of technology. The readers are expected to walk along a way of questioning on the essence of the world and humans that lies between the rationalist and functionalist conception of the world and humans and the conception of the world and humans out of rationalism and functionalism. The way of questioning is the way of thinking for Heidegger. His dialogical essay, with its illogical twists, brings the readers to walk along the way of thinking, keeping a distance from the simple dichotomy of object and subject, wherein the attraction to and repulsion from the essential tendency of modern technology maintain the tension. The way of thinking is the way of releasement in this sense. A specialist in the history of philosophy in the dialogue (Scholar) comes to realize the hidden relationship between releasement and the dialogue itself:

> Scholar: But it means that it [the conversation] brings us to the path which seems to be nothing but releasement itself…[29]

Heidegger's theory on the free relationship with technology never explains releasement as a certain ideal that we must and can represent clearly. His theory leads the readers to the question about the essence of the world and humans and encourages them to walk along the way of releasement by themselves. Heidegger had no choice but to apply such an unusual strategy because if releasement were glorified as a convenient ideal for human life and education, it would be understood in the light of rationalism and functionalism[30]. The essential self-contradiction contained in "yes and no at the same time" would be eliminated and the free relationship with technology would, same as natural

[28] Heidegger 1959: 35.
[29] Heidegger 1959: 44.
[30] cf. Itani 2013: 305ff.

and human resources, be evaluated with the standard of "What is it useful for?" The concept of releasement as "yes and no at the same time" to a world dominated by modern technology is not a specific answer that provides the readers with a clear direction of living. Releasement must be realized as a long-distance way of questioning on the essence of the world and humans. The twists in the arguments on free relationship with technology are key devices of Heidegger's theory. They lead the readers to the way of thinking wherein the free relationship with technology is able to maintain its self-contradiction in "yes and no at the same time" without being admired as a convenient ideal or represented as a naïve objective of human life and education.

> The way of thinking does not lead from somewhere to somewhere else like a roadway hardened by cars nor does it exist somewhere in itself at all. First and only the walking, here the thinking questioning, is the opening of the way (*Bewegung*: movement).[31]

(2) Need for Questioning and the Spiral of Questioning

The 3.11 catastrophe compelled us to reconsider the relationship among the threat of natural disaster such as earthquakes and tsunamis, development of modern technology symbolized by nuclear power plants, and human life. It seems, however, that even though many problems caused by the catastrophe are still unresolved, we are becoming even less aware of the present critical situation and losing the motivation to deliberate the relationship described above. When we are confronted with serious problems that cast critical suspicions on our conceptions of the world and humans, we often resign ourselves to easy solutions and persist in them to escape the critical question of the essence of the world and humans raised through the problems. Because of this attempt at escape from the essential question, the problem of the relationship among nature, technology, and humans can be easily treated as a matter of cost performance and risk management in the light of rationalism and functionalism. Indeed, some thoughtless propositions that only search for easy solutions without confronting urgent problems may provide temporary respite as they never deal with the essential contradictions in the world and human life. However, these solutions must be consumed merely for transient tranquility or enthusiasm as they are fated to stay in the previous rationalist and functionalist conception of the world and humans since they can never reach the essential questions at the core of

[31] Heidegger 2002: 174.

serious problems.

Heidegger explained that thinkers are driven to questioning not out of ethical and moral value but out of a kind of need (*Not*: necessity and difficulty) to face the critical question about the essence of the world and humans[32]. The need for questioning can originate from different situations such as natural and man-made disasters, like earthquakes and wars; encounters with great works of art; and individual experiences of adversity, like diseases, injuries, setbacks, and separations. However, Heidegger declared that these are not the origins of the most urgent need for questioning in modern society. He suggested that the primal need for questioning today comes from a more serious situation. People in modern society are leading peaceful lives and turning away from the need for questioning, although it is now a substantial task to reconsider the essence of the world and humans because the possibility for beings to emerge as something beyond rationalist and functionalist conceptions has been veiled by the essential tendency of modern technology. He identified the oblivion of the essential question as the lack of need[33]. When Heidegger cited, "A savior also grows where danger is," a line from Hölderlin, during his lecture on modern technology and releasement[34], he implied that the question about the essence of the world and humans today originates from the lack of need as the most critical need in modern society.

It is to be revealed on the way of questioning that the self-contradiction of releasement reflects the ambiguity of the essence of the world and humans: the world and humans are simultaneously of and beyond rationality and functionality. We cannot represent the ambiguity as a material object because it is a manifestation of the unfathomable depth of the essence of the world and humans that invites us beyond the objects in front of us. Heidegger's philosophy demands the readers to sense the depth of the essence of the world and humans on the way of thinking without capturing it as a simple object. All beings can be easily evaluated with the criterion of "What is it useful for?" once they are reduced to simple material objects in a modern society dominated by the essential tendency of modern technology. This is why the ambiguity of the essence of the world and humans should neither be seen as a simple object that we can capture as the conclusive answer to essential questions nor praised as a naïve objective of human life and education. Instead, it must be sensed as the depth of the essence of the world and humans on the way of questioning.

Heidegger sometimes compared the way of thinking to a circulation or a spiral.

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[32] cf. Heidegger 1989: 45.
[33] Heidegger 1989: 10f.
[34] Heidegger 2000: 29.

> So we must perform the circulation. This is not any makeshift or deficiency. To step into the [circulative] way is the strength of thinking and to stay in the [circulative] way is the feast of thinking […][35]

> It seems that thinking is continuously taken around the same or just trifled with like in a magical circle and it cannot come closer to the same. The circle is, however, perhaps a hidden spiral.[36]

The depth of the essence of the world and humans manifests itself as the center of the spiral just as long as the spiral of questioning continues to rotate. It is impossible for thinkers to capture this depth as a fixed object like a certain answer because the center of the spiral gradually disappears once they stop walking along the spiral way of questioning. They can indistinctly sense the depth of the essence of the world and humans only in the spiral of questioning as long as the question is being asked continuously. The spiral becomes larger and deeper and develops greater centripetal force to involve people as thinkers continue to walk along the spiral way of thinking. Now, it is revealed that the strange twists in the arguments on the free relationship with technology are derived from the spiral of questioning on the essence of the world and humans that manifests and maintains the depth of the essence and tends to involve the readers into the way of thinking.

(3) Philosophy of Hope and the Spiral of Questioning

We have now acquired the point of view that makes it possible to restore significance to the illogical twists in the arguments on the moods of security and hope propounded by Bollnow. The twists are derived from the spiral of questioning that involves the readers into the way of thinking and creates an opportunity for the depth of the essence of the world and humans to manifest itself.

The concept of releasement introduced by Heidegger was adopted by Bollnow through the intermediation of Theodor Ballauff. We can find contradictions and conflicts in the concept of releasement in Bollnow's philosophy of time and space as well as in Heidegger's philosophy of technology as mentioned above. Releasement in Bollnow's

[35] Heidegger 1977: 3.
[36] Heidegger 1976: 410.

theory as the hopeful attitude toward the future means to believe that a way out of difficulties will be somehow provided while simultaneously knowing that the future is full of uncertainty and unpredictability. The mood of security as the trust in the world means, likewise, to believe that the whole space protects us safely while seeing clearly that the world is full of threats and danger. Reflecting the contradiction and conflict in the moods of security and hope, Bollnow's theory on trust in the world and the future itself contains impossible-to-ignore contradictions or twists in the arguments, as shown in the previous section.

Bollnow recognized that it is not an easy task to chase the moods of security and hope as fixed goals because they contain essential self-contradiction and conflict. His theory demands the readers to abandon not only the natural tendency to imagine a beautiful future naïvely but also the will to leave themselves to trust in the unpredictable gifts of the future[37]. Here, it is suggested that we must give up the will to learn to hope in order to learn to hope in actuality. In addition, concerning the mood of security, Bollnow declared that we are able to dwell in the world comfortably only when we are dwelling in our houses as essential foundations. He insisted, at the same time, that we can dwell in our houses comfortably as long as we are dwelling in the whole space. Moreover, he added that we must overcome the "deceptive" security provided by our houses in order to acquire the mood of security in the whole space[38]. Thus, it is implied that the way toward acquiring trust in the whole world is not a simple one-way street. Bollnow even suggested that whether we can acquire the moods of security and hope as the trust in the world and the future, sometimes referred to as the trust in the being itself, depends on contingent grace[39].

The moods of hope and security contain unsublatable self-contradictions and conflicts that make it impossible to admire the moods as certain ideals of human life and education. Bollnow's theory on trust in the world and the future ventures to accept the fact that each phenomenon refuses to be completely captured in solid logic and a fixed system. The price for this venture is that the theory contains impossible-to-ignore contradictions or twists in the arguments that prohibit its readers from representing the world and the future as mere objects. Is the world full of threats against us or is it a peaceful and safe place for human life? Is the future filled with the danger of ruin or the promise of relief for human beings? Are crises the chance for new beginnings or the opportunities of predicted maturity? The readers of Bollnow's theory are required to keep

[37] Bollnow 1955: 124.
[38] Bollnow 1963: 148, 304, 307.
[39] Bollnow 1955: 126f. & 168.

asking these questions. The ambiguity between security and insecurity in the world, hope and despair toward the future, and rebirth and maturity through crises manifests itself as the depth of the essence of the world and humans as long as the readers are walking along and deepening the spiral way of questioning in a thoughtful and continuous manner. The central characteristic of the new security and true hope in Bollnow's theory is nothing other than the ambiguity that is to be kept open through thinking that never advertises itself as facile optimism or easy pessimism.

Here, the style of "sitting between the two chairs" in Bollnow's theory regains its original dynamism as the illogical twists in the arguments on the moods of security and hope are identified as the key devices in the theory.

4. Conclusion toward the Inconclusive Future

In what manner is it possible for philosophers of education today to think and write toward the future? This paper concludes that it is in the manner of thinking and writing in which contradictions or twists in the arguments involve the readers in the spiral of questioning on the essence of the world and humans that is driven by the need originating in critical situations such as that after the catastrophe of 3.11. Each philosopher must, of course, avoid arbitrarily twisting arguments. Twists in the arguments inevitably arise on the way of sincere questioning on the essence of the world and humans that is driven by the need for questioning originating in critical situations, especially by the lack of need as the most crucial need today[40]. Twists in the arguments by each thinker who is driven by this need invite the readers to the way of thinking about the essence of the world and humans and give them the opportunity to maintain the depth of the essence without capturing it in the light of rationalism and functionalism. What is important is not the answer that is usually obtained through and so distinguished from questioning but the questioning itself. Questioning the essence of the world and humans is itself the human activity that maintains the depth of the essence of the world and humans beyond naïve objectivity and logicality. To undertake the question is exactly to respond to the call from the depth of the essence of the world and humans and this is what we call responsibility.

Continuing to question the essence of the world and humans includes continuing to

[40] Heidegger admonished people's problematic tendency to reduce questioning easily to a tool for a goal and spread it as a useful model solution for present problems.

> Let's pay attention to another thing, however, concerning the overhasty masses. It happens easily that people spread the catchphrase as soon as just tomorrow: everything depends on the questionability. People with this slogan appear to belong under those who question. (Heidegger 2002: 189)

reconsider the problems described at the beginning of this paper: the definition of what we define as a "stricken area" and whom we are referring to as "we." What philosophers of education today can and should do for future generations is not simply produce convenient ideas and concepts but fully maintain the depth of the essence of the world and humans as the depth that definitely refuses to be captured with easy ideas and concepts. The way of sincere questioning about human life and education that enables us to survive an age of homelessness and human alienation after major catastrophes without absolute reliable grounds and boundaries is opened up as long as the depth of the essence of the world and humans is retained.

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Towards Thinking Not Modelled on the 'External':

Discussion of Alternative Thinking within Research on Japanese Philosophy of Education

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Abstract

Since the advent of the modern era, Japanese educational and academic fields have been characterized by a tendency to model domestic education and pedagogy after given alternatives from overseas. This type of thinking has provided an orientation for alternative solutions, but has not sufficiently contributed to human or social transformation. Rather it has sometimes been complicit in maintaining existing societies. In this study, I will provide an overview of special issues, symposiums and subject studies/thematic researches collected from *Studies in the Philosophy of Education*, from the founding issue (1959) through Volume 111 (2015), and then review how the Philosophy of Education Society of Japan has examined and evaluated its own research style, particularly its own alternative orientations and thinking. In addition, I will consider how we should reflect on our own alternative orientation and thinking from now on, and, moreover, what these self-reflections might lead to in research on educational philosophy. This study will demonstrate the importance of thinking beyond the traditional dichotomy and the disregard for the Other (the alien outside of the known) in research on educational philosophy. What I mean here the traditional dichotomy is, for example, that between language-centrism (logo-centrism) and intuitionism, that between education for the purpose of industrialisation and pedagogy with the goal of human emancipation from industrialization, that between institutionalisation and criticism of institutionalisation and so on. I will also show the importance of continually questioning and examining our political positioning and thinking style.

Keywords

alternative orientations and thinking, Japanese philosophy of education, beyond the dichotomy, beyond to the Other, thinking not modelled on the 'external'

Introduction

The statement of the purpose of this symposium mentions that 'an orientation to a different, better education than what exists here and now', in other words 'an alternative orientation', is what drives the pursuit of education and pedagogy. This is certainly valid, if we presume that education and pedagogy, in particular modern education and pedagogy, should be the forces driving human transformation, which in turn creates social transformation. This is also valid for educational philosophy in the present-day, which has attempted to succeed critically modern pedagogy or to overcome or transcend it. If we recall that the Philosophy of Education Society of Japan was founded with the goal of examining and designing post-war pedagogy from a perspective different to that of the Japanese Educational Research Association[1], the work of the Philosophy of Education Society of Japan, as well as its very existence, might well be said to embody alternative orientations and thinking themselves.

In such a case, we would do well always to be mindful, as is noted in the statement of the purpose of this symposium, of whether alternative orientations of research on educational philosophy have 'betrayed their own purposes and closed themselves within a certain fixed structure of thinking'. A typical example of this pitfall is the phenomenon criticized by Akira Mori[2], which he referred to as 'exhibitions' and 'rapid discards and adoptions': the successive introduction of new systems, methodologies or concepts from the West by government and academia, to which school teachers should respond by quickly discarding the old and adopting the new. This phenomenon has been seen in Japanese educational and academic fields since the advent of the modern era. Criticisms of similar phenomena are found in symposiums and subject studies in *Studies in the Philosophy of Education*, for example, Vol. 31 (1975)[3], Vol. 55 (1987) [4]and Vol. 73 (1996)[5].

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[1] M. Ogasawara et al., "Sengo Kyouiku Tetsugaku no Shuppatsu" (Departure of Educational Philosophy after the Second World War), *Studies in the Philosophy of Education,* Vol. 97, 2008, pp. 164-172 and p.174.

[2] A. Mori, "Gendai no Kyouiku to Kyouiku Shichou" (Modern Education and Educational Trends), *Gendai Kyouiku Shichou*, A. Mori ed., Daiichi Houki Shuppan, 1969, p. 34.

[3] T. Oura, "Shinohara Sukeichi ni okeru Kyouikugaku Keisei no Tokushitsu: Oubei Kyouiku Shisou Sesshu no Taido wo Chuushin ni shite" (Characteristics of Pedagogical Formation in Shinohara Sukeichi: A Focus on Attitudes for Ingesting Western Educational Thoughts), *Studies in the Philosophy of Education*, Vol. 31, 1975, p. 2.

[4] H. Usami, "Kenkyuu Tougi ni kansuru Soukatsuteki Houkoku" (A Comprehensive Report on the Symposium), *Studies in the Philosophy of Education*, Vol. 55, 1987, pp. 14-15.

[5] S. Yano, "Kyouiku Tetsugaku no Mirai" (The Future of the Philosophy of Education), *Studies in the Philosophy of Education*, Vol. 73, 1996, pp. 42-43.

This structure of thinking has certainly driven domestic education and pedagogy by seeking out given alternatives from overseas. This raises the questions of why this structure of thinking is problematic and whether contemporary research on educational philosophy is already free from such thinking.

In past research on educational philosophy in *Studies in the Philosophy of Education*, many special issues, symposiums and subject studies/thematic researches have reflected on research on educational philosophy itself, including this structure of thinking. Therefore, in the following sections, I will provide an overview of special issues, symposiums and subject studies/thematic researches collected from the founding issue of *Studies in the Philosophy of Education* (1959) through Volume 111 (2015), and then look back on how the Philosophy of Education Society of Japan has examined and evaluated its own research style, particularly its own alternative orientations and thinking. In addition, I will consider how we should reflect on our own alternative orientation and thinking from now on, and, moreover, what these self-reflections might lead to in research on educational philosophy.

1. Lack of a Sense of the Other

Before giving an overview of past content from *Studies in the Philosophy of Education*, let us first examine the issue underlying the structure of thinking that drives domestic education and pedagogy in their search for given alternatives from overseas.

As is well known, this structure of thinking is not unique to pedagogy. According to Masao Maruyama[6], the same tendency can be found across Japanese research and thought. Generally speaking, Japanese academics have imported Western ideas and thoughts without regard to their inherent historical structures and premises, and have focused only on independent fragments of them (for example, Rousseau's concept, Hegel's dialectic, Dewey's school system and so on), with this continuous influx of fragments occurring without profound dialogue or examination of their roles and meanings in the context of Japan's past and current situation. Put differently, Japanese academia's encounter with Western research and thought has not been a dialogue or confrontation with the Other, but rather a non-confrontational acceptance based on one's own daily life and experience[7]. Thus, Japanese research and thought have never been able to form a historical core or pivot, through which they could position themselves

[6] M. Maruyama, *Nihon no Shisou* (Japanese Thoughts), Iwanami Shoten, 1961, p. 7 and p.14.
[7] J. Karaki, *Shinban Gendaishi e no Kokoromi* (An Attempt to the Contemporary History: New Edition), Chikuma Shobou, 1963, p. 236.

historically in relation to foreign research and thought[8].

Maruyama notes that the biggest danger brought about by this structure of thinking is the lack of a sense of the Other, the alien outside of the known. The 'sparsity of attitude in confronting what is completely different from oneself' creates a certain type of 'tolerance' in accepting any type of foreign research and thought[9]. However Maruyama notes that such 'tolerance' brings about an 'easy joining' of the 'internal' (the known) and the 'external' (the Other), and forms a timeless and borderless world of thinking in which one sees and thinks always and everywhere based on one's own daily life and experience, and therefore one never encounters or confronts the Other[10]. There are no discontinuities, leaps or qualitative transformations in this world of thinking, and there are no deep conversations with or confrontations of the Other. Even with new systems, methodologies or concepts being continuously introduced from overseas, the structure of 'internally' oriented closed thinking remains largely unchanged. This results in what appears to be a constant, passionate struggle of alternatives, but is actually a state in which there is no change; that is, no human transformation nor social transformation to speak of.

2. Alternative Orientations in *Studies in the Philosophy of Education*

In this section, we discuss how the Philosophy of Education Society of Japan has addressed issues surrounding the style of its own thinking.

(1) Initiative

The first appearance of reflective discussions on the Society's own research style was in the special issue of Volume 12 (1965), entitled 'Kyouiku no Kitei toshite no Ningenkan' (Viewpoints of Human Being as the Basis of Education).

According to Sosuke Hara[11], a contributor to this special issue, modern educational thought has asserted the emancipation of sensibility via intuitionism that could break out of the closed language-centric system (logo-centrism) so that education could maintain a 'transformative effect', as well as an orientation towards change. However, underneath

[8] Cit. Maruyama.
[9] Ibid., p.16.
[10] Ibid.
[11] S. Hara, "Ningen Henkaku to Kansei: Kindai Shimin Shakai Seiritsuki ni okeru Kyouiku no Kadai to Houhou kara" (Human Reform and Aesthesia (Sensibility): an Examination of Educational Issues and Methods at the time of Founding a Modern Citizen Society), *Studies in the Philosophy of Education*, Vol. 12, 1965, pp.28-43.

this simple dichotomy between intuitionism and language-centrism/logo-centrism lurks the spectre of all education causing simple 'assimilation' to existing societies. Only by escaping this dichotomy would actually occur a breakthrough leading to a 'transformative effect' in education.

Hara was a pioneer on this topic. It is not until the end of the 1980s that discussions on this kind of dichotomy became prominent in the Philosophy of Education Society of Japan.

(2) Moving with Alternative Movements in Society

At the beginning of the 1970s, the Philosophy of Education Society of Japan began to question its own research style[12]. Initial reflections were strongly influenced by drastic social changes, such as accelerated progress in science and technology, industrialisation, high-level economic growth, internationalisation and a shift towards a society of lifelong learning.

The series of self-reflections by the Society at that time uncritically condemned school education and educational administration for the purpose of industrialisation, and alternatively elevated and promoted pedagogy with the goal of 'human' emancipation from industrialization. This was an overly naïve dichotomy politically, as is well known today[13]. This dichotomy failed to take into account the fact that some aspects of industrialization have contributed to safe cultural 'human' life and that 'human' itself is a concept that is both context-dependent and political[14].

This dichotomy in the Society's thinking at that time presumed the institutionalisation of the modern society to be 'external to pedagogy' and criticism of institutionalisation to be 'inside (or internal to) pedagogy', and then attempted to mediate or sublate the 'external' and the 'internal', while making no attempt to understand a complex and complicated reality. This is, as was noted by Tsunemi Tanaka, no more than a discourse on 'the union of institutionalisation and criticism of institutionalisation; at first glance these appear to be in conflict, but are actually complementary and unified'[15]. In light of

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[12] See symposium in *Studies in the Philosophy of Education*, Vol. 29 (1974), subject studies in Vol. 47 (1983) and symposium in Vol. 49 (1984).

[13] M. Okabe et al., "Kyouin Yousei ni taisuru Kyouiku Tetsugaku no Shikou Style no Hensen" (Thinking Styles of Educational Philosophers Engaged in Teacher Training: A Historical Review), *Studies in the Philosophy of Education*, Vol. 100, 2009, p.90.

[14] M. Okabe, "Ronsou no Topos toshite no 'Ningen'" ('Human Being' as a Controversial Topos), *Studies in the Philosophy of Education*, 100S Special Supplementary Issue, 2009, pp. 312-328.

[15] T. Tanaka, "Kyouiku Kankei no Rekishiteki Seisei to Saikousei: System to Sougosei" (The Historical Generation and Reconstruction of Educational Relationships: Systems and Mutuality), *Kindai Kyouiku Shisou wo Yominaosu*,

the fact that this discourse itself has efficiently promulgated institutionalisation since the advent of the modern era, the series of self-reflections by the Philosophy of Education Society of Japan has led to a certain orientation towards change, but in actuality was perhaps complicit in maintaining the existing society. It was not said to be an alternative orientation and thinking in itself.

(3) Beyond the Dichotomy

This dichotomy in thinking finally became a central focus of self-reflection by the Society in the 1980s. In this reflection, concepts and principles assumed to be self-evident in post-war educational philosophy in Japan became the subjects of critical scrutiny.

Tsunemi Tanaka, for instance, noted that it may now be extremely difficult to reach a consensus on what constitutes a 'mature adult'[16]. Yasuo Imai noted that education 'for children' has not necessarily turned out according to the projections of educators, and has sometimes conversely given way to the pathological suppression of children[17]. Akio Miyadera claimed that no universal principles of education now exist, and we must constantly examine their dependence on their contexts of use[18]. Satoji Yano proposes that we treat the subject of learning/education not as an entity, but rather as a complex communication system (or relationship) that flows in a diverse fashion[19].

Common to these four researchers' thinking is a concern that criticism of modern education and pedagogy does not simply devolve into anti-modernism. They were very much aware that the supporting foundations for criticism of modernity are fully contained within modernity itself; hence it is important to criticize modernity even as we inherit it[20]. This style of thinking does not model substantially the 'external' (and the 'internal') in order to drive domestic education and pedagogy in their search for alternatives from the 'external' like overseas or outside of modernity.

S. Hara et al. eds., Shinyousha, 1999, p.195.

[16] T. Tanaka, "Otona no Seijuku to Isedaikan Sougo Kisei" (Adult Maturation and Mutual Regulation between Generations), *Studies in the Philosophy of Education*, Vol. 61, 1990, pp. 6-7.

[17] Y. Imai, "Filter/Jiko Katsudou/Kaisou: Mollenhauer 'Wasurerareta Renkan' no Yohaku ni" (Filter, Self-activity and Retrospection: Mollenhauer; In the Margins of *Vergessene Zusammenhänge*), *Studies in the Philosophy of Education*, Vol. 61, 1990, p. 13.

[18] A. Miyadera, "Kyouiku no Gourishugiteki Rikai towa Nani ka" (The Meaning of Rationalistic Interpretation of Education), *Studies in the Philosophy of Education*, Vol. 63, 1991, p. 7.

[19] S. Yano, "Gouri Shugi to Higouri Shugi no Nikou Tairitsu wo Koete: Asobi no Ronrigaku to Kindai Gourishugi" (Transcending the Dualistic Opposition of Rationalism and Irrationalism: the Logic of Play and the Modern Rationalism), *Studies in the Philosophy of Education*, Vol. 63, 1991, p.14.

[20] Y. Masubuchi, et al., "Kenkyuu Tougi ni Kansuru Soukatsuteki Houkoku" (Summary Report on the Symposium), *Studies in the Philosophy of Education*, Vol. 81, 2000, p. 18.

In this style of thinking, there are certainly no preformed consensus or substantive entities. There is also no possible way of setting predetermined goals, processes or plans in education and pedagogy. Moreover, languages as media are constantly being revised. In such a case, it is critical for researchers to be aware not only of the historicity of thoughts as objects of one's research, but also of one's own historicity as a researcher and that of the languages one uses. Specifically, it is important that 'each researcher [creates] a map of thoughts in which one's theoretical research is positioned', 'self-consciously forms a framework for organizing, understanding and evaluating the process of scholarly development', and plans and conducts unique, original research for the future of educational philosophy in accordance with this map and framework[21].

Conclusion

The proposal to create a map and framework for researchers to use in positioning and evaluating their own work is perhaps a response by educational philosophy to address the problem of a lack of historical core or pivot in Japanese research and thought, as was posited by Masao Maruyama. The problem, as suggested by Maruyama, is that the biggest and most fundamental danger is the lack of a sense of the Other. In actuality, the Philosophy of Education Society of Japan has already begun work on this problem in recent years. This work includes discussions on 'public sphere' and 'pathos' that go beyond into the Other[22]. As noted by Satoshi Tanaka, 'the potential to go beyond monologues and to resist neoliberalism can be found within the knowledge of pathos'[23]. If this is so, discussions on public sphere would be ontologically supported by the knowledge of pathos, and the knowledge of pathos would reflect itself within discussions on public sphere. They are just in a relationship with each other, neither too close to nor too distant from one another.

What must be kept in mind is that the knowledge of pathos as a form of alternative thinking certainly points towards the Other, but that this is extremely different from substantially modelling the 'external' and assimilating the 'external' into the 'internal'.

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[21] S. Yano, "Kyouiku Tetsugaku no Mirai" (The Future of the Philosophy of Education), *Studies in the Philosophy of Education*, Vol. 73, 1996, p. 44.

[22] For more information on discussions of public sphere, see subject studies in *Studies of the Philosophy of Education*, Vol. 83 (2001) and symposium in Vol. 101 (2010) and Vol. 111 (2015) of the same. For more information on discussions of pathos, see Thematic research in Vol. 109 (2014).

[23] S. Tanaka, et al., "Kyouiku Jissen to Kyouiku Tetsugaku: Kore made no Kyouiku Tetsugaku, Kore kara no Kyouikugaku" (Summary Report on the Thematic Research: Educational Practice and Philosophy of Education), *Studies in the Philosophy of Education*, Vol. 109, 2014, p. 52.

With the knowledge of pathos one gazes on the Other, reaches out to it, resonates with its emotions and actions, and in doing so, both the self and the Other 'turn towards their own inherent and intrinsic lives'[24]. This thinking is not modelled on the 'external' even though it stares off and beyond into the Other, evokes a sense of the Other, and invites us to the knowledge of pathos. We can then pursue alternatives. Our pedagogical desire for an alternative orientation will avoid the desire for enlightenment that attempts to assimilate and incorporate the Other, and will perhaps become a wish or a prayer for the Other to continue to exist as it is.

In any case, our thinking no longer involves a simple dichotomy between the 'external' and the 'internal'. The position where we research educational philosophy here and now is comprised and textured by multi-dimensional, varied potentialities of pasts, presents and futures that are not necessarily on one's own daily life and experience, while resonating with the Other. We are so open that we can freely envisage potentialities of our research positions. That is why the political positioning of our thinking should be continually questioned and examined.

[24] Ibid, p. 53.

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First Cry and Dying Breath:
The Door to Transcendence in Education

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Abstract

This paper aims to present a single view on the best way to understand the problem of transcendence in education by adopting a standpoint that regards "the human practice of care for life" as the essence of education. Taking education as "the practice of care for life," there exist two poles in life from which the imputation of its basis and significance must, in principle, depart and to which it must return. Namely, these are the moments at which each of us, as human beings, are born and then die, respectively, because they are events that transcend our intentions and plans. This paper focuses on the first cry of a newly born baby and the final breath that accompanies our dying moment, unraveling issues that are involved with the problem of transcendence in education. To be precise, the discussion is advanced with reference to the possibilities of life when the lessons of knowledge and the guidance of technology have yet to be established and or when assistance and support are no longer possible, either physically or psychologically. Education as "the practice of care for life" is, at its root, not an intentional or planned desire that aims at the realization of a good life as an alternative to the here and now. Education, in principle, rather than such a "desire" is something that manifests as a "response" to the summons of a life that is born and passes away in the here and now, before our very eyes. Education is our "prayer" of limitless devotion at the prospect of a life of hardships that has transcended our intentions and plans. Transcendence in education is exclusive to the here and now; it is lived in and through the here and now.

Keywords

transcendence, baby's first cry, the moment of death, the practice of care for life, education as prayer

On a moonlit night, a button / was left on the strand line. /
I picked it up: that it might be useful / hardly occurred to me. /
Somehow I couldn't bear to throw it away; / I tucked it into my sleeve. /
On a moonlit night, a button / was dropped on the strand line. /
I picked it up: that it might be useful /hardly occurred to me. /
I couldn't throw it at the moon; / I couldn't throw it at the waves. /
I tucked it into my sleeve. /
On a moonlit night, the button I picked up /shook me to the fingerends, shook me to the heart. /
On a moonlit night, the button I picked up: / how could I throw it away?

Chūya Nakahara, "Beach on a Moonlit Night"
(trans. Mackintosh and Sugiyama)[1]

1. The "here and now"

To begin, I would like to briefly clarify my own understanding of "an orientation toward alternatives that are not possibilities in the here and now," which is positioned as a starting point for the discussion in this symposium. Later, I will proceed to the problem of "transcendence," which has been marked out to advance the discussion.

When I say "alternatives that are not possibilities in the here and now," the "here and now" to which I refer is not some given present moment or particular location. Rather, it could be a viewpoint reflexively and selectively adopted in view of the ongoing educational event. By relying on this viewpoint, we consider an instance of education in order to imbue it with meaning. While the way in which we perceive education in the here and now varies depending on these acts of reflection and selection, at the same time, envisioned and perceived in each of these acts is an instance of education located in some "beyond" that is *not* the here and now, which could also be called a "beyond" in relation to educational possibilities in the here and now.

[1] This poem was famously composed immediately after the death of Chūya's elder son, Fumiya, at the age of two. At that time, the poet was still reeling from the mental anguish brought on by his lingering grief. A button washed on a beach by a wave catches the narrator's eye by chance in "Beach on a Moonlit Night." This button becomes an object of obsession that the narrator simply cannot toss away. Viewing the poem in terms of the thesis put forward in this essay, a perfectly ordinary button encountered on a beach (representing a "here and now"), simply by virtue of its overwhelmingly commonplace and nondescript element, opens the door to the transcendence of involvement with the lost Fumiya. It is simply by the virtue of Chūya's way of being in the "here and now," of not being able to toss away the button, that the door to what lies "beyond" the "here and now" is opened and the image of Fumiya, lost forever to the "here and now," can nevertheless be touched in the "here and now."

It is my belief that this "beyond" is not some "next stage" indicated on the basis of some fundamental prospective outlook related to an overall process of change and transition, such as is found in human development theory or progressive views of history related to social and humanistic values. This "beyond" is not a "here and now" of a decisively different character in response to the continuous and gradual changes and transitions similar to progress or development; it is always something other than what lies next to the "here and now" in either time or space. The academic study of education, while devoting its inquisitive gaze to the pursuits of teaching/cultivating and learning/growing in the "here and now," has attempted to pursue the very wellsprings of the forces that fundamentally drive such changes and transitions in the possibilities for human life. Through this effort, it has likely honed its sensibility to a "beyond" after the "here and now" that is reached by breaking through the gradual standards of what lies "next" in both time and space.

However, I am somewhat hesitant to connect the problem of the involvement between such education and the "beyond" directly with a discussion on a "desire" that yearns for a "different kind" of education. This is because I am concerned that the idea of a "different kind" could be perceived as "a new situation that has dismissed pursuits in the here and now." This concern is linked with the faint but not easily dispelled feeling of discomfort over the fact that when I rely on this way of perceiving "difference," the "beyond" in education also comes to be positioned as an object for research with visible and concrete form, the significance and challenges of which are then discussed critically as a matter of course. The feeling of discomfort, for me, seems to have a close relationship with the problem of determining the ideal way to think about "transcendence" in the context of particular educational events.

Keeping in mind this understanding with regard to "alternatives to the here and now," I describe some of my own narrow insights on a view that finds the transcendent in education and the ways it is given significance.

2. Education as "the practice of care for life"

There are likely a variety of standpoints with regard to where we should look to find the core of an educational event. Our pursuits in contemporary society increasingly strengthen the tendency to functionally differentiate, with mutual interrelations as a standard of social utility and economic efficiency. Education, too, is understood, analyzed, and explained from such a perspective of utility and efficiency as a social function that is exercised in constant relation to various other social phenomena. Under such

circumstances, it is not easy to question what education is without any restrictions as to its primal character or wholeness, that is, without interrogating it from the standpoint of educational philosophy. As soon as you begin to answer what education is in the first place, the varied series of phenomena therein labelled as "education," from whatever perspective or standard, are discerned at that moment in relation to various other social phenomena that exist in close proximity; this directly and certainly leads to the critique on whether these phenomena can also be defined as "education" in the contemporary academic study of education.

I certainly cannot deny the current validity or significance of such a critique for the study of educational philosophy. Nevertheless, in the present paper, given that I seek a thorough and rigorous critical redefinition of the concept of "education" and am aware of being possibly accused of bias in terms of the refinement of my themes and the roughness of the texture of my polemics, I would like to propose, somewhat audaciously, a consideration along the following lines. I wish to posit that education is, in its most straightforward and essential sense, "the human practice of care for life." Here, "life"[2] refers to the complete whole of our lived existence as humans, founded through a perspective that fully comprises the dimension of our own lives and lifestyles[3] as well as life in its biological, social, historical, and even cultural, moral, and religious modes. Similarly, by "care," I refer to the whole body of human pursuits fully comprising the ways in which we express solicitude and outreach to the lives of others. In this sense, care can be expressed in a variety of activities: from protection, upbringing, tuition, and guidance to assistance and cooperation, encouragement and sympathy, or even nursing and palliative care.

Posited thusly as "the practice of care for life," it is evident that education is a pursuit that may take place both inside or outside home or school and, in principle, over an entire

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[2] As distinct senses for the term *inochi* ("life"), the *Nihon Kokugo Daijiten* cites terms such as *seimei* ("life"), *jumyō* ("lifespan"), *shōgai* ("lifetime"), *isshō* ("whole life"), *unmei* ("destiny"), *tenmei* ("fate"), *yuiitsu no tanomi* ("the last recourse"), *sonomono dokutoku no yosa* ("a unique good in itself"), and *shinzui* ("essential core"), and traces the etymology of the term from roots that include *i-no-uchi* ("the substance of breath") and *iki-no-uchi* ("the substance of being alive"), and *inochi* (in the senses of "the substance of spirit," "breath-route," "breath-force," and "life-spirit"). Although I have not been able to do so in the present essay, should the opportunity arise, I would also like to attempt a consideration that follows up the threads offered by these various senses and etymologies.

[3] As a point of departure for the humanistic questions related to the various dimensions of meaning surrounding the word "life" (*inochi*), Shizuteru Ueda offers a distinctive discussion of the structure of the "self-awareness of 'living' implicit within the three closely related words *seimei*, *sei*, and *inochi*" (1991: 47) and "the associations among the three qualities of living, namely *seimei*, *sei*, and *inochi*" (1998: 19). While I cannot, in this paper, enter into a detailed explanation of the features of Ueda's understanding of "life" (*inochi*), I acknowledge that my conceptualization of the idea in this essay has been inspired, in part, by Ueda's discussion. Although Manabu MURASE's "life studies" (Murase 1991, 1995) can also be cited as another inspired discussion, I will leave consideration of Murase's views to another time.

lifetime. The basis of this notional supposition is constituted by a view of "life" that considers that even as we, as humans, are absolutely unique entities, the events of our lives over the course of our lifetimes form our mutual solicitude and outreach for each other. That is to say, life, while taking individually separate forms, through the entire process of its unfolding, can be understood as being lived out together in a relation of caring and being cared for by each other.

3. A view of education and the poles that confer meaning

When we understand the essence of education as "the practice of care for life," what we may call life's two poles become manifest. These poles are two points from which how we see the pursuits of education that are lived out in daily life and how we give them meaning repeatedly depart, both in principle and in a symbolic manner, and to which these perspectives always return. In other words, these two poles are the moments of our birth and death as individual human beings.

Witnessing the moment a baby vocalizes its first cry in the world or the moment someone draws their dying breath invokes powerful, irrepressible emotions in people—particularly immediate family members and other loved ones—and makes them deeply aware of the fact that life fundamentally comes into being and disappears in every event and that it is education that encourages our involvement with such matters.[4]

The moments of birth and death represent life events at their most extreme. They are the points by which the pursuit of education as "the practice of care for life" is first encouraged and to which it finally gets. Further, the significance of these extremes is that life events, in principle, transcend all of our intentions and plans.

Although we have the freedom to decide when to have a child, we do not choose to give birth to a specific child and no other; similarly, this limitation extends to the child as well, who is born to be a specific child and no other. In addition, although we can make plans to provide long-term nursing care for elderly parents by fully utilizing existing information and knowledge, we cannot choose when the final day will come. In the face of birth and death, we unconsciously enter into the most primordial and fundamental ways of practicing "care for life," transcending the dimensions of intentional involvement

[4] Accounts bearing witness to the events of birth and death are too numerous to mention. Here, it will suffice to quote the following passage by Itsurō Yamanouchi, who describes the moment of a baby's first cry from the unique perspective of a pediatrician: "Then, with the final contraction, as though squeezed out, the entire body emerges. For an instant, it grabs at the empty air. It struggles, spreading its arms wide. Frowning, sobbing, it sucks in a big breath … Here is the first breath. In the next instant, it is expelled with a strong wail. The child is born. Now it breathes. Now it lives!" (Yamanouchi 1986:1).

and deliberate engagement. To a newborn child, we teach neither letters nor numbers. We are determined simply to shower it with overflowing love, to cradle the child and whisper to it without care as to whether or not our words are heeded. Similarly, an elderly parent who has just passed away will neither respond nor nod when we speak to them. We may repeatedly attempt to speak to them, half-knowing that no answer will ever come—that our nods will not be returned. When these attempts finally and unavoidably disappear into the void, we cannot but stand still at the bedside, bowing our heads in the company of our overwhelming grief. Such are the possibilities for "the practice of care for life" at the moments of birth and death and the possibilities for "a life that cares and is cared for" that appear therein. In the context of this paper, these moments are the poles for how "education" is viewed and conferred with significance.

This position taken by the present paper, which regards "the human practice of care for life" to be the essence of education, thus presents a renewed perspective by focusing on life in terms of its extreme moments of birth and death. The paper is an attempt to discover the primordial and fundamental character of education, especially in the possibilities of care at these extremes of life. If we can, for the moment, understand the concept of "desire" in the context of the "pedagogical desire" (that has been raised as a topic for discussion) to be an emotional dynamic that attempts to engage with an object in an intentional or planned fashion so as to render the involvement with the object desirable to oneself and that attempts to realize or achieve some change in the object commensurate with the said intention or plan, it would be extremely difficult to call the pursuit of education as "the practice of care for life" a form of "desire."

While it is, after all, impossible for us to deliberately select or intentionally contemplate with regard to births and deaths in this world, life is even still inevitably engendered through us: it motivates us and propels us toward this "care." If we pay attention as we are shot through with irresistible torment, it is life that engages and involves us. In this way, when we understand the life we encounter in the context of "the practice of care for life," education, more than "desire," is likely rather a "response to life" in the form that implicitly follows on from the requests that emanate from the respective events of life themselves. Furthermore, it could be argued that this "response," just as conceivably as for the aforementioned embrace of the newborn child or attempt to speak to a parent, who has just passed away, could keep being extended without any concern as to whether the life we seek can acknowledge or reply to our follow-on response. In this sense, education as "the practice of care for life" is also a "prayer to life." I say "prayer" because the aim is not to acquire something from the object or to fulfill something in the object but to dedicate ourselves entirely to the object without the expectation of return.

4. The "here and now" and transcendence at the moments of birth and death

The pursuit of education as "the practice of care for life" holds the point in time when tuition and guidance (whether of knowledge or technique) have yet to be established and that when help and support (either physical or emotional) are no longer possible as the two polar extremes of life in which we are involved and engaged. By repositioning the ways in which we view and give meaning to education toward the beginning and end of such life manifestations, it will be possible for the door to what lies "beyond" the "here and now" to be opened in the pursuit of education.

Nevertheless, the births and deaths of our loved ones are certainly also life events in the "here and now" in that they take place in this world. In that sense, even when faced with such life extremes, we can still speak of education as "the practice of care for life" in the "here and now" in each case. At the same time, however, does this not stir our thoughts about the situation of life before birth and the abode of life after death?[5] While we see birth as the beginning of life, the view that apprehends this as the beginning considers birth as a beginning that is, at the same time, the end of something. While we see death as the end of life, the view that apprehends this as an ending considers death as an ending that is, at the same time, the beginning of something new. As we embrace an infant as though to wrap it up in the instant after its first cry and as we stroke the withered hand of a loved one who has just breathed her final breath as though in thanks, it is through the life events of birth and death in the "here and now" that we think of endings and beginnings of "the practice of care for life" somewhere "beyond" the "here and now."

The events of birth and death, even though they take place in the "here and now," also invite and open us to a world that transcends the "here and now"—toward our involvement "beyond" the "here and now." From this paper's standpoint, when education is said to have turned its gaze upon and become devoted to "different" and better life possibilities not found in the "here and now," these possibilities are not present as a reality in some separate space isolated from the "here and now." Education as the "practice of care for life" found along the journey of life, with its two poles of birth and death, is a testament to the fact that our lives, simply by virtue of their pursuit in the "here and now,"

[5] Discussions relevant to this thesis are those of Shūji Wada (1995, 2002), whose key concept of "the courage to educate" derives from a spirited engagement with the difficult challenge of making "a thorough reflection of postwar education," which he undertakes with the intention of restoring trust and hope in modern education. Wada suggests that what inspires us with the "courage to educate" by directing us from the wellspring of its existence toward education that looks beyond nihilism is "solidarity with and responsibility to unborn children and the dead" (Wada 2002: 97).

are secretly yet certainly in contact with an everlasting moment that lies "beyond" the "here and now."

Transcendence in education must truly be said to lie in the "here and now" and, moreover, to be lived through the "here and now."[6]

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[6] In connection with my provisional conclusion for this discussion, I would like to cite the research conducted by Kei Hachiya, who discusses "transcendence in education" from a unique perspective and conceptual framework (Hachiya 1983, 1985). Through his learnings with the educational philosopher Motomori Kimura, a member of the Kyoto School, Hachiya notes that to regard human beings as technologically proficient beings who strive to live better by applying themselves to their environment is also to regard the basis of education, in the broadest sense, as the transmission of technology. He argues that this world of technology is supported by a transcendent world within which it is structurally encompassed; he further holds that "for human beings to live in the world of technology is for them to also have a world of transcendence" (Hachiya 1983:34).

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Ontologia of Kairos:

Reflexion on Education and Transcendence

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Abstract

The aim of this Article is to distinguish the transcendence from "Idol" worship, to describe *alternative as a pedagogical desire* based on the premise to transcendence. *Pedagogical desire* is in the conflation state that *willing to reform better* activity in accordance with ordinal meanings and values and each one *trying to live a better life* specifically and singularily. Transcendence that is disconnected from the "Idol" worship is the *call of conscience*, the prototype of it is shown in Kairos of St. Paul. So the commitment to Kairos of St. Paul is the oldest representation of the thought of *trying to live a better life*. The Kairos is to enable to imitate the essential of education as activity responding to the "call of conscience". *Taisho Shin Kyouiku* (Tisho New Education Movement in modern Japan) as the historical alternative will be able to conceive as the activity supported in the responding to the "call of conscience", that is, as the thought of *trying to live a better life*.

1. Activity and Ideas

Implicit references to transcendence

Pedagogy, as a discipline, has repeatedly sought to improve itself, or, to create a better method of education. Further, the vector for this improvement has often been associated with faith in God's transcendence as an Absolute other (the infinite inherent distance from man). In other words, in envisioning a better education, what is important is the power of faith that people generally have, or connecting the active ability to remake reality with the receptive ability to face "transcendence" (listening to and follow "revelations").

For example, Shuji Wada's "authority" is essential for improving education and is supported by "faith." Wada said in 1963 that education is the process of "molding of humans," so they may become "complete human beings." Further, its maxim is "ultimate

reality," that is, "God," and when God appears as "ultimate You," a person becomes "Me" and accepts this "God." The source of "authority" in education is the acceptance of this "God", or "faith," and learning is supported by the behavior of "a believer who stands before God in search of the archetype of this authority" (Wada 1963: 22–3).

For example, the "Ontological Security" (Geborgenheit) of Otto Friedrich Bollnow is an essential element of superior education and is the "grace" of God (Gnade). Bollnow says, "The conviction that is fundamentally protected even in all hardships, being at peace, is based on a person's faith (Gläubigkeit) which comes to man through grace, rather than possessing it." It is the theology that speaks of "grace" and philosophy that speaks of faith. "Faith" is "the essential human state that is purely and inherently equipped" (Bollnow NG: 66, 65). In other words, talking about philosophy without talking about God (as a reference term) is a deviation from the nature of philosophy. This philosophy can be called "pedagogy."

Given that the origin of modern educational thought—pedagogy—was based on Christian thought, we can consider that the reference to the transcendence of God in the context of "better" education, is conventional. This tradition goes back to Augustine. In his book *Of True Religion*, which was probably written around 390 AD, Augustine stated that "Philosophia is not inconsistent with religio" (AO, DVR: 5, 8). Needless to say, this "religio," or religion, is a reference to Christianity.

Criticism of "idol" worship

However, this "alternative as a pedagogical desire" is in jeopardy as long as it is spoken of in association with so-called “transcendence.” The “transcendence” could lead to "idol" (Idole) worship, as once discussed by Friedrich Nietzsche, and argued in recent years by Jean-Luc Marion (Marion 2010).

“Idol” worship in religion means that the values (norms) of the founders of the religion or the doctrines are worshipped as God. In a broader interpretation, it defines virtue, country, race, truth, authority, usefulness, ability, etc., as being the most significant values (Canon), and puts "faith" in them for self-interest. "Canon," for example, in the case of Christianity, is the Apostle's Creed (Credo/Symbolum Apostolicum) created in the 4th century as the state religion of Rome, and "Meritocracy" or Japanese “Nouryokushugi”(ability/capacity oriented-ness) maybe one in the present day. Such "idol" worship is fundamentally a violent self-contradiction. This is because "idol" worship is the justification of established meaning and values that overlooks the specific and individual call, as is reconfirmed later.

However, my aim is not to exclude transcendence from education but to place

original transcendence in education while excluding "idol" worship. To do so, I first divide the state of better existence into two kinds. The first is the activity of bringing improvements in humans and societies according to the predetermined "objectives or ideals," which have become a determined *signifié* with assigned meanings and values. The other is the desire to try to "live better" with each individual's specific "telos," to which no meaning or significance is attached: in other words, nothing more than a *significant* that is constantly questioned. Both are elements that make existence "better," but at least the "better" in the latter may not lead to "idol" worship. We will elaborate on it further in the subsequent sections.

Better reformation

"Better reformation," whether for tools or people, is an artificial operation to surpass the existing limits. It has been formerly embodied in Plato's and Plotinus' "Eros," and in modern technology as Bergson's "Homo faber". The concept of "molding humans" (*Bildung*, cultivation) in pedagogy, and "ability formation" and "capacity development" in modern education theory both comprise this artificial operation. Even if such an artificial operation speaks of transcendence, it might be popularly comprised of the intention, expectation, significance, and value of people.

In modern society, this "better reformation" activity seems to have been accelerated not only by the development of technology but also due to the social structure. This is because the chief modern social structure is functional distribution, in which the distribution of status and fortune is determined mostly through ability and achievement, and the standard of distribution has almost been reduced to one's "usefulness." This usefulness is a value that cannot easily be ignored within the context of globalization, or the economic competition between individuals, organizations, and nations that is intensified through networks on a global scale.

Amidst this emphasis on usefulness, our abilities/capacities, as well as various life activities, are reduced to the means to some other ends, which is to say, objects for manipulation. For example, childbirth is already being manipulated by reproductive technology—the selection of superior sperm, performing in vitro fertilization, reverse calculation of conception date from the time of birth, and artificial insemination. This is to avoid giving birth to children with disabilities, avoid disadvantages of being born between January 1st and April 1st in the Japanese fiscal system, and prevent job loss. This is not limited to medical procedures, as various forms of technology are entwining in complex manners worldwide, creating a "cluster of technology."

"Trying to live better"

The idea of "trying to live better" is often forgotten within this "cluster of technology." We can say that this idea certainly has "telos" but not "purpose/ideal", and not even "significance/value." It is a reflection made only after the twists and turns and is unique to each person. Therefore, this idea, when viewed in its entirety, is a diversified transformation.

This idea will be reflected in what can be summed up in one word as "human potential" in modern educational thought. Some examples are Baruch de Spinoza's "Conatus", Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz's "spirit" (esprit), John Locke's "human perfection", Jean-Jacques Rousseau's "Perfectibility"(perfectibilité), Immanuel Kant's "human nature" (menschlichen Natur), Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's"spirit" (Geist), and Johann Friedrich Herbart's "Pliability" (Bildsamkeit).

I would like to clarify that these ideas, though metaphysical, were originally derived from the concept of "perfection" that early Christianity spoke of. For example, it is "perfection" as Thomas Aquinas defines it in *Summa Theologiae* as when human seeks the "perfection" of God (ST: I, Q. 35,a.2, ad. 3). Further, it dates back to the transcendence of Paul's "Teleios" (τέλειος), or "Jesus Christ" (I Corinthians 13.10 Colossian 1.28). In other words, it is "agape", clearly distinct from "eros".

As seen in the difference between responsibility and blame

The distinction between "better reformation" and "trying to live better" is evident in the difference between "responsibility" and "blame". "Responsibility" is having both the correct legal and commonsensical response from a person's judgment and action. This "responsibility" is the value created by a person's "will/intention," as seen in the pairing of "freedom and responsibility." On the other hand, "blame" does not require a response legally or using common sense, but it is an internal "sense" rising for an ethical response. This "sense" of blaming oneself is the "call of conscience" that we will revisit later. This "sense" is distinguished from "will/intention."

As mentioned earlier, to talk about education while assuming transcendence, I would like to trace the idea of "trying to live better" by returning to the origin of modern educational thought. In other words, I would like to take up the idea of transcendence that early Christianity, especially Paul, spoke of on the notion of Kairos, separate it from "idol" worship, and understand it ontologically. That is, even according to Paul, it deviates from "transcendence" and "faith."

2. Receiving Transcendence and the "Call of Conscience"

Receiving Transcendence

First, let us return to Nietzsche. Was the transcendence of "Jesus" in early Christianity premised on "idol" worship? At first glance, Nietzsche, who advocated "Antichrist," seems to have found idol worship in Jesus' transcendence. Nietzsche says that Christian "faith" (Glaube) is the idea of exchange for self-interest: earning the reward of "forgiveness" and avoiding the punishment of "sin" (KS 6, A: §25, 33), and to have such "faith" abandons "establishing purpose from within [= call of conscience]" and makes one the "mere means" to protect one's existing value, making faith a "throwaway" to defend this value (KS 6, A: §54).

Surprisingly, however, for Nietzsche, such Christian "faith" is not a requirement for the existence of Jesus' transcendence. Nietzsche appreciates the "works" of "Christ" shown by Jesus while acknowledging himself to be an "Antichrist." He states, "In truth, there was only one Christian and he died on the cross... Therefore, original Christianity is... not faith, but works" (KS 6, A: §39). The last expression, "works, not faith," may be a refutation of Paul's "it is faith, not works, that are valued in this world, that justify people", but the two talk on similar lines.

The "works" that Nietzsche finds in "original Christianity" is a person "receiving" the transcendence demonstrated by Jesus. It is the belief in him (credere in eum) that Augustine distinguishes from "believing him" (credere ei) regarding Jesus in *Tractates on the Gospel of John*, although Nietzsche does not mention this (AO, IEvI=1993 (2): 29). According to Arai, “ei” means "him" and an accusative case that means a stationary object, while “eum” means "to him" and is a dative case, which means the direction that the subject is facing (Arai 1997: 304). In my understanding, "to believe Him" is to trust "Him" for good reason, that is related to Augustine's "use" (uti)――"usefulness" (utilitas) ― ― and "believing in Him" is "Me" "receiving" (frui) "his Word" ― ― to "Receive"(fruitio)――(AO, DC: I. 3. 3, 4. 4, 5.5).

A stepping stone toward separating education-based transcendence from "idol" worship ("faith") can be found in this "receiving" transcendence. Here, rather than Nietzsche, we refer to Nancy (Jean-Luc), who elaborates on this "receiving" transcendence. For Nancy, it is the foi, which is distinguished from "faith" (croyance, belief).

Listening to and following the "Call of Conscience" that is "Faith"

Nancy's "faith" is to live anew beyond self-interest as well as the meaning and value

of any kind (Nancy 2005: 120). It does not seek "definite things" like "miracles," "revelations," or "salvations" sought by after Christianity became the state religion of Rome or the "arguments of the existence of God" that the theology of the Middle Ages refined; rather, it is to feel the transcendence and live anew under the "works" through the words and life of Jesus. Therefore, "faith" is equal to "transcending." "Faith, strictly speaking, is that a person is connected to the name of God (which is to say, love), even when God and his love are not exactly present or do not manifest" (Nancy 2005: 221).

Nancy describes this act of "faith" as "sincere" (fidèle), which is to listen unconditionally to and follow the "call of conscience". In other words, Jesus' transcendence appears only as a "sense" of "calls of conscience," and "faith" is merely listening to and following this "call of conscience." For Nancy, the sense (sens) is what connects people (bind them together), which is clearly distinct from meaning and value, from intention and expectation; and a "call of conscience" is its ultimate state. Nancy said, "Faith is not believing in [God] without evidence, not believing beyond the evidence. It is the work (acte) of a sincere person, and this work is the testimony of the conscience within their heart"(Nancy 2005: 221).

The Ethical Sense of a "Call of Conscience"

In other words, this "call of conscience" is a sense of ethics. That is, it is not the possibility of neutral and universal meanings and values that the general public can choose from, but the fact that comes and is understood only when "I" is against "You." Moreover, once it comes and is understood, no matter how the times change, the sense of ethics remains in the mind. This is because only listening to and following the sense of ethics fulfills a person's time. In other words, the existence of the self and the world can only be affirmed not by rationality but by emotion. That is, the "call of conscience" comes and is understood only in this world or situation, but persists or sustains beyond them.

This "call of conscience" is also the basis for objective rationality, which is extrinsic. This is because life will be fulfilled through listening to and following the "call of conscience," and as part of that fulfillment or "virtue," people will be able to sacrifice without grudging, and strive, concentrate, and exceed themselves in their schools or workplaces to realize their future potential. Effort, whether in sports, commercial activities, or academia, can be described using any number of common and relative meanings and values, but for the person in question, it is peculiar, unique, and irreplaceable. In other words, "self-overcoming" and "self-transcendence" occur when a person listens to the "call of conscience" and follows it.

Receiving in the "Nearness" of "Distance"

In order to listen to and follow these "calls of conscience," one would have to have already felt, if faintly, "separation" from their transcendent. In other words, the opposite and common dimension (continuity) of the transcendent—people will have to be opened, as the "call" will not be audible otherwise. In other words, finite people adhere to meaning and values listening to and following the "call" of the infinite God that transcends them to connect a human—already in the "nearness" of the primordial "distance" from the transcendent—and the transcendent while being far separated.

This transcendent-human connection is similar to the human-to-human connection. Indeed, unlike the transcendent-human case, the human-to-human live together in meaning and value, but it is similar to the case of the transcendent-human, as it originates fundamentally from "distance" and "nearness." Furthermore, the fundamental trigger of the "nearness" is not the similarity of form but the similarity of feelings. Without the overlap of this desire, the word "believing" becomes extremely sorrowful. In other words, it is a word that refers to the "broken heart." In any case, the reason that people care about others as if they were themselves may be that they find obedience to the "call of conscience" in others. It is a person's listening to and following their "call of conscience"—even if sometimes—that resonates with that of others.

Incidentally, this "nearness" of "distance" may overlap with the "closeness" (Nähe) of Heidegger. For Heidegger, "nearness" of person-to-person assumes that the people are "far apart, that is, far separated as the earth and the heavens, where God and man are involved." (GA. 12, WsS: 199). "Nearness" is that people, like God and man, or man and man, who are fundamentally separated from each other, try to connect to each other in that "distance." Moreover, "nearness" as this "distance" is also the true form of "existence" (Sein) that Heidegger says, that is, the essence or nature of "co-existence" (Mit-sein) (SZ: 114).

Connection of men, through the "call of conscience"

Laying such obedience to the "calls of conscience" as the foundation of talking about education that assumes transcendence is not to have an education based on mystical experiences such as "revelations" and "conversions" or new religious values models, and make it a ground for criticizing education. Listening to and following the "call of conscience," while giving truth to the deep and rich implications of Christian thought, is the shelving of "faith," and is an element of "emotion" that probably everyone experiences. For example, the word "heart" in everyday expressions such as "wholehearted" and "from the heart" may, though not always, be connected to this "call

of conscience."

The noteworthy point here is that such a "call of conscience" can be heard only by actually being with other people and by facing "You"—moreover coming from a place that transcends "You." The fact that this "call of conscience" comes in confrontation with man is also found in an ontological understanding of the "Kairos" of early Christianity. Subsequently, we will have seen that "Kairos" is the oldest word that expresses the idea of "living better."

3. From the Ontology of Kairos

Time of the Ontological Kairos

The term "kairos" (καιρός) used here is St. Paul's concept of time in the New Testament, which is distinguished from "Chronos" (χρόνος). Chronos is the quantitative time that flows and can be measured, while Kairos is a qualitative time ("now") for "I" to act and determine. In the book of Romans, Paul calls Kairos "now," and it is mentioned as "now is the time that has already come, [is time] for you to wake out of sleep" (ὥρα ἤδη ὑμᾶς ἐξ ὕρνου ἐγερθῆναι [hora ede hymas ex hypnou egerthenai]) (Roman 13.11). The theologian Paul Tillich describes it as "the time to start taking important action" (Tillich 1967; 8: 1). The difference between Kairos and Chronos is clearly shown in the difference between how the idea of "now" is perceived. Chronos's "now" is an infinite number of points on the linear chronology of past, present, and future, when various things happen, whereas Kairos's "now" is the particular instance of each person's life, when only one thing can happen. In other words, it is "parousia".

This "parousia," which is the heart of Kairos, has conventionally been given meaning by the "eschatology" (Eschatologia). The concept of "Apocalypse" (the theory that Christ will reappear on earth at the end of history for the final judgment of people) in Christianity refers to Kairos at the "future time" that begins with Christ's "Second Coming" (Parousia), and simultaneously, it has meant the time to "wait" for the "second coming" (see Welborn 2015:12). This apocalyptic concept of Kairos shelves the idea of "time that has already arrived" given before by Paul, and instead, attaches great importance to "waiting" at the time of the "second coming." Kairos as this "long-awaited" time is one in which the heart rejoices with the approach of the "second coming" of Christ. It is the time of breaking the cycle of life and death, so to speak, the time of Pantarei, and moreover, it is time for their lives to shine beyond the time dominated by rational purpose. However, during this time, people only see ahead and do not look at "You" before their

eyes.

On the other hand, the ontological concept of Kairos presented by Heidegger leads to transcendence as "faith." This is because Kairos is "here and now when I turn to you." That is the "presence"(parousia) of Jesus man feels, that Jesus is already with him, and "Here and now, I will love you as Jesus does." Heidegger says, "The root of the parousia is said to be long-awaited, but that is completely wrong!" (GA. 60, PrL: 102). Heidegger's interpretation of Kairos is in consonance with Paul's, "Now is the Kairos of salvation" (νῦν καιρὸς εὐρρόsδεκτος [nun kairos euprosdektos]) (Ⅱ Corinth 6.2). Even in *Being and Time*, although he does not refer to it as "love," Heidegger states, "what 'parousia ...' implies as 'presence' (Anwesenheit) is that an entity is living in confrontation with someone in its existence. In other words, existence understands itself in the peculiar time pattern of living 'face-to-face'" (SZ: 25)*.

Kairos of Paul

Indeed, Paul speaks of the time of the Messiah's "Second Coming" in the Book of Romans (Romans 3. 26; 8.18; 11.6), "[I tell you] be transformed by renewing your mind (ἀνακαινώσει [anakainosei]) without conforming to this age (αἰῶνι [aioni]). To prove what is the will of God, good and acceptable and perfect (τέλειον [teleion])" (Roman 12.2). Specifically, it means "loving thy neighbor." As Paul says in the Book of Galatians, "belief works by love" (pístις dι 'ἀγάρης ἐνεργουμένη [pistis di'agapes energoumene]), the purpose of "loving" is the "works" of "faith", that is, its "actualization" (ἐνέργεια [energeia]) (Galatea 5.6).

However, the apocalyptic concept of Kairos would not hold if Paul's theory of Kairos was followed. For example, as Agamben argues in *The Time That Remains* (Agamben 2000=2005: 115), Paul did not mention anything about the future there. When he speaks of the Messiah's "Second Coming" in the Book of Romans, he refers to the

* The relationship between Heidegger and Christianity has been argued in various ways, but it can be considered quite close. Heidegger said in his *Letter on Humanism* (1946), "If a person proudly declares God to be the "highest value," this is a degradation of the essence of God. Thinking while evaluating ... is the greatest blasphemy imaginable against being"(GA. 9, Hum: 349, 351). Further, 20 years later in a 1966 interview with *Spiegel* magazine, Heidegger said, "The only thing we can do is to hope for and prepare for the coming of God." (GA. 16, RZL: 671). This "God" may be the Christian god. Indeed, Heidegger says, "The underlying existence is never God's own rule. The underlying existence is what God needs to be God (Götterung) and is wholly distinct from God")(GA 65, BP: 240. However, Heidegger states that despite being the "most primitive," "God" was "long removed from [thinking]" (GA. 65, BP.: 416). Does this not mean that the "works" of "God" that give life to the creatures are hidden by metaphysical perception? Heidegger also says that "existence is a straightforward transcendent" (SZ: 38), and that it is "transcendence" (Transzendenz) when a person listens to and follows the "call of existence" (SZ: 440. 440). Is this "transcendence" not equal to "belief" through the "works" of "Christ"?

word "Kairos" to involve one's heart with his neighbor in the "nun" (νῦν [nun]); in other words, it means "towards you, here and now." In other words, Paul's time for Kairos is not "after the Day of Judgment," but "towards you, here and now."

Moreover, Paul associates Kairos with "time that has already come" (ὥρα ἤδη [hora ede]) in the Book of Romans. In other words, "towards you, here and now" is connected to "when Jesus has already come." "When everything has come" is Paul's "Day of Salvation" in "The Second Corinthians." That is, "I saved you on the day of salvation" (ἐν ἡμέρᾳ σωτηρίας ἐβοήθησά σοι · [en hemera soterias eboethesa soi]), which is "the day of salvation" (II Corinth 6.2). In other words, the "when everything has come" is the "presence" ("coming") of Jesus which has already occurred. Therefore, the Kairos referred to by Paul is "towards you, here and now" by "remembering the truth" that Jesus has already given, that is, the time for our lives to shine together.

This alternate reading makes it apparent that Paul's Kairos is transcendental and internal. Kairos is "now and here" in the sense that he knows what to do "here and now." In other words, it is inherent in "I". However, it simultaneously transcends the "I" that is "now and here." This is because Kairos is heading for the transcendence of Jesus who "is present."

Time of Kairos that begins with resonance and determination

The word of Jesus who is "present," which is a requirement for the existence of Kairos, is described in some detail by Paul as "the word of Pistis" (τὸ ῥῆμα τῆς πίστεως [to rhema tes pisteos]) in Romans. Paul said, "The word (of Jesus) is near you. In your mouth, and in your heart. That is the word of Pistis" (Romans 10.8). In other words, Pistis's word is a person innocently expressing the words of Jesus that rise in himself.

These words of Pistis, the word of "present" Jesus, demonstrate the same "work" as Nancy's "call of conscience." This is because Jesus' words (that is, "unconditional love for neighbors") invites one to "obey" (Gehorchen) without being "commanded" or "persuaded." It means that people live in their way while being inspired by "works" of Jesus as "Christ," ontologically speaking, to live in a unique singularity while resonating with the existence of Jesus' "love" (Paul's "indescribable inward groan of Pneuma [= spirit] itself" (Roman 8.23) is probably this "resonance"). In other words, "loving" a person before you resonate with the transcendence (declaring "unconditional love")—in a transcendent entity who "exists"—and they themselves are transcendent, "trying to live better."

Paul does not specify, but I would like to explicitly state what Heidegger implies through the words "what they have already listened to" (Zusammengehören) (GA. 65,

BP: 78), and what Nancy states with "shared" (partage) (Nancy 2005: 179). It means that when a person "loves" another person before them, they also want to "live better," in other words, an unconditional assumption of listening to and following the "call of conscience"—even if it is dangerous. In fact, though there are others who do not (cannot) do it, at any rate, we can say that the face-to-face coexistence of people is premised on the continuity of the self and the other (counter-polarity) by the "call of conscience."

I verify here that Kairos, which begins with listening to such "calls" of Jesus, is uncertain. Heidegger says, "There is no certainty in a Christian life. The life is always uncertain" (GA. 60, PrL: 105). Honestly, "believing" despite this uncertainty requires "determination" because the "call" of Jesus (via Paul), "Kairos of salvation is now," is not an instruction or a persuasion but an invitation, as mentioned above. Along with the desire "to live better," people can accept parousia, and if they live in Kairos, they may reject it. The time of Kairos is the person's choice.

Listening to and following the "call of conscience"

When a person follows this "call", they sense the "nearness" mentioned above. This has been discussed in Christian thought in various ways. For example, the two "functions" of the "soul," are what Thomas calls the ability of acceptance (potentia passive), and the ability of obedience (potentia oboedientialis) to the "order of God" (ST: III, q. 11,1 a. 1). It is like a receptacle prepared for human beings to accept the divine attribute of "integrity" (incidentally, the "ability of acceptance" of another soul is called "potentialia naturalis" because it is in response to the "natural order" (ST: III, q. 10, a. 4). Further, Heidegger considers this act of listening as "the activity intrinsic to thinking." That is, "All pursuit of the essence of thinking is supported by calls from what is to be questioned [of thought]. Therefore, hearing this voice is an inherent, original activity of the thought necessary here and now. It should not be performed by asking [True / False] (GA. 12, WsS: 169).

Whether it is Thomas's ability to listen to and follow or Heidegger's thought, listening to and following a call is always an unending process lasting for an eternity, or, in ontological terms, will be connected to "existence." Further, this "eternal existence" implies that "I" is something "separated" from the great "existence" and that "I" is given to "existence." That is what Heidegger has shown with the word "presence" (Da-sein), that is, an "existence" limited to "I".

Through listening to and following the "call," one opens up the circumstances of reality around him toward a peculiar telos specific to himself and transforms it into the place that goes to telos beyond scientific understanding. The telos is given to each person

in a specific situation. Violence is part of the action toward telos, as long as it is unavoidable, as certain circumstances necessitates violence. Freedom and hope are not facts but arise at this time. Regardless of how troublesome and alienating the circumstances, a person finds freedom and hope there from finding a specific Telos through listening to the "call of conscience."

Imaginary Focus of the Incessant Response to "here and now"

The listening leads to the place of the imaginary focus (focus imaginarius). This is dunamis, and not fully realized. This was given as a trace, and does not probably reach actual "fulfillment" (πλήρωμα [plḗroma]) (Galatia 4.4; Roman 13.10), without reaching "completeness" (τέλος [telos]) (Roman 6. 12, 10.4), that is, it is the one that repeatedly lays the foundation and is abandoned. This imaginary focus, however, will not only create awkward illusions and violence but also bring the greatest breadth and cohesion to the humanitarian ideology.

As an image, the time that heads toward this imaginary focus is always "here and now," so to speak, the "eternal present." This time is not something that accompanies a linear time that is purposeful and rational as a bonus such as "leisure." This time breaks up the linear time to drive people's emotions and feelings to "here and now." For example, it manifests itself as an aversion for those who value their vanity by slandering others and pride themselves to be intelligent. This emotional or sentimental impetus is not the "emotions" of a psychological state when thinking about Christian thought in the Middle Ages but a past made present through type or antitype (typos or antitypos). That is, what has been shown in advance manifests itself in "here and now" by confronting what is not.

Education from the Ontology of Kairos

Heidegger states that such determination to Kairos is necessary even in modern society. For Heidegger, people usually live in a world given meaning and value by using "language" intentionally and artificially, not by listening to the "call of conscience" ("the call of God" and "the call of existence"), because people have an existence that can naturally escape from this "ordinary people" (Das Man) state, listen to and follow the "call of conscience" (Stimme des Gewissens), and "be able to exist most as something existential going to" (eigenste Seinkönnen) (SZ: 286-7, 296).

What Heidegger repeatedly said in *Being and Time*—but what he does not describe as "telos"—is "the most unique possible existence" (eigenste Seinkönnen) and "inherently possible unique existence" (Eigentliche Seinkönnen). It is embodied by a person listening to the "call" and listening to the voice who wants to "live better" and

following and supporting that voice to realize that. In other words, when a person strongly feels that he is irreplaceable, it is time for the person to respond to the call of someone who is unique, and it is when it feels most important to do so.

The determination to head toward Kairos will be indispensable when we live in modern society, even if it can be unfairly criticized as "deterministic." Especially in education and learning, a person's receiving the "call of conscience" is the most ethical activity in that people fundamentally separated from each other can feel their common ground by communicating with each other through their voices, and connect with one another. In that sense, the primary form of education is teaching by teachers and learning by children—calling for authority and power, and defining meaning or value, etc.—not a subject (sujet) causal relationship, but a continuity (counterpolar) of self and others—creating "faith" and "love" and inventing co-creation and cooperation—may be a "persona" (ὑpóstasις [hypostasis]) or responsive relationship. The Book of Hebrews says, "If we continue to hold the first persona (ὑpostάseως [hypostaseos]) to the end, we will be the ones who share Christ (μέτοχοι [metochoi])" (Hebrews 3.14).

Times to receive the "call of conscience" and times to ignore it

If we overlook this "call of conscience," transcendence will lead to an almost exclusive and oppressive situation. The reason for this is that transcendence will instantly attract "idol" worship, and the discourse of education driven by "idol" worship will create a division between those with "faith" and those without, to compel those with "faith" to follow the rules, and to reject those who are not. Whether that "idol" worship is obedience to any religious doctrine or obedience to meritocracy, it constitutes a rejection of specific characteristics of every one of us.

Conversely, if we listen to and follow the "call of conscience," the transcendence within education leaves open the question of its meaning and values and will become a *signifiant* that continues to be questioned beyond the assignment of meaning and value. This is because the "call of conscience" is an ethical urge that intensely shakes both the mind and body and occurs when "I" have to face someone accidentally. In other words, there is no significant meaning or values prescribed by ethics and moral theory. This leads to the protection of each of our specific characteristics.

To put it concisely, I locate transcendence that education should presuppose in listening to and following the "call of conscience" as a sense that transcends authority, power, intention, expectation, meaning, and value. That voice is a call without a message that comes in face-to-face relationship but beyond it as well. What can be more liberating than this call? We all have "desires" (intentions and expectations) supported by some

meaning or values and are accustomed to seeking "better" education; however, those desires are also premised upon the "works" in which every one of us will continue to head toward the peculiar and specific "telos" by receiving the "call of conscience." In short, the condition for the existence of transcendence in education (education on the premise of transcendence) is not the active desire of the individual subjects, which tends to converge to the activity of "better reformation," but is a joyous response to the "call of conscience," which is one with the "desire to live better."

4. To the Ontology of Taisho New Education

Kairos and Contemporary Thought

To recap, the theory of Kairos was the central concept of the Christian "regeneration" (παλιγγενεσία [paliggensia]) theory developed by Augustine, Bonaventura, Thomas, Luther, Calvin, and others. This "regeneration" theory formed the matrix of modern educational thought mentioned at the beginning. However, with the development of modern education, the theory of Kairos seems to have fallen out.

In any case, the theory of Kairos plays an important role in the contemporary thought. For example, in *Difference and Repetition*, Gilles Deleuze described Kairos as an "occasion to precipitate all of its uniqueness," that when it physically connects people and shakes reality hard and transforms it." (Deleuze 1968: 246). In addition, the "here and now" ((ici et maintenant) that Jacques Derrida repeatedly speaks of in *Specters of Marx* may be an adaptation of this Kairos (Derrida 1993)—that is, the "event" that is to be engraved in words precisely because it is drowned by a repetition of words, listens to and follows the "call" (Derrida 1986: 73).

Kairos and Taisho New Education

Finally, I would like to present a hypothesis that listening to and following the "call of conscience," the desire to "live better," and the determination to head toward Kairos, which have been described so far, are related to Japanese Taisho New Education (Taisho Shin Kyoiku).

The primary motivation for this was that "Christian ontology" according to Heidegger, Tillich, Bultmann, and others were introduced to Japan during the Taisho era through the Kyoto school by philosophers such as Kitaro Nishida and Hajime Tanabe. For example, as Kobayashi's research discusses in detail, Nishida's "eternal present" is Kairos (Kobayashi 2010: 25). Nishida, in 1932's *The Self-awareness and Determination*

of the Nothingness, hinted at Paul's Kairos with the term "eternal present," and the reason for that is found in "the voice of conscience," which is "the voice of a spirit at the bottom of the flesh." That is to say, "The content of self-restriction for eternal present appears as a voice of conscience" and "the voice of conscience is the voice of God" (Nishida 1979, 6: 230). Further, what the "voice" asks from people is "absolute love" or "self-limitation of love," which means "discover yourself by abandoning yourself" (Nishida 1979, 6: 231, 257).

It seems that the authors of the Taisho New Education were familiar with the "Christian Ontology" and similar "Ontology" that the Kyoto school accepted and developed. Indeed, the idea of Taisho New Education tends to discuss "life" rather than "existence." However, the "life" referred to here is not biological, but rather, it may be a word for "great love" that connects each life. If so, is it not a word that corresponds to Heidegger's "call of conscience" and Nishida's "voice of conscience? Whether it is Takeji Kinoshita (1872–46) of Nara Higher Normal School, who was devoted to Dewey, or Heiji Oikawa (1875–1939) of Akashi Women's Normal School, who had a great esteem for Dewey and Bergson, was the "life" they spoke of not colored by a Christian ontology, such as Ralph Waldo Emerson's theory of "inner life" for instance?

This should be verified in the future, but it is my conjecture that Taisho New Education will be found to contain the idea that each and every person listens to the "call of conscience," goes beyond specific intentions, expectations, meanings, and values, and "try to live better" for others. This conjecture of mine is neither novel nor original. The ontology of the idea of Taisho New Education overlaps with the historical image of ideas that Fumio Ono used to understand the "new education" of Europe. Already in 2009, Ono found "church, institution, theology" or "artificial indoctrination" behind the "old education," while there was "faith from the overall inner life of the individuals" found behind the "new education" (Ono 2009).

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Education, Philosophy and University:

A Consideration thorough Jan Amos Comenius and Jan Patočka

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Abstract

This article deals with the requests to open higher education through the works of Jan Amos Comenius and the contemporary interpretation of his works. Whilst his ideas suggest an image in which openness in education was pursued to the apex, it is easy to criticize his ideas in terms of multiculturalism insofar as his request for unconditional opening is seen as monism. Nevertheless, we can hardly oppose the requests to open because education, which correlates to the transmission of knowledge and technology, is nothing but an emergence of openness in a broader sense. Therefore, it is necessary to assess the validity of the requests to open. In Czechoslovakia during the cold war era, when the freedom of speech and academic research were strictly restricted, twentieth century Czech philosopher Jan Patočka gave some significant lectures at the so-called Underground University. He regarded Comenius as a thinker of the open soul, who experienced itself as something which is innately dependent on unparalleled otherness. Insofar as human existence was understood as the openness towards the world, education cannot be an action to form the human into a vessel and fill it with knowledge and skills. Education is founded on the conversion or the turn through overcoming self-centeredness, turning around and meeting otherness outside of the self. At present, the more scientific technology penetrates all the aspects of human life, the more education is reduced to technological matters. In this sense, attention should be paid to that which Patočka researched, within philosophical thinking, the possibility to restore the nature of human existence. The Open Soul, which was brought to him through his interpretation of Comenius, might be paraphrased as 'Openness Within.' It implies that any openness is never activated without philosophical thinking as Openness Within.

Keywords

Higher education reform, Openness, Comenius, Patočka, Philosophy of education

University exposed in the requests to open

Today, universities are under pressure for further reform to respond to the global transformation in politics, industry, sciences and education. In the trend for higher education reform based upon the requests for open and access, there is, among intellectuals and academics, a concern that research will be reduced to mere form. However, these feelings are not always shared with the public, probably because this scepticism on the part of intellectuals is perceived as self-interest. In fact, such a slogan "Towards an Educating University" captures the demand for universities to make all possible efforts to accept various students, to incorporate more diverse content in education, and to open the organization towards the society.

In this article, I will try to consider the requests to open higher education through the works of Jan Amos Comenius, a seventeenth Century philosopher, and the contemporary interpretation of his works. In spite of the fact that this approach is seemingly a roundabout way, Comenius' works are full of suggestions for the reconsideration of higher education. For example, universities in the time of Comenius could not adequately respond to the political, religious and cultural crises because of conservatism in education. In fact, most intellectuals who contributed to the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century were neither professors nor alumni of traditional universities. Nevertheless, there were various ideas and practices in higher education in the century that deserve attention. As for Comenius, he dealt with higher education within the lifelong process of human transformation through his unique philosophical concept, *Pansophia*. Two Comenian texts are noteworthy to understand his ideas of higher education. In the main work in his later years entitled, *De rerum humanarum emendatione consultatio catholica* (*The General Consultation on the Emendation of Human Things*), he considered the universal reform of society including religion, politics, sciences, languages and education. The fourth part of the work, *Pampaedia* should be regarded as the climax of his educational ideas. Although in *Pampaedia*, Comenius elaborates on education in academia after gymnasium (high school), there are no references to research activities in this work. However, he mentioned that the location of academia 'is desirable also for colleges' [Comenius 1966=1986: 154] and he elaborated the collegium (colleges) in the sixth part of the work, *Panorthosia*, which dealt with the reform of sciences, politics and religion. In short, the college is seen as a research organization and academia as an educational function in the university today. His ideas of education are summarized as universalism seen in his motto, 'all men are taught all subjects in all thoroughness (Omnes, Omnia,

Omnino doceantur).' [Comenius 1966=1986: 19] His thought is, curious to say, affinitive to the present trend of higher education reform.

Openness in Admission

Comenius, who was a successor of the tradition of Czech Reformer Jan Hus, had to confront the entrance barrier for higher education because of the religious intolerance of the period. He was not accepted by the institutions of higher education in Prague such as Charles University (the oldest university in central Europe), and Clementinum, founded by the Jesuits, and therefore he studied at two institutions in Herborn and Heidelberg in Germany. Although academia in Herborn is non-existent, it played a significant role in the scientific revolution owing to its tolerant atmosphere. When he later considered education as a lifelong process, he emphasized that 'no man may be exempted, much less debarred from the pursuit of wisdom and the cultivation of his mind.' [Comenius 1966=1986: 30] Thus, he argues that 'academies should therefore be founded in every kingdom and or sizeable province,' [Comenius 1966=1986: 154] and wished for the expansion of opportunity in higher education. It is worth pointing out that the openness of admission has been a main principle of educational reform. We may acknowledge that the contemporary challenges in higher education originate through responding to the openness of admission. Thus, it is clear that openness in higher education was a primary concern addressed by Comenius in seventeenth century Europe.

Openness in Curriculum

In the philosophical concept of Comenius, *Pansophia*, human knowledge was premised on the parallelism between World, Mind and the Bible as the *Three Books of God* (*tres libri Dei*) between Sense, Reason and Belief. Therefore, Comenius tried to deduce the didactic principles through the philosophical analysis of the nature in the world and human. As emphasized in the mutual relations between mind, tongue and hands, Comenius positioned reason within the inseparable connection to language and action. He thought that *Pansophia* should be learned at all stages in human life. This can be interpreted to mean that the higher education curriculum should be open, contrary to the traditional curriculum, in which philosophy was positioned after mastering liberal arts. Moreover, since he positioned academia as a transitional stage between the private and the public, he was consistently critical about contemplative thinking. He composed the curriculum in academia of three classes as Universal Wisdom, Universal Books and

Universal Preparation and added them to Foreign Travel and the choice of career. Whilst his idea is distant from professional education, it cannot simply be positioned in the humanism tradition. Given that he grasped human development in the process through theory (theoria), practice (praxis) and use (chresis), it is likely due to the fact that he stressed the ability to apply skills in higher education.

Openness of University

In Comenius' work for the reform in politics, sciences and religion, *Panorthosia*, he stated that 'we have multiplied schools and studies and selfish scheming for advancement, but we have not yet added to the true joys of life.' [Comenius 1966=1993: 38] Such negative evaluation can be attributed to his scepticism of intellectualism. In the work for the reform in education, *Pampaedia*, he explained two ways to present teaching materials; 'philosophical rigidity' and the 'popular way.' [Comenius 1966=1986: 89] Whilst the former is 'to present teaching matters in the form of rigid decrees,' the latter 'uses appeal, persuasion and encouragement.' He criticized that the former 'insults or threatens intelligent minds and thereby intimidates them' and appreciated that the latter 'inspires the inborn light to burst into flame.' As inferred from his attitude to intellectualism, he believed that the college as a scholarly institution should be thoroughly open to the public. In *Panorthosia*, he proposed three international councils taking responsibility for the reformation in philosophy, politics and education and positioned the College of Light 'to exercise control over all human knowledge, curbing its excesses or defects or any tendency to go astray at any stage or in any circumstances, seeking ever to increase and improve the dominion of the human Mind over the real world, and to spread the light of Wisdom throughout the minds of nations all over the world.' [Comenius 1966=1995: 221] Whilst the incorporation of each college and academia into the international council might be oriented to realize the openness of higher education, it implies the restraint of freedom in each institution.

Openness and Education

Within Comenius' reference that 'the colleges of light will use the power of light to banish the darkness of error,' [Comenius 1966=1993: 142] we are able to perceive the implication of the Enlightenment despite the fact that his optimistic trust in light was based upon his belief that his design on universal reform included the conversion of the Jewish and the Turkish to Christianity. Whilst his ideas suggest an image in which

openness in education was pursued to the apex, some points cannot be exempted from criticism. It is easy to criticize his ideas in terms of multiculturalism insofar as his request for unconditional opening is seen as monism. Nevertheless, we can hardly oppose the requests to open because education, which correlates to the transmission of knowledge and technology, is nothing but an emergence of openness in a broader sense.

Despite that a contemporary of Comenius, Descartes, was critical of education in the Jesuit College where he was educated, when he was asked about the teaching method of philosophy, he highly appreciated the Jesuit methodology of education because of the ordered and varied materials. [Descartes 1936: 74] The Jesuit schools, which rapidly prevailed in the seventeenth century because of paying much more attention to education than research, is well associated with 'the Educating University' today. Apart from the difference in denominations, it is obvious that Comenius also emphasized the educational function in higher education institutions.

Philosophy as Openness Within

It is apparently not easy for us as intellectuals and academics to depart from the present trend towards an Educating University, since it is accompanied by the requests to become more open. However, we have to assess the validity of the requests to open, apart from Comenius who attributed this legitimacy to his beliefs. At this point, twentieth century Czech philosopher Jan Patočka and his study of Comenius provides a lot of suggestions. In Czechoslovakia during the cold war era, when the Communist regime imposed an embargo on the freedom of speech and academic research, Patočka was expelled from Charles University for almost twenty years and gave lectures on philosophy privately from the 1950s. The main work in his later years, *Kacířské eseje o filosofii dějin* (*Heretical Essays in the Philosophy of History*), which had a decisive impact on Jacques Derrida, was created from his informal lectures at the so-called Underground University. He was known not only as a phenomenologist, who was under the instruction of Husserl and Heidegger, but also as an interpreter of Comenius. His interpretation of Comenius drastically changed from the end of 1960s.

In his article entitled '*Comenius und offene Seele* (*Comenius and the Open Soul*)', Patočka revealed the historical view and positioned the era after the seventeenth century as 'the epoch of closed-ness.' According to his consideration, all phenomena, in the epoch, are seen as things which are inducted from reason which is hierarchically above the phenomena and thereby knowledge is deemed as a power to manipulate all things. [Patočka 1970: 63] By contrast, he regarded Comenius as a thinker of the open soul

through his interpretation. As stated by Patočka, the open soul experiences itself as something which is innately dependent on unparalleled otherness. [Patočka 1970: 63] Insofar as human existence for Comenius was understood as the openness towards the world, education cannot be an action to form the human into a vessel and fill it with knowledge and skills. Education is founded on the conversion or the turn through overcoming self-centeredness, turning around and meeting otherness outside of the self. Such an interpretation is based upon Patočka's insight to the transformation of educational concepts through modernization. He shared the view with Heidegger, who analysed the Greek concept of education, *Paideia*, in his lecture on Plato's Cave, mentioned the situation in which *Paideia* came to represent culture and education, and described it as 'the worst of the nineteenth century.' [Heidegger 1988: 116] Taking the transformation of educational concepts toward modern times into consideration, it might be natural for the Neoplatonism philosopher that learning was to realize the world-openness in humans and therefore mastering knowledge and skills was necessary to arrange the conditions toward the openness.

Through these reflections, Patočka stated that 'the original meaning of future education is in conversion.' [Patočka 2011: 283] Moreover, he discussed 'universal conversion' which Patočka said should be realized by the highbrow intellectuals to attain a prospect for the transition from the closed-ness to openness through emancipating themselves from the closed soul, since they are nothing but the bearers of the knowledge as power. [Patočka 1996: 134] The author of *The Velvet Philosophers*, Barbara Day summarised his view of the significance of philosophy as 'a tool for diagnosis, thus enabling him [man] to recover his instinctive sense of the reality of the natural world.' [Day 2008: 201]

At present, the more scientific technology penetrates all the aspects of human life, the more education is reduced to technological matters. In reality, learners are assessed according to the degree of their proficiency in responding to the stimulus which is arbitrarily constructed. However, not a day passes without watching scandals in which the intellectuals are involved. Although a young Japanese biologist was the object of the world's attention on her sensational discovery two years ago, the discovery was revealed as fraud in just a few months. If this incident ironically shows that artificiality becomes natural or unconscious manner in natural science, it must suggest the technology-oriented education is in a deadlock. In this sense, attention should be paid to that which Patočka researched, within philosophical thinking, the possibility to restore the natural sense. The Open Soul, which was brought to him through his interpretation of Comenius, might be paraphrased as 'Openness Within.' If my interpretation was not far distant from the

essence of the both thinkers, it implies that any universality or openness is never activated without philosophical thinking as Openness Within.

Even if school education was adequate to obtain philosophical knowledge as Descartes noted, learning philosophy is not identical with doing philosophy. Patočka's practice in the Underground University must show another possibility of the openness of university. In its long history, the university has been able to continue through comprehending plural orientations which were so often in severe conflict. In this sense, the future of the university might depend on whether we commit ourselves to informal and voluntary endeavours even if they were not officially acknowledged. Comenius found the light in the darkness of his time when it is often deemed as the century of crisis. Whilst the time of normalization was seemingly illuminated by scientific positivism, Patočka's lectures, which were conducted secretly, must have been a light for the people who were obliged to select multiple faces according to circumstances. It is common for both Comenius and Patočka to look through the darkness within the de facto publicness which was seemingly light, and at the same time, find out the light within appearing obscurity or darkness. Whether we are open to such vision or not remains a question.

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The Education of Transferable Skills at Japanese Universities

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Abstract

Colleges and universities in Japan are responding to the shift of educational goals due to the diffusion of new learning methods such as active learning and deep learning. The positive use of active learning and deep learning is a common goal for schools and colleges in our country. This movement generated a new task for our college education: the mastery of transferable skills. It is one of the central components of general attributes for our college students to learn during their university lives. Transferable skills are the essential components of practical intelligence, which will be applied to future life situations. The aim of learning transferable skills is to nurture a person of independent mind and cooperative intelligence. Colleges of education are expected to play an important role not only in the provision of liberal arts education to their students but also in the development of special teacher education programs for their students to learn the methods of active learning and deep learning. Those students are the future teachers who will disseminate the methods of active learning and deep learning to their students. We should carefully watch the development of this reform movement at our schools and colleges.

Keywords

Active learning, deep learning, transferable skills, teacher education, independent mind, cooperative intelligence

Introduction

Colleges and universities in Japan faced a radical change of educational policy during the early 1990s. Especially college education and university research went through a drastic change during this decade. The Deregulation of University Establishment Standards, which started in 1991, set the basic orientation of the present reform. Also, the

enactment of the National University Corporation Law in 2004 accelerated this trend. In the 1990s, the teaching methods and learning techniques widely practiced in the American colleges were introduced into Japanese college education. The Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT) reported that the introduction of these methods and techniques improved our college teaching practices and upgraded the quality of our students' learning activities.

In the meantime, Japanese universities had to respond to the market principle introduced by the MEXT to win competition-based financial support for excellent research. This policy accelerated the development of useful university research activities and university researchers suddenly noticed the merits of evidence-based scientific research. In this sense, our university reform was basically initiated, supported, and accelerated by the government. Also, the government started to introduce a new policy of functional grouping of our national universities based on the two standards of "research and service." This policy will be another stimulus for transforming the function and hierarchical structure of colleges and universities in Japan.

The service ideal is rapidly changing the mission of our university teaching and research. In the process of changing from loosely structured communities to tightly controlled organizations, Japanese universities are facing the challenge of incorporating the new ideal of "serviceability" into their own missions. This service ideal also influences the direction of our college education. Our colleges and universities should produce "useful" human resources for the 21st century society. In this context, the new goal of our undergraduate education will be discussed with reference to the learning of transferable skills, one of the main goals for our college education proposed by the MEXT.

1. The new goal of college education in Japan: The mastery of transferable skills

In 2008, the Central Council of Education announced a new goal for our college education. It is called the education of "Bachelor's competencies," or "graduate attributes." They are the common learning outcomes of undergraduate education and those competencies or attributes consist of four skills. Those four skills are "knowledge, generic skills or transferable skills, interpersonal and social skills, and comprehensive learning and thinking ability." These skills are essential for all our college graduates to live in the 21st century knowledge-based society. The focus of this proposal is the mastery of generic skills or transferable skills. They include such skills as "communication skills, numerical skills, information literacy, logical thinking, and problem-solving skills."

The focus of our undergraduate education after World War II has been the nurturing

of the "breadth" of knowledge. Now, the focus has moved to the mastery of useful and practical skills. Generic skills or transferable skills are considered to be practical and useful skills in the 21st century. The mastery of these skills for college graduates is a widely shared goal by British universities.

Liberal arts education in Europe started as the education of seven liberal arts in the Middle Ages. Liberal education in the modern age stressed the importance of the cultivation of intellect or mind for the educated person. However, the idea of intellect or mind was gradually transformed after the infiltration of natural sciences into college curricula. American universities in the 20th century experienced the influence of the scientific method upon the social sciences and the humanities. Gradually, the concept of "practical intelligence," which appreciates the value of practical and useful knowledge, influenced the goals and contents of the college education. Up against this tide of higher education in the United States, the College of the University of Chicago introduced the "Great Books" curriculum and the education for "speculative intellect" in the 1930s (Butts, 1939). This program adopted the study of classics as the core of their curriculum.

After World War II, Japanese college education adopted the idea of "general education" proposed by Harvard University (Harvard University, 1945). The basic goal of general education was to cultivate the free person living in a new democratic society through the learning of "intelligence in action." Intelligence in action is an intellectual and practical tool not only to cope with pressing problematic situations but also to be applied to future life situations. At the beginning of the 21st century, Japanese colleges and universities confronted the unfinished task of the 20th century college education: the cultivation of practical intelligence, which is presently called the learning of generic skills or transferable skills.

2. Active learning for the education of independent mind

In accordance with the rising need for learning the generic skills or transferable skills at our colleges, new types of learning methods are also proposed: active learning and deep learning. While the first phase of our university education reform during the 1990s can be called the time for innovation in "teaching," the second phase of that in the 21st century can be called the time for innovation in "learning." It is also called the time for introducing innovative learning methods, because the active and participatory learning methods are required to upgrade the qualities of the learning activities of our college students.

According to the survey conducted by the MEXT, almost 70 percent of our college

teaching is conducted in lecture style and only 30 percent is delivered in an active type of teaching such as seminar, experiment, fieldwork, internship, etc. Another survey conducted by the MEXT informs us that those students who are good at problem-solving tend to score high on tests and examinations and those positively engaged in active learning find independent and cooperative learning more congenial. The OECD's Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) test evaluates student academic performance in both basic knowledge and the application of knowledge to life situations. In order to cope with this PISA test, our schools started to concentrate on the teaching of creative problem-solving knowledge.

The diffusion of active learning at our colleges also aims to promote the dissemination of problem-solving skills and transferable skills. Problem-solving skills are required for the solution of a pressing current problem and for tackling future life situations. We need more experience in the teaching of problem-solving skills and the assessment of the mastery of transferable skills at our colleges and universities. New types of performance assessment to evaluate the mastery and validity of transferable skills are still at the development stage. The introduction of active learning in college education will transform the curricular contents and evaluation system in the near future.

3. The mastery of the structure of knowledge through deep learning

Deep learning, an advanced form of active learning, is also considered to be another method for the mastery of transferable skills. It aims to advance student's learning abilities such as the deep understanding of concepts, the bridging of concepts with experience, the discovery of the structure and pattern of knowledge, the promotion of critical thinking, and the deeper interest in knowledge. Deep learning consists of the mixture of two orientations: one is a deep commitment to the object of learning and the other is the widening of the horizon of knowledge.

The problem-solving learning adopted by Japanese schools after World War II was criticized as a vulgar form of activism—a busy but empty learning activity. Deep learning should avoid the trap of the misguided idea that to be active is a guarantee of learning deeply. Active mind or intelligence grows *because* the student thinks and learns deeply. In that sense, we try to examine the untested possibility of experiential learning and cooperative learning of the 20th century: the nurturing of independent and cooperative mind. Deep learning in the 21st century, which aims to promote the advancement of independent mind and cooperative intelligence, will be a common method shared by primary, secondary, and higher education in our country.

For the time being, the mastery of transferable skills through deep learning will be a vital tool for the activation of our college education. Deep learning should be useful and effective for all the students. We need the evidence that every student can learn deeply. Every student can engage in some type of deep learning: some are intelligent enough to learn the sophisticated method of research and inquiry, others are good at learning the methods of problem-solving, and still others are committed to productive projects. The diffusion of deep learning is harder than that of active learning. We should carefully examine the relationship between active learning and deep learning and its implications for the mastery of transferable skills.

In addition, we should refer to the role and meaning of the dominant type of teaching at Japanese colleges: lecture. Lecture is an unpopular learning method for the present educational reform in our country. In contrast to the emphasis upon student's active learning and deep learning, the role of lecture is rarely discussed. Lecture is considered to be one-way and passive, and teaching is of secondary importance compared with learning. We should notice that the deep understanding and interpretation of the structure of knowledge can be achieved through the education by lecture. An excellent lecture has its own unique structure and irreplaceable quality. It will be a stepping board for self-reflection and the beginning of deeper thinking. Can a MOOC or flipped classroom be an alternative tool for an excellent lecture? The proposal of active learning and deep learning will be a good opportunity for rethinking the meaning of lecture in the 21st century.

4. The role of transferable skills in teacher education

The education of transferable skills in our country will be utilized for another purpose: education in response to the diverse needs of our students. Ortega Y Gasset, the Spanish philosopher, indicated that the university in the 20th century would be an institution accessible to the average man (Ortega Y Gasset, 1944). This is true for Japanese universities. Our colleges and universities need to develop new academic programs responding to the diverse interests and needs of our youth. The education of transferable skills is considered to be an effective means to this end. Our universities are required to maintain the tradition of liberal education to cultivate a new generation of independent citizens. The mastery of transferable skills will play a significant role in achieving this goal. Transferable skills must be integrated with the tradition of liberal education. In that sense, the learning of transferable skills should play a pivotal role in nurturing the art of problem-solving and inquiry and the love of wisdom.

In our present higher education reform, the colleges of education play a central role in promoting the diffusion of active learning and deep learning. They should be a model school to impart the teaching and mastery of transferable skills to their students and to upgrade the quality of their own teacher education programs. Some colleges of education are successful in introducing the new learning systems such as problem-based learning, the flipped classroom, cooperative learning, etc. They are ready to develop unique teacher education programs for nurturing the future teachers who will be experts of teaching through active learning and deep learning. They are missionaries to spread the method of active learning and deep learning. Colleges of education should become experimental centers of active and deep learning, so that they can disseminate the results of their educational experiments to the primary and secondary schools. We need to watch carefully the future development of active learning and deep learning at our colleges of education.

Conclusion

The idea of *in loco parentis* is firmly embedded in the tradition of Japanese college education. This culture of "caring" is pervasive throughout various practices of our college education and, thanks to this culture of protection, those students who succeed in graduating from their colleges within six years were almost 88 percent in 2014. Needless to say, we should be careful not to produce a loosely controlled system of college education, where over-protection is dominant and the mastery of transferable skills to cope with real-life situations is insufficient. The introduction of active learning and deep learning into our college education and the learning of transferable skills should produce a new balance between the search for academic excellence and the care for students.

The reconstruction of university education is one of the vital concerns of our country. Our colleges and universities, where more than 50% of our 18-year olds enroll, should exemplify the three missions of higher education: education, research, and service. In such citadels of higher learning, some students attend the classes of liberal education for the nurturing of free and independent minds, others engage in the cutting-edge research activities, and still others seek advanced professional training.

Our duty is continuously to reconstruct our higher education system in order to implement the ideals of original research, education, and service in the rising tide of tighter control and lessening discretion. Can the teaching and learning of transferable skills be a new means to promote this goal? Now is the time for us to examine the role of transferable skills as an essential tool for the reconstruction of 21st century higher

education.

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Considering the Philosophy of Education from the Front Line of Teacher Training

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Abstract

This paper discusses roles and tasks of the philosophy of education based on concrete studies of the involvement of researchers of the discipline in practical teacher training, by referring to the author's own experiences at the front line of teacher training at Hyogo University of Teacher Education and Kobe University, which take contrasting approaches to teacher training. The philosophy of education takes the following two roles: (1) education in the discipline; and (2) the designing of teacher training. Of the two, the latter has more importance than the former. In the design of teacher training, a considerable amount of "play" should be secured to compensate for today's rational and goal-oriented teacher training.

Keywords

teacher training, philosophy of education, Hyogo University of Teacher Education, Kobe University

1. Introduction

This paper discusses the philosophy of education from the perspective of teacher training rather than vice versa. In other words, rather than exploring ideal states of teacher training and the significance of the philosophy of education based on abstract concepts, its roles and tasks are clarified through concrete studies of the involvement of researchers in the discipline in practical teacher training.

In this discussion, the paper also refers to the author's own experiences at the front line of teacher training at Hyogo University of Teacher Education and Kobe University, which take contrasting approaches to teacher training. To illustrate the purport of this

paper, I would first like to introduce an outcome of previous studies of teacher training in the field of the philosophy of education.

2. An outcome of previous studies of teacher training and the philosophy of education

As one outcome of previous studies of teacher training in the field of the philosophy of education, I would like to introduce a book titled, *"Kyouin Yousei wo Tetsugaku suru: Kyouiku Tetsugaku ni nani ga dekiruka"* (A Philosophical Study of Teacher Training: Roles of the Philosophy of Education, Hayashi et al., 2014). This book discusses the roles and significance of the philosophy of education from diverse viewpoints, in light of the situation where teacher training and school activities have begun to increasingly prioritize the development of practical teaching abilities. The book was written driven by a strong sense of crisis concerning the current reform of teacher training in Japan, which reinforces *"jissen shiko"* (practical approaches) in the trend toward *"genri teki na kosatsu no so wo usukusuru"* (thinning the layer of studies of principles). (P. 100) This sense of crisis, which is shared by many researchers of the philosophy of education, characterizes the entire book.

However, the co-authors of the book are not unified in their views and viewpoints. It seems to me that their views concerning the significance of the philosophy of education can be roughly classified into three categories.

Proponents of the first category suggest that the philosophy of education should be treated as an established, independent discipline, and that its role is to provide educational sciences and related technologies with integrated views, and to critically review and reorient present educational practices from a broad perspective. To use Matsuura's terminology, this category can be termed *mohan-gata* or a model type. The second category comprises what Matsuura calls *senryaku-gata* or a strategic type. Rather than regarding the philosophy of education as an established discipline, proponents of this type of view stress the importance of addressing respective educational problems as each situation demands. At the same time, they believe that "the roles of the philosophy of education should be determined along with methods to develop its potential through joint efforts with researchers of other educational sciences" (P. 242). Finally, proponents of the third category focus on and critically review the theory-practice schema, which represents how a theory can contribute to practice (through appropriate policies).

From the viewpoints of these three categories, the book convincingly emphasizes the significance and usefulness of the philosophy of education in teacher training and

school activities. Since the book has sufficiently demonstrated the significance of the discipline, based on this recognition, researchers of the philosophy of education may ask themselves what is left for them to explore. I would suggest that there are two important study themes for researchers to deal with. Firstly, the role and significance of the philosophy of education should be clarified and included in the curriculums of teacher training at universities. Secondly, the philosophy of education should be included in holistic teacher training systems, including advanced training programs for in-service teachers. In this paper, I would like to focus my discussion on the first theme. I will discuss the various roles of the philosophy of education in teacher training by referring to my own experiences of serving at Hyogo University of Teacher Education (academic years 1997 to 2013) and the Faculty of Human Development of Kobe University (academic years 2014 to present day), where I am engaged in the education of elementary school teachers.

3. Teacher training at Hyogo University of Teacher Education and Kobe University

(1) Hyogo University of Teacher Education

Hyogo University of Teacher Education was established in October 1978 with the aim of providing in-service teachers with advanced training. Since its establishment, the university has been serving at the front line of teacher training reforms in Japan. The prospectus of the university states: "In response to social demands to improve the abilities of in-service teachers and foster more teachers for elementary schools, the university shall establish a graduate school designed to provide in-service teachers with opportunities for research and advanced training, along with a faculty that fosters teachers for elementary schools. With the focus on the education of the graduate school, the university shall promote practical education and research into school education." (Hyogo University of Teacher Education, 1988)

The university has a single faculty to foster teachers of elementary education. The faculty admits up to 200 students, with 160 students currently enrolled. The faculty is dedicated to the development of kindergarten and elementary school teachers. Whereas conventional educational universities focus their efforts on the linkage between elementary and secondary education in terms of both curriculums and educational organizations, Hyogo University of Teacher Education concentrates its efforts on the continuation of kindergarten and elementary school education.

According to Nobuhiro Miyoshi, the principles of teacher training can be classified

into those based on what he calls "liberalism" and those based on "professionalism" (Miyoshi, 1972). Similarly, Noboru Yamada classified teachers into "academics" (specialists in a specific subject) and "educationalists" (specialists in education) (Yamada, 1970). The views based on "liberalism" in training and teachers as "academics" have become the mainstream in secondary education. Proponents of this notion believe that anyone who has mastered a specific discipline can be a teacher of that subject. On the other hand, the notions of "professionalism" and "educationalists" have gained greater support in elementary education. Proponents of these views suggest that teachers need a background in pedagogy and experience in practice teaching.

In terms of these classifications, Hyogo University of Teacher Education can be categorized into the group of professionalism-oriented institutes. However, the university also maintains an academically-oriented system under which courses on specific subjects are provided. This system, commonly known as the "peak system," requires students to study a specific subject deeply, while at the same time to engage in the comprehensive study of a range of subjects.

The university offers a four-year practice teaching program, which starts shortly after students' enrollment and ends in the fourth year. This unique and unconventional program has presented a model for other universities. As a front-runner in teacher training, the university continues to take on various challenges, including the founding of Japan's largest professional graduate school for teacher training (admitting up to 100 students) and the development of teacher education standards under the Good Practice (GP) program of Japan's Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT).

(2) Kobe University

Kobe University comprises 11 faculties (and 15 graduate schools). Of these faculties, the Faculty of Human Development plays a leading role in teacher training under the "open system," whereby students of other faculties can also obtain teacher's licenses under certain conditions. The predecessor of the university was Hyogo Normal School, which was founded in 1877. Its Faculty of Education was established in 1949, following the end of World War II, and was reorganized into the Faculty of Human Development in 1992. Concurrently with this reorganization, the faculty adopted the open system. After a quarter of a century, however, fostering educational specialists is currently regarded as having less importance, as is evident from the fact that successors of educational programs of specific subjects have become selected by faculties of the

respective disciplines. In this environment, the Faculty of Human Development has been striving to maintain the function of fostering elementary school teachers, producing a small number of teachers at the Elementary Education Division (admitting up to 30 students) of the Department of Human Development and Education. Instead of the "peak system," under which students are encouraged to study specific subjects, the division seeks to foster all-round "professional" educationalists.

Kobe University is currently promoting structural reforms to reinforce university functions. As a part of this initiative, in academic year 2017 the university plans to combine the Faculty of Human Development and the Faculty of Intercultural Studies and establish a Faculty of Global Human Sciences. The university plans to create four departments under this new faculty, including a Department of Child Education, which will continue elementary teacher training. At present, the university is preparing for the establishment of a university founding committee and a teacher education curriculum committee.

4. Involvement of a researcher of the philosophy of education

To date, I have been engaged in teacher training at Hyogo University of Teacher Education and Kobe University. Although I am a specialist in new education in Germany, I have been committed to research into teacher training, which entails tremendous efforts and much time, because I believe that fostering excellent teachers is indispensable for education. Needless to say, education plays a key role in fostering children and in the development of society. To improve the quality of education, it is therefore essential to continue to enhance the quality of our teaching staff. With this view in mind, I would like to review my own experiences of teacher training at the two universities from the three viewpoints described below.

(1) Teaching of the philosophy of education

Firstly, I have long been involved in teaching the philosophy of education. During lectures and seminars at the universities, I have imparted my knowledge concerning the philosophy of education to my students. At the same time, together with students, I have explored solutions to various educational problems by taking a philosophical approach.

Specific subjects that I taught at Hyogo University of Teacher Education include the history of education, the history of thoughts on school education, and educational anthropology; while those I now teach at Kobe University include the philosophy of

education, the history of educational thoughts, and moral education theories. At Hyogo University of Teacher Education, my main theme concerned research into various thoughts on school education. On the other hand, at Kobe University, in addition to school education, I deal with various types of education, including those provided at home and in communities for all generations ranging from babies to the elderly. Despite this difference, at both universities I have basically adopted the same approach, that is, to critically review modern education in the historical and social contexts by regarding the philosophy of education as a part of pedagogic education.

When I teach the philosophy of education, I take an approach of the first type (*mohan-gata* or model type) described earlier in this paper, which stresses the significance of the philosophy of education. In other words, during my classes I held discussions with students, based on the understanding that the role of the philosophy of education is to provide educational sciences and related technologies with integrated views, and to critically review and reorient educational practices from a broad perspective.

(2) Holistic design of teacher training

Secondly, I have also been involved in the holistic design of teacher training. At Hyogo University of Teacher Education, I took the initiative in the first full-fledged revision of the faculty curriculums (in academic year 2008) since the founding of the university, and the development of teacher training standards in the Good Practice (GP) program of Japan's Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (academic years 2009–2011). At Kobe University, I am responsible for the certification of new curriculums for the teacher-training course for the new faculty to be established in the 2017 academic year.

The two universities are different concerning the following items. At Hyogo University of Teacher Education, elementary teacher training is stipulated in the prospectus for the establishment of the new faculty. Accordingly, the purpose of establishing the new faculty has direct implications for its vision of teacher training. On the other hand, the mission of the new faculty of Kobe University is stipulated as "developing cooperative human resources with global perspectives." Accordingly, our first challenge was to link this mission with the vision of elementary teacher training. After thorough discussions with other faculty members, I developed the following vision for the Department of Child Education: "With the ultimate aim of pursuing a harmonious global community through the development of future generations, the Department of Child Education will foster human resources to engage in elementary education, who will

adopt a broad perspective concerning the global community, and have the abilities necessary to recognize—from diverse angles—the challenges facing both children and schools, and to find practical solutions to such challenges.

Throughout my service at both universities, I have been developing a holistic vision of teacher training from a wide perspective. When I engaged in the preparation of teacher education standards at Hyogo University of Teacher Education, I selected 50 abilities and qualities required for teachers. Rather than simply listing these 50 items, I classified them into several categories and arranged them in a structured form. At Kobe University, I have developed a vision for fostering teachers as well as a vision for the teaching curriculums, by seeking an optimal balance between the following three elements: [1] the expertise and study outcomes accumulated in the Faculty of Human Development; [2] the vision underlying the new faculty; and [3] the criteria for certifying teacher-training courses, which have become increasingly rigorous. Through these personal experiences, I have developed a strong conviction that the philosophy of education—developed though studies of diverse visions about teachers based on a holistic view of society and human beings—can and should play a leading role in the search for the ideal qualities of teachers.

(3) Securing "play" in teacher training

In designing teacher training, I have been striving to include a considerable amount of "play" in teacher training programs. In this context, the term "play" refers to room for potential learning and hands-on training that cannot be confined within the framework of current "rational" teacher training, which is most notably characterized by a means-ends schema.

When I explained the practical use of the teacher education standards to other faculty members at Hyogo University of Teacher Education, I repeatedly stressed the following characteristics of such teacher education standards. The standards do not cover all abilities and qualities required for teachers. Even though teachers have diverse types of abilities and personalities as an integral part of their presence, the standards can only list measurable abilities and qualities. Moreover, the standards list the minimum number of abilities and qualities essential for becoming teachers. Accordingly, it must be remembered that there are certainly other important abilities and qualities for teachers that are not specified within the standards.

In preparing and providing their classes, respective faculty members are expected to work to develop students' abilities and qualities as specified in the curriculum maps. At the same time, they are expected not to restrict the desired abilities of teachers to those

specified in the curriculum maps. Instead, faculty members are encouraged to develop the abilities that they believe their students should acquire.

At Kobe University, I am currently striving to prepare curriculums that conform to the vision of the new department while also complying with the standards specified by the Teacher's License Act. Concerning hands-on training at the front line of schools, students are encouraged to participate in long-term school internship programs, in addition to the practice teaching, which has relatively well-established programs and fixed methods. Since the internship programs have greater flexibility, students are expected to build personal relationships with schoolchildren and teachers and learn from such relationships.

Recently, "functionalistic" teacher training is becoming increasingly influential. This of course has positive impacts, but at the same time, it is also true that students should learn beyond the framework of the teacher training provided by their universities so as to meet the changing demands of society and schools. In this sense, it is essential to include a considerable amount of "play" in the teacher training curriculums, as well as in our vision of "ideal" teachers. In preparing this vision and the curriculums, the knowledge accumulated in the philosophy of education should be fully utilized, as researchers of the discipline have been exploring what is possible and what is impossible for education, the significance and limited capacity of rational and goal-oriented education, and the unlimited possibilities of developing diverse human resources.

5. Conclusion

I have discussed the roles and tasks of the philosophy of education in teacher training. In summary, of the two roles of the philosophy of education, I believe that the designing of teacher training is more important than the teaching of the discipline. In the design of teacher training, a considerable amount of "play" should be secured to compensate for today's rational and goal-oriented teacher training in which a priority is placed on achieving set goals.

Finally, researchers in the philosophy of education are expected to exert their leadership in the front line of teacher training. At the same time, however, they are expected to promote more aggressively the importance of the roles of the philosophy of education in the front line of teacher training, as well as in preparation of policies concerning teacher training.

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