

Corporeality and Education: Reconsidering the basis of 'experience' and 'connection'

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The Symposium set by the Board of Directors of the 2022 Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy of Education was *Corporeality and Education: Reconsidering the basis of 'experience' and 'connection'*. In this Symposium Chiharu Fujii reported on "The Concept of Communication on Dewey," Nobuo Fujikawa reported on "Ethnometry Method," and Ayaki Monzen reported on "Technological Transformation of Corporeal Existence".

The Concept of Corporeality was often discussed in the 1970s and 1980s (for example, Hiroshi Ichikawa's *Miwake*(Physical recognition) theory, Masakazu Yamazaki's rhythm theory, Bernhart Waldenfels' self-body theory, etc.), which does not appear to be much discussed today. The purpose of this year's Symposium theme is to reconfirm the reality of our corporeality from the perspective of educational philosophy, based on the social reality of the rapid progress of Information Technology/Digital Transformation(IT/DX) in addition to the Corona Disaster that has continued since the years before last.

Corporeality is an ambiguous concept, but at the very least it is distinguished from the concept of the body. If we trace the history of European philosophical thought, we find that the Japanese word "*sintai*" can be traced back to the Latin word "corpus" and the Greek word "soma". "Soma" is distinguished from "sarx," which is translated as English "flesh". The Latin translation of this "sarx" is "caro". Soma is the gathering of sarx, and in this sense soma means unity and community. This distinction between the corporeal/physical of soma/corpus and of sarx/caro is inherited by the distinction between "Körper/Leib" and "Fleisch" in German, and the distinction between "corps" and "chair"

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in French. And also for example, the meaning of the unity of soma/corpus was inherited by Henri Bergson's concept of "system sensori-moteurs" and by Maurice Merleau-Ponty's concept of "circuit sensori-moteur".

However, it is also possible to establish an ontological concept of corporeality that is distinct from the traditional concept of the body as mentioned above. First of all, it is the real bodily sensation (*sensus corporis* : perception of the five senses) as an experience of perception (in addition, *anima* and *esse*, which means vitality and activity, also can be considered as corporeality). The perception(*affectus*)of the other person through this bodily sensation functions as the context of words and conversations (if this acceptance is poor, the words will become stereotyped and redundant in order to avoid omissions and misunderstandings). What is produced in the mind by this perception is affection(*affectio*). It involves the judgment of right or wrong, and induces(*cultura*)the image of transcendence that are not sensible(as *sensibilis*) but intellectual (as *intelligibilis*).

When we think in this way, corporeality is an experience of creation that realises a connection between my feeling "I am here" and "You are there," in other words, the expanse of "*aida*"(between) that evokes the feeling that I am with others. In other words, one's corporeality is not a thing located in physical space, such as a body or an object, but a place to perceive others, to sympathize with others, and to direct intellectual reality of others. What is really sensed, for example, the "gestures" and "facial expressions" of the other, along with interpretation and inference, creates some kind of recognition of the other (for example, "You are bored") and responds to the other (for example, "I change the topic"). However, what is really sensed may also produce sympathy, an emotion that transcends the distinction between me and others, without interpretation or reasoning, and may also produce a natural my response to the other person (for example, "caring" in primacy). It is not only to human beings, but also to animals and material nature). What is really sensed is also the basis for constructing intellectual reality. To be sure, the construction of this intellectual reality requires the perception of the real. In other words, when what is perceived with attention is real, intellectual reality is carefully sought behind it. For example, when there is a real face in front of one's eyes, that reality is the personality(uniqueness, spirituality) that people carefully look for behind that face. But when what is accepted is virtual reality, intellectual reality becomes less sought after. It is felt as "frustration". For example, when using a webinar, I can see you and hear you, but they are mostly artificial and unreal. Therefore, there is a sense of absence that you cannot feel that you are "there". This absence hinders the formation of your conscious reality.

The trigger that creates the desire for intellectual reality is the perception of the real.

This attenuation of the perception of real things also reduces the perceived things to just an piece of information as a temporary proposition. The fact that corporeality is the main element that creates the expanse of sensitivity-imagination that transcends information suggests that corporeality is the basis of human formation/becoming, which should be reconfirmed in this information-based age.

In the first part of the symposium, three members of the society gave presentations.

Fujii's report examined the flaws in online communication, which have become quite evident during the COVID-19 pandemic. In his last paper published in "Studies in the Philosophy of Education" No.124, he opined that, based on J. Dewey's concept of the plurality of the "self" and its integrity, it is possible for us to "continue the conversation" with "incommensurable others" if we have a "translator" who shares a common part of the "self" with the others in our community. In this report, he again referred to Dewey's concept of "empathy" to expound that antagonisms often become more serious in the internet space because it is difficult to express the plurality of the "self" there. While confirming that Dewey's "empathy" is never the emotional unification but the cognitive "deliberation" of the other, Fujii stated that it is the empathy based on common experience, sense, and feeling confirmed in "activities exposing bodies each other" that makes the bases of the "continuity of conversation" with others.

Fujikawa's report was on his project that aimed to measure children's physical movements in school to support and modify teachers' practical knowledge with empirical evidence. He tried to visualize and present practitioners' impressions of children's physical movements, which may be negated as merely subjective, into reliable knowledge that can be shared and discussed inter-subjectively among teachers to resist the "corruption pressure of evidence" and control by technocrats. Fujikawa insisted that his method of Ethnometry observes two restrictions: indexes of measurement must be set up by the teacher himself/herself, and what is measured must be only the impressions of children's movements, not their bodies or inner states. In a situation where the restrictions are removed (he imagined science fictionally), children will move uniformly according to the provided norms and their inner states will be measured by microchips embedded in their skin. He opined that education should resist such a compulsive pursuit of precise measurement motivated by the fear of an uncertain future, which is symbolized by "death."

Monzen's report was on the theories of corporeality by two philosophers of the Kyoto School, Motomori Kimura and Kiyoshi Miki, and focused on their concept of "Gijutsu" (art/technology). Kimura's term "Gijutsu" shows us the double character of

human corporeality; we "have" bodies as "tools," but we "are" bodies, corporeal existences. A "tool" is the "remote extension" of the body. It works as an extension of the body; at the same time, it calls to the person who makes something with it. In contrast with the collaborative character of the "tool," the "machinery" built up as an "objective body" beyond the "tool" reorganizes human corporeality with its overwhelming power. Kimura regarded it as the root cause of the crisis of the modern age. Miki understood "Gijutsu" as separation from and confrontation with nature as well as a return to nature, based on the concept of "historical nature," which he succeeded from Kitaro Nishida. Miki also paid attention to the "demonic" character of "Gijutsu," in which Monzen tried to find a possibility to overcome the crisis of the modern age.

After the three presentations, we had a question-and-answer session between the three presenters and the participants of the symposium. Topics under discussion include the following themes: How can we realize the negative moments of corporeality, which cannot be controlled by the mind, and bring about discordance? When discussing corporeality, do the presenters presuppose the physical, temporal-spatial co-existence? Should the "empathy" in the sense of Dewey be supported and supplied by educational guidance? Does the concept of "machinery" in the sense of the Kyoto School include the moment of transcendence?

We are now confronting a situation in which our corporeal existence is being transformed irresistibly by a trend referred to as "digital transformation," which is realized by the Global and Innovation Gateway for All School. It is one of the important tasks for the philosophy of education to explicate how we can understand the situation, in order not to be passively affected by the trend. We hope that the symposium helped offer abundant clues for the task.