

Philosophy, Education and Translation: Towards Bidirectional Academic Exchange

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I. Introduction: bidirectional academic exchange

Travel is known to have a broadening effect, at least if the traveller is willing to keep his mind open. The amount of enlightenment which is gained from travel usually depends upon the amount of difference there is between the civilization from which the traveller starts his journey and that of the country at which he arrives. The more unlike the two are, the more opportunity there is for learning. (Dewey 1983, p. 262)

So says the 20th century American philosopher, John Dewey. This essay from which these words are drawn, “Mutual National Understanding,” was written on the occasion of Dewey’s visit to Japan and China. With metaphors of travelling and being on a journey, Dewey expresses his idea of democracy as a way of life that is always being created, and still to be created through mutual learning from difference. He takes the view that, even in the midst of tension and hostility, we human beings can be open to the possibility of reconciliation *if* we learn from our enemies as from “friends” (Dewey 1988). Dewey envisions a kind of *bidirectional* international exchange as a means of our mutual transformation.

In his actual experience, however, Dewey encountered radical difference in the undemocratic culture of Japan at that time—radical to such an extent that his humanitarian position was threatened and aspects of his American philosophy were incommunicable to the Japanese.¹ Dewey’s visit to Japan proved to be a test case in which he was caught out by a real gap in cross-cultural communication—in a foreign place where the English word *democracy* was untranslatable.² Dewey saw a flickering hope for liberalism in Japan, but he left the country in disappointment, especially in

comparison with his more positive subsequent experience during his trip to China (Feuer 1969, p. 143). Despite such apparently negative experience, Dewey wrote the passage above after his trip, sustaining his pragmatist as well as humanist faith in mutual learning from difference. Much as Dewey's hope for mutual learning from difference is called for, at a time when recognition is urgently needed in the face of worldwide tensions, conflicts, and atrocities, its viability is today severely tested. Our age encounters a greater difficulty than did Dewey's times in that the spirit of mutual learning is blocked by fear and anxiety.

Under these circumstances, what might be the role of international academic societies in facilitating such mutual national understanding as Dewey envisioned? Today in the 21st century, the term *internationalization* has become a catchphrase in higher education. In educational policy statements, the phrase is oftentimes coloured by the busy, even aggressive discourse of global markets and the apparently pioneering crossing of borders between different countries and different cultures. Academic associations around the world need to respond to this trend. The sanguine confidence that is expressed in internationalization is apt to hide the experience of those who find themselves to be strangers in a foreign environment. There is no space to acknowledge the sense of alienation – of getting lost, of losing one's way (perhaps literally, in the street), of losing one's bearings in unknown places. When we encounter radical difference, we feel our sense of identity is threatened. We can easily close our hearts, insulate ourselves from the outside world. Then the words we exchange in the name of internationalization become militant, defensive and insulated. Academic exchange ends up merely with the exchange of neutral data and information. This will prevent us from being genuinely *international*, making us blind to the possibility of the rich experience we might otherwise obtain from the other.

Hence, the specific questions I would like to address in this paper are as follows. How can we make academic associations in the humanities, including in the philosophy of education, places for mutual learning between friends – resisting something in ourselves that holds back from this? How can we make international exchange genuinely bidirectional? These are questions that are crucial if the philosophy of education is to be internationalized in a global way. In response this paper proposes a turn from one-directional and one-dimensional communication to bidirectional translation. I shall, first, refer to three international academic associations in Europe and in the U. S. A. and observe the general features of their being *international* academic communities. Second, the problem of monolingualism is illustrated, along with some fallacies that arise in connection with language. Third, a way out of the constraints of monolingual mentalities is sought from the perspective of translation. In particular, from the standpoint of Stanley

Cavell's idea of *philosophy as translation*, the paper explores translation as a metonym for human life and thought. Finally, based upon the idea of translation, I shall propose a vision of international academic community for mutual learning.

II. International academic associations in an Anglophone context

As a start, I would like to refer to three academic societies for the philosophy of education that were established in Anglophone countries and in Europe: Philosophy of Education Society (in North America) (PES), Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain (PESGB) and International Network of Philosophers of Education (INPE). PES was founded in 1941 and its headquarters is in the U. S. A. As of June 2019, there are about 230 members and 27 are from Canada and Mexico, 38 from other countries. There is an affiliated yearbook, *Philosophy of Education*, where conference papers are published online, while there are also close connections with the journal *Educational Theory*. The PESGB was established in 1964. It is based in the U.K., and its membership numbers some 750 people (about 50% of the membership being international). Its journal is the *Journal of Philosophy of Education*. It is also pertinent to mention in this context the International Network of Philosophers of Education, which was established in 1988. As a point of principle, it has no base in any particular country but rather is run by a gradually evolving executive committee, led by a president whose office has no fixed term. (The INPE conference, which is biennial, was held in Japan, in Kyoto in 2008 and nearly two hundred people from around the world participated).

They are all international in many respects, but in different styles. Let us first take PESGB. PESGB is constituted and organized predominantly by UK scholars or those who are located in the UK. In this sense, it is a *British* society. It is international, however, in four respects. First, being British, it already involves some multicultural and international components. Then, on a second level, the UK is already quasi-international in that it is constituted by four different, distinct parts – the countries of England, Scotland and Wales, and the at times troubled and in some ways disputed territory of Northern Ireland. Third, the UK, though in the process of Brexit, is still part of the looser structure of the European Union, which has important significance in terms of academic association. The PESGB has for decades enjoyed strong connections with other European nations. Finally, the PESGB is international in the most straightforward sense: participation in Society events by people outside the UK has been increasing. For example, approximately half of the 200 participants at the 2019 Annual Conference were

from countries other than the UK.

This multi-layered international character makes the conference and the Society very friendly to overseas participants. While a high rigor of presentation in English is expected, one feels less foreign than being in PES. This is very much related to the fact that a significant number of the participants are non-native speakers of English. Despite such international quality, the members of the Executive Committee are predominantly British. Given that this is a British association, the center-periphery structure of course exists, but I find PESGB to be a loose form of international community with British people being at the center surrounded by international members. Furthermore, one distinctive feature of this association is that its work was originally mainly characterized by analytical philosophy, though over the past twenty-five years more continental philosophy have been included, sometimes in a degree of tension with the analytical approach. Perhaps this is another element that adds to the international quality of this association.

In comparison to the international nature of the PESGB, PES is, let's say, more American-oriented. PES is a Northern American academic association, in which the USA of course plays the major part. The majority of the participants are Americans, though of course, being American already involves being multicultural. But the sense of being American, and of the United States as the nation, permeates the general atmosphere. In comparison to PESGB, PES has a much stronger center-periphery structure, between Americans and non-Americans. Board members are predominantly Americans. This does not mean that PES is exclusive or unfriendly to outsiders: it is relatively open to them, and politically it is liberal in that multicultural elements are outspokenly emphasized and valued – more consciously perhaps than at PESGB. Race and feminist studies, for example, are popular topics for presentation. The actual number of international participants, however, is relatively small: for example, at the annual conference in March 2019, about one fourth out of the 160 participants were international. International elements are, as it were, an addition to the central core of American participants. Despite my longer-term (nearly 20-year) affiliation with PES than with PESGB, I am more conscious of being a foreigner at PES than at PESGB, even though I feel more at home at PES. INPE is the most “international” in terms of its inclusion of diverse nations and of the form of its organization. The membership is roughly 100. There is no central office at INPE and no tie to any particular country. In a sense, it is nomadic.³ Board members, of which I am one, come from a variety of countries (Norway, Japan, Italy.....).

The advantage and disadvantage of this academic community is that there is no

central influence exercised by a single nation. The common language for presentation is English, though in some meetings in the past, parallel sessions have been held in the local language (for example, in Spanish in Madrid (2004) and in Bogotá). In this community, all are foreigners. English is the *lingua franca*, a common language, but tolerance to the diversity of English is highest in this conference. East and West dialogue is facilitated more than in PESGB or PES.⁴ It sounds like an ideal form of international association, but since this is a very loose network with no central core, there is always a sense of fragility in terms of its basis, and it requires constant efforts to sustain the sense of commitment among members and of belonging to this association.

There are two distinctive common features of these three international associations. First, there is the *interdisciplinary* nature of papers presented and published. The discipline of philosophy of education is flexibly identified, and philosophy is opened to and in dialogue with such disciplines as literature, religion and political studies. Second, there is their emphasis on the educational implications of philosophical studies. In order for submitted papers to be accepted, what kind of impact a certain philosophy can have in education must be explicitly mentioned, or, conversely, an educational topic or issue must be raised and subjected to philosophical enquiry.

As much as all of those associations are, on the surface, open to internationalization, further questions need to be asked in order to see to what extent they provide occasions for internationalizing philosophy of education. First and foremost, is the issue of language. In all these associations, even in INPE whose activities are not necessarily limited to Anglophone contexts, the common language is *English* – though, of course, the way English plays its roles is different in these three associations. In PES, English tends to be the driving force to determine the center (North America who are native speakers of English) and the periphery (non-American, non-native speakers). In PESGB, the dichotomy is not as stark as PES, but still, native speakers of English are more vocal than non-native speakers, and they tend to play a central role in organizations and publications. In INPE, the situation is different, and English does not necessarily serve to create any particular center: the *lingua franca* is not English but English-as-a-second-language. The majority of participants communicate in a language (English) that is not their native tongue. Of course, a good command of English is expected for submitted papers to be accepted, and they need to create common ground through English for smooth communication.

Second, and associated with this first point, there exists an inevitable tendency to solidify identities through English, while also welcoming diverse identities and different Englishes. PES and PESGB in effect consolidate their identities through English;

language other than English tends to be a negative factor – a potential obstruction to understanding the arguments at issue and perhaps a weakening of the central identity. INPE does not seem to prioritise or establish any central identity and if there is anything like identity, it can be multiple. It is a very open community, with a flexible flow of incoming and outgoing of members from all around the world. (Interestingly there are comparatively few participants from the United States!) One might call this a cosmopolitan community. On the negative side, it is unstable in sustaining its identities.

Third, there is the inevitable imbalance between cultures, especially between East and West. In all of these three societies, there is no such a thing as Orientalism – a romanticizing of the East in the eyes of West. Still, the majority of papers accepted, presented and published, and ideas circulated are associated mainly with *western* ideas in some way or other. Whenever the “East” comes up (whether it is pedagogy in the East or some aboriginal Eastern religious tradition), it tends to be in the form of some unknown, exceptional, or even eccentric ideas to be promulgated rather than anything that might produce a substantial change in people’s ways of thinking and that can have impact on the whole discourse in philosophy of education. There exists not only imbalance here between East and West here.

III. Internationalization and the global dominance of English: Constraints of monolingualism

As the examples of the three academic associations have shown, English is now common language of academic exchange, and this very fact seems to be inseparable from a certain imbalance in internationalization. The global dominance of English and policy transfer from west to east has produced the currency of thought and language that runs from west to east, bringing forth a certain form of colonization of thought.

In his “Social Justice in Translation” (2011), Paul Standish reflects on the hegemony of English in academic research in social science and educational studies. English expressions carry a certain authority. He argues that such a key term as “social justice” in English, precisely because it is English, has been given importance in the process of policy borrowing – in such a way as to distort the way we think about the series of things: the term is itself imported into or adapted in the language in use, effectively suppressing the different range of significance that a translation of the term might have. The numbers of publications in educational research worldwide is predominantly in English. Measurement of research quality gives priority to publication in English. Hence, he

argues: “Anglophone researchers have an obvious advantage in this process” (p. 73). At the same time, however, the global spread of English can create opportunities, in a counter-movement, to enlighten the monolingual (native English-speaker) and to broaden the range of understanding that can be shared.

Under these circumstances, Standish emphasizes that “the traffic is likely to be one-way” as it involves the relationship with Anglophone countries. Comparative study, especially in the United States, tends to be undertaken out of “purely academic interest” (ibid.). This one-way traffic, however, is not necessarily an advantage for the native speakers of English. Chinese speakers, for example, who translate “social justice” into Chinese, can experience a difference in range of meanings, whereas native speakers of English who encounter only the English terminology of social justice, cannot experience such different possibilities of meanings (p. 74). The dismissal of such experience is a kind of “suppression of thought, of which the monolingual person may be unaware” (ibid.). The suppression of thought and of the possibilities of meanings in language by monolingualism is not, however, limited to native speakers of English; one-directionality is not necessarily from west to east. A reaction to the global dominance of English is found, for example, in the “Japanese model” of internationalization.⁵ In this project of exporting Japanese ideas and practices, there lies the possibility, however, of further one-way traffic, from east to west. While such a model seeks mutual understanding by communicating the ideas of Japan, there is an enshrining of Japan with the reactionary turn to the primordial origins of Japanese culture and Japanese identity.

In reality, however, cultural identity is not so straightforward. In discussing Naoki Sakai’s argument on the issue of translating subjectivity into Japanese (*shukan, shutai*) (Sakai 1997), Standish points out the structure of “double-grafting” in Japanese identities – the grafting of an image of Japan on Japan determined by Western notions of identity (Standish 2011, p. 76).

In other words, the East’s construction of the West is grafted on a Western construction of the East, but the origin of such identity-construction is in Western forms of representation and objectification, and Western notions of identity. (p. 79).

What is suggested here is that there is a dilemma for Japan: the alleged Japanese identity that is exported to the West in reality takes a form that depends upon a Western construction. (And this further indicates the deep power structures created by the hegemony of English.) What is called Japan, its identity, in fact, carries complexities and

obscurities. Such complexities destabilize the illusion of the secure ground of national identity, which is a form of monolingualism.

And in fact, such monolingualism is deeply related to certain fallacies in our understanding of language – ones that lie behind and aggravate monolingualism and one-directionality of communication. The first is the idea that language is primarily *a means* of communication. The second is the idea that major languages are *pure*. The assumption of purity tends to be assumed in models of translation – where source language and target language are unproblematically identified. But in fact no language is totally independent of others, and variations in language occur in messy and uneven ways. Third, there is the assumption that meaning is stable at the level of concepts and logic, and variations in natural language do not matter. Logic is without ambiguity, and this is taken as an ideal of meaningfulness and of thought. But in fact the ambiguity of words – their openness to new connections and association, and the unavoidable role of interpretation that comes with this – is essential to our lives and culture and to the world that we have. This may present us with problems at times, but it is also the source of creativity and development and the production of thought.

A monolingual view of language is based on false views of language and, in turn, reinforces them. Where such a view is prevalent, it seems to justify one-way traffic in international communication. And of course, when such one-way traffic is propelled by English, colonial tendencies are promoted and power structures are reinforced. Hence, internationalization, if it is to overcome one-directionality and monolingualism, should first be aware of the aforementioned fallacies in language, and open itself to the experience of translation.

IV. Philosophy as Translation

Translation is widely viewed as a primarily technical procedure – just a matching of words from one language to those of another in the light of a common range of meaning. But in reality the translator is engaged in a practice where she is not simply governed by rules (like matching temperature scales) but is constantly exercising judgment – judgement in the absence of a rule. It follows from the above also that no perfect translation is possible – hence the Italian adage: *traduttore traditore* (A translator is a traitor). In a sense, then, we cannot translate, but we must translate! Translation is imperfect but necessary. The experience of this unbridgeable gap brings us humility in the way we perceive the world, and it involves receptivity to new possibilities of thought.

In relation to this sense of a gap, Derrida talks about the abyssal nature of language and its haunted quality (Derrida 2002, pp. 194-195). The haunting of language of which Derrida speaks is evident because “the words we use, the very terms of our thought, are . . . available to us only from origins we cannot know, with connotations we cannot fully fathom” (Standish 2010, p. 364). Language is not simply a set of tools of communication but has this haunted nature. It is this very spectral aspect of language that leaves us at a loss, that puts us on the edge of the abyss – in a position that is precisely the “space for responsibility and judgment” (ibid.). The translation that accompanies such experience of loss and exercise of judgment, then, is integral to human being, which is to say, to linguistic being.

The views of the American philosopher, Stanley Cavell also carry a sense of the fragility, even the abyssal nature, of the human relation to language, but they diverge in some degree from those of Derrida in terms of the place and prominence given to the idea of the ordinary. Neither indulges in a romanticization of the ordinary; but while Derrida, in suspicion, subjects it to doubt, Cavell embraces it as already troubled or disturbed. Under the influence of the later Wittgenstein and Austin, as well as that of the American transcendentalism of Emerson and Thoreau, Cavell develops a distinctive ordinary language philosophy (Cavell 1979). He hardly ever talks about translation explicitly, and yet in his pursuit of ordinary language philosophy, the idea of translation appears both as a substantive feature and as itself thematized (Standish and Saito 2017a; Saito 2019). His language itself performatively enacts this process of translation, in all its transitivity and volatility.

Cavell’s takes translation beyond any simple sense of linguistic exchange. This is captured most acutely in Cavell’s book on Thoreau’s *Walden*, *The Senses of Walden* (Cavell 1992). Thoreau expresses the sense of transitivity that inheres in language as follows:

The volatile truth of our words should continually betray the inadequacy of the residual statement. Their truth is instantly translated; its literal monument alone remains. The words which express our faith and piety are not definite; yet they are significant and fragrant like frankincense to superior natures. (Thoreau 1992, p. 217)

What is implied here is something like the following. The meaning of words always extends beyond what we intend. That the truth is instantly “translated” suggests that it refuses to be fixed and shifts. Even if you think you are achieving true expression, that

expression immediately falls out of your hands and becomes lifeless words. The residual statement on the page symbolizes the representationalist view of language and hints at the deadening effects of this conception. Words and their objects are not in a one-to-one relationship of correspondence: words do not just represent the world. Language does not serve to solidify the objects or meanings: rather it allows us to confront a gap that lies between the occurrence of words and their objects: what an object is not stable either. Yet such dead words can be revived, translated into live words. As Cavell says, any sign opens to new possibilities—which he describes in terms of the “projective” nature of language: a word always exceeds its existing context and is open to new usages and contexts (Cavell 1979, p. 180). This is at the heart of translation. In translation, thought comes off its tracks. Yet this shows something about how language works: it exemplifies the movement of thought that takes place within language; it reflects ways that, as Thoreau puts it, language puts words to work; and it reveals the dynamism that inheres in them. Through it, we regain our surprise at what is beyond our grasp.

The nature of language shows something also of the nature of human being, as linguistic being. Thus, the identity of the self does not remain the same but is always open to new possibilities. The self is “always to be found” (Cavell 1992, p. 53). As Cavell says, “Thoreau’s book on *Walden* can be taken as a whole to be precisely about the problem of translation, call it the transfiguration from one form of life to another” (Cavell, forthcoming). In Cavell’s ordinary language philosophy, against the conventional understanding, translation is at work not only inter- but intralingually: it is a part of language’s intrinsic nature, permeating our life as a whole. In the sense that translation itself is transformation, translation is not a metaphor of human transformation: rather it is the metonym of our lives (Standish and Saito 2017, p. 2). As Cavell says, “I consider that it is an essential moment in the work of philosophy to make human existence, or show it to be, strange to itself” (Cavell, forthcoming). It is this very endeavor of making the familiar strange that is the process of translation. With all these features, we might think of Cavell’s as *philosophy as translation*.

Translation involves an attunement to what happens in the encounter between different languages, and this ordinarily involves the experience of a gap—of the incommensurable, of the “untranslatable” (Cassin 2014). Philosophy as translation does not take up the untranslatable as a problem to be solved: it does not seek some definitive answer to the question of whether full translation is possible. The point is rather that in encountering the untranslatable we can gain some intimation of the way that we must find ourselves and, hence, are founded without fixed foundation. The untranslatable brings us back to the fact, therefore, that the criteria for our judgment are generally a work

in progress, recreated in our daily expression, tested against one another. And so, from within the abyss, right in the middle of transition, it is still possible to find a foundation. This is not, however, a metaphysical foundation that gives us ultimate guarantee, and we do not need it.

What does it happen within such experience of translation? We find ourselves, Cavell says, on “some boundary or threshold, as between the impossible and the possible” (Cavell, forthcoming).⁶ Translation reveals the impulse to transcendence inherent in language, producing “a new revelation within an old familiarity” (Ibid.). It accompanies the sense of the obscure, the ambiguous. Quoting Thoreau’s words, “I do not suppose I have attained to obscurity” (Thoreau 1992, p. 217; Cavell 1992, p. 50), Cavell suggests that our relationship with language is the matter of an endless engagement with the obscure. Against the (Western) philosophical quest for clarity, Cavell’s worldview is permeated by a Wittgensteinian sense of the obscure and the transient (the ungraspable). It is only by going through the obscure that one can “lay the foundation of true expression” (Thoreau 1992, p. 216). This might be called a *realism of the obscure* (Saito 2017a) – keeping faith in a reality of the world that cannot be fully illuminated under light. It is this imperfect answerability in translation that is the condition, in humility, of opening ourselves to the other. Confronting the impossibility of solution, the unknown, we lose ourselves. The success of translation hinges on regaining new interest and trust in the world with the rebirth of words. What is at stake here is the experience of transcendence through leaving and abandoning (Cavell 1992, p. 137).

Philosophy as translation emphasizes the unknowability and gap in the untranslatable. This, however, does not point to agnosticism, relativism or anarchism. Cavell’s antifoundationalist view of language, along with Wittgenstein’s, reminds of constraints imposed upon the human being who is inevitably destined for language community – the criteria of language and the culture of the community into which one is born: these criteria are there already but they are not static; they are always in the making or being remade. From within such constraints, and in the light of them, criteria continue to be revised. From such limits – as a result of a risk-taking that transcends borders and disturbs them – the possibility of a language of “extravagance” is produced.

V. Towards an open academic community

How, in international academic exchange, can the monolingualistic view of language and the mentality that goes with this be reconsidered now within scope of philosophy as

translation? How can international academic communities be places for mutual learning, beyond the limits of one-directionality? Philosophy as translation points us to a different direction than the stereotypical call for making a conference multilingual as a reaction to the dominance of English. “Ideological position taking,” as Standish points out, “is commonly shored up by monolingualisms of various kinds” (Standish 2010, p. 366). A trace of such position-taking can be seen where the step is taken to make an academic conference more equal and multicultural – by, for example, introducing session in Spanish, in parallel to sessions in English. In reality, such attempts can turn into a closure of communication by creating divisions between languages and cultures, triggering a monolingual mentality. Hence, what is at stake here is not so much an ideological insistence upon a kind of equality between languages, but the problematization of how language is understood, inviting a change in the way that we perceive and are engaged in language – including English itself. The sharing of this experience is something that the common use of English can, in fact, facilitate: an effort needs to be made to take up this opportunity.

Thus, I would like to propose to shift in the mode of dialogue from the symmetrical discourse of mutual respect and presumed commensurability to the acceptance of a relationship of disequilibrium – one that acknowledges an unbridgeable gap and the sense of loss in communication. As Cavell indicates, such dialogue is not so much a matter of the social project of Rawlsian cooperation based upon fairness and justice: as the locus for conversation marked by the opacity, or non-transparency, of the present state of our interactions” (Cavell 2004, p. 173; Standish 2011, p. 78) – a kind of conversation in which we lend our ears to and expose ourselves to the dissonant voices of the other, disturbing any cosy, self-compliant state of equilibrium and gaining the momentum for self-abrogation. It involves the constant conflict and tension within self-knowledge – whether it involves academic knowledge or knowledge of one’s cultural identity.

More specifically translation can be a mode of academic dialogue that can have impact on academic organizations and on the way philosophy of education is practiced in the following respects. First, it encourages us to redeem the position of those who speak languages other than their own. Imbalance and inequality in terms of the use of English can be reconsidered from the perspective of translation as an advantage of the non-native speakers as they can make best use of the lesson the untranslatable offers. They can contribute by drawing attention to the difference between expressions in English and those in their native language, highlighting the different fields of meaning that are thereby opened up.

Second, philosophy as translation teaches us the significance of *not* solidifying

identities. Rather than shoring up identity, what is important is readiness to become. The experience of translation helps us question anew our relation to our native language and go beyond the limits of our home ground. Philosophy as translation presents a third way, beyond the ethnocentric consolidation of cultural identities, on the one hand, and beyond borderless cosmopolitanism, on the other.

Third, the experience of translation in the common use of English along with a foreign expressions can heighten the sense of being outside. A good example is a joint panel between Korean, Taiwanese and Japanese scholars on Asian philosophy in Philosophy of Education Society (March 2018). Those who originally have relatively stable relationship with their native language (Japanese, Korean and Chinese) are exposed to a new horizon of language by use of English as a common language and yet as a second language. Dialogue in such a panel can be a place to re-see one's own culture from outside.

The use of foreign language accompanies the experience of *ecstasy* – in Thoreau's words, of being "beside oneself in a sane sense" (Thoreau 1992) – sane in the sense that being crazy (i.e. beside oneself) is a positive occasion to re-see oneself from outside – to be thrown out of one's self, to lose one's ground momentarily. The sense of struggle over words, the sense of loss the untranslatable brings in does not mean to stop thinking and judging in mystifying the unknown: rather it provides us with a chance for creating judgment out of chaos and triggers our efforts for finding common ground in meanings out of the lack of shared ground. Hence, this is the significance of the presence of outsiders and space for strangers in academic associations to make them truly international from within. The remembrance of the sense of being outside into the mode of dialogue can help overturn the existing centre-periphery structure in English speaking academic associations – overturning the relationship between the native and the non-native speakers of English, blurring the boundary between inside and outside. Presence of non-native speakers of English is to be welcomed and even celebrated as an opportunity to enlighten the monolingual and to broaden the range of understanding that can be shared.

Thus, translation makes possible a turning from one-directionality to bidirectionality, and from symmetrical exchange to *other-directedness* derived from disequilibrium. Once we realize this, we can create educational occasions in academic conferences where the art of translation is cultivated. This is a significant factor in making academic associations genuinely open. Academic associations, especially in the humanities, can be reconstructed as places for mutual learning and get deeper into the inner lives of other people, as Dewey mentioned. And this can be begun by reconsidering

the way we are engaged in organizing discussion, using words, raising questions and presenting our ideas.

For academic associations to be really international, they should become communities in which everyone can share the sense of being foreigners – both native and non-native speakers of English. The reconstruction of an academic system should begin from within: it requires internal human transformation of each participant and the cultivation of the art of translation. Such other-directed exchange is educational by nature. It is here that philosophy of education can serve its role in promoting educational studies as a mediator between different academic disciplines and between theory and practice. There are questions that come up frequently – in INPE, PES, and PESGB that are less likely to be heard in Japan or China or Korea or Taiwan: for example, questions about multicultural societies or about the oppression of some groups, and maybe questions about gender too, including the raising of LGBT issues; also perhaps it is the case that questions about the governance of education occur more in PES and PESGB. To be international and interdisciplinary, and to heighten our global awareness, perhaps, philosophy of education should open its eyes more to these practical issues in daily practices without undue anxiety about maintaining theoretical purity.

Questions in the philosophy of education are not, by nature, peculiar to one country (e.g., the nature of knowledge, how we enter into language and become persons, what is worth studying, the nature of the good life and the good society). These are fundamental questions for education, and they typically provoke a divergence of views in all countries. There are ways in which insight into local practice can cast light on these questions. Hence, the standpoint of translation that I have expounded in this paper indicates a way of making best use of such quests for universality in the philosophy of education, through the mutual inspirations of diverse cultures, languages and ideas. And yet, as I have emphasized, it would not take a problem-solving direction of ideological position-taking by calling forth multilingualism and simply by expelling English as a common language. Translation is a way of modifying the existing power structure from a different route than rectifying the imbalance between powers.⁷

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¹ Dewey acknowledged that "Japan is a unique country, one whose aims and methods are baffling to any foreigner" (Dewey 1982, p. 171).

² Dewey saw a flickering hope for liberalism in Japan, but he left the country in disappointment, especially in

comparison with his more positive subsequent experience during his trip to China (p. 143).

³ Recent annual meetings have been held in such countries as Hungary (1988), England (1990), Bulgaria (1992), Belgium (1994), South Africa (1996), Turkey (1998), Australia (2000), Norway (2002), Spain (2004), Malta (2006), Japan (Kyoto, 2008), Columbia (2010), Ethiopia (2012), Italy (2014), Warsaw (2016) and Israel (2018) and the next meeting will be held in Mexico (2020). Board members, of which I am one, come from a variety of countries (Norway, Japan, Italy.); the current President is a Canadian, now located in Ireland.

⁴ In the biennial meeting of 2016 in Warsaw, for which I served as Programme Chair, the conference theme was “Philosophy as Translation and the Understanding of Other Cultures,” and there was much dialogue between East and West.

⁵ Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology promotes “Lessons of the Japanese Model Education for Overseas Development and Promotion” and it tries to develop attractive Japanese education abroad. <https://www.eduport.mext.go.jp/summary/index.html>

⁶ For more detailed account on the connection between Cavell’s ordinary language philosophy and his idea of translation, see Standish and Saito 2017: 2-4.

⁷ This paper draws on the author’s following publications and international project “Philosophy as Translation and Understanding Other Cultures: Interdisciplinary Research in Philosophy and Education for Bidirectional Internationalization (Supporting Program for Interaction-based Initiative Team Studies [SPIRITS] (Interactive Model and International Model) (2013-2017); Naoko Saito, “Philosophy as Translation and Understanding Other Cultures: Becoming a Global Citizen through Higher Education,” *Educational Studies in Japan: International Yearbook*, No. 9 (2015): pp. 17-26; Naoko Saito and Naomi Hodgson, *Philosophy as Translation and the Understanding of Other Cultures* (Taylor and Francis, 2018); Standish, Paul, and Saito, Naoko (eds), *Stanley Cavell and Philosophy as Translation: “The Truth is Translated”* (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2017); Naoko Saito, Paul Standish and Yasuo Imai (eds) *Social Justice in Translation* (University of Tokyo Press, 2018) (Japanese); Naoko Saito, “Philosophy as Translation: Towards Other Directed International Exchange in Education,” *Kyoikugaku Kenkyu* (Japanese Educational Research Association, 2019); pp. 162-175 (Japanese); Naoko Saito, *American Philosophy in Translation* (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019).