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‘Beispiel’ as a Medium of ‘Bildung’:
Günther Buck’s Interpretation of Kant

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to clarify the contents of Günther Buck’s ‘Bildung’ theory, with respect to his concept of ‘Beispiel’ and his interpretation of Kant’s theory. In this paper, I present Buck’s Beispiel’ concept as a medium of ‘Bildung’, the German word for education, and I suggest that ‘Beispiel’ is a mediator between the empirical and ideal worlds, between heteronomy and autonomy, and between historicity and universality.

As a 20th century German pedagogist and philosopher, Buck was a student of Hans-Georg Gadamer. Early in his studies, Buck passed away, leaving few published works, and his following has been small. Interest in Buck has recently grown in Germany within pedagogy studies; however, the relationship between Buck and Kant has not yet been investigated.

This paper is organised into three sections. In the first section, I clarify the problem between historicity and universality by examining Kant’s focus on the universality of morality and comparing it to Gadamer’s emphasis on historicity. Then, I examine how Buck attempts to resolve this conflict. In the second section, I investigate his concept of experience. While Buck’s theory of experience is influenced by Gadamer, it remains uniquely his own, especially with respect to universality. In the third section, I establish Buck’s ‘Beispiel’ as a medium for education.

In conclusion, Buck attempts to solve specific pedagogical problems by engaging in the challenge of closing the gap between historicity and universality, and thus illuminates the transition from heteronomy to autonomy. In Buck’s ‘Bildung’ theory, historicity and universality are united harmoniously.

Key words

Günther Buck, Gadamer, Kant, Hermeneutics, Bildung

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Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to elucidate Günther Buck's (1925–1983) 'Bildung' theory in the context of his reception of Kant. I then show how the concept of 'Beispiel' is a mediating device for the universality and historicity of 'Bildung' in Buck's theory of 'Bildung'.

Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002) had the first decisive influence on Buck's theory of 'Bildung'. Gadamer was Buck's mentor and was known as the author of *Wahrheit und Methode.* Buck's theory of 'Bildung' is a continuation of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutic position that 'understanding' is 'the way of being itself' (GW2: 440). In that sense, it is legitimate for Pauls, a current leader of 'Buck Studies', to identify Buck's 'Bildung' theory as 'hermeneutic Bildung'[1]. By relying on Buck's theory of 'Bildung', Pauls essentially re-critiques the position that restricts pedagogical research to the empirical and its spheres, and it attempts to separate the normative aspects from pedagogy as 'non-disciplinary'. Schenk, in her voluminous book, *Praktische Pädagogik als Paradigma* (2017)*,* clearly shares this position[2], as she relies on Buck's vision of hermeneutical 'Bildung' in an ambitious attempt to establish a 'practical pedagogy' for contemporary pedagogy. The significance of Schenk's study is that it provides a detailed interpretation that reveals the validity of Buck's ideas to contemporary discussions by drawing on his texts, showing their relevance to temporal problems of education, despite Buck's having remained the 'implicitly acknowledged landlord' of 'Bildung' theory[3].

The current paper generally agrees with this position while interpreting Buck's thought from an alternate perspective. First, I focus on the difference between Buck and Gadamer's relationship, which has traditionally been understood as a continuum. Although he was not a pedagogue himself, Gadamer's thought contains several elements of pedagogical issues, though there were not many previous works on the subject[4].

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[1] In his book, Pauls, the leader of 'Buck Studies', relies especially on Buck's work *Hermeneutik und Bildung*, and describes his conception of 'action hermeneutics' as a 'hermeneutic theory of Bildung' that takes on Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. cf. Pauls: 2009.

[2] Cf. Schenk 2017.

[3] Cf. Schenk/Pauls 2014: 9. This collection of essays, edited by Pauls and Schenk, includes contributions from many German pedagogues, and indicates the high level of interest in Buck. The contents range from intrinsic readings of key Buck concepts, such as negativity and hermeneutics, to comparisons with Dewey and discussions of the applicability of Buck's ideas to sociological methodology. However, 'Buck Studies' is still in its infancy, and there is no solid image of Buck. Thus, it is necessary to continue to follow the research trends in this regard.

[4] In Gadamer's thought, too, the concept of 'Bildung' plays a role that cannot be overlooked, as it has an entry in Wahrheit und Methode. Ozeki's discussion is more detailed on this point. Grondin also discusses the relationship between Gadamer's thought and education. Both agree on the following points. First, they both see the process of human development as a process of opening one's own perspective, which occurs through 'dialogue' with others.

However, although Buck's thought is a continuation of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutic, there is a crucial difference between the two. This difference is not a hidden criticism of Buck's Gadamer but rather a 'transformation' such as philosophical hermeneutics inevitably undergo when brought into the field of pedagogy. This transformation is an inevitable element of pedagogy. First, I focus on the differences between the Buck and Gadamer, which have not been emphasised in previous studies. Second, I focus on the relationship between Buck and Kant. To the best of my knowledge, no previous studies have focused on interpretations of Kant. However, in Buck's theory of 'Bildung', Kant's philosophy is so important that it can be considered in tandem with Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics. While Schenk's work is remarkable for its intrinsic analysis of Buck's thought and for raising its contemporary significance, it does not, by the author's own admission, do enough to consider the relationship between Buck and the thinkers who had an important influence on him (Schenk 2017: 19). From these two perspectives, the current paper aims to reveal an ideological linkage on which previous studies have been inadequately focused and, by emphasising the immediate problems of education, to bring the image of 'Buck the Thinker' to light in a different way than previous studies.

Buck's intention is neither to overcome Kant with Gadamer nor to criticise Gadamer in his reliance on Kant. Rather, he attempts to actively incorporate both into the context of Bildung' theory. Buck attempts to interpret the historicity of philosophical hermeneutics and the universality beyond the experience of critical philosophy in a consistent, non-contradictory manner. In so doing, the concept of paradigms plays an important role as a medium for both. Buck's concept of paradigms represents the process of the transformation of philosophical hermeneutics and critical philosophy as they meet in the magnetic field of pedagogy. Witnessing this transformation process is a modest attempt of the current study.

In the following section, I briefly describe the path of this study. In the first section, I take a pedagogical perspective to clarify the problems of Kant's critical philosophy and Gadamer's critique of it. As I see it, this problem is related to the 'aporia of autonomy and heteronomy', which is important for pedagogy. Then, I depict Buck's theory of 'Bildung' as an attempt to mediate the conflict between 'universality and historicity' that characterises this conflict between Kant and Gadamer. In the second section, I identify the issues of 'experience' and 'universality' as cornerstones in Buck's theory of 'Bildung'.

Second, they emphasise the importance of what they call the 'classical' in this process. Third, they both characterise it as 'humanistic'. Ozeki 2002; Grondin 2012.

Buck adopts the concept of experience from Gadamer but modifies it significantly to make it part of his theory of 'Bildung'. For Buck, experience and universality are inextricably linked. The role of mediating this experience and universality is given to the exemplars. Finally, in the third section, I reveal the moral dimension of 'Beispiel'. This is significant because the universality of 'Beispiel' includes a dimension of 'universality' not only in a mere theoretical sense, but also with a moral dimension. This section clarifies the dimensions by focusing primarily on Buck's interpretation of Kritik der Urteilskraft. The goal of this paper is to describe the process of ideogenesis in which the historicity of philosophical hermeneutics and the universality of critical philosophy dissolve in Buck and emerge as a bi-directional theory of 'Bildung'.

1. The Conflict Between Universality and Historicity

1. 1 The Moral Law and the Difficulties of Education

In this section, I first discuss the 'paradox of freedom and education' in Kant[5]. Moral law is the prescriptive basis for freedom in Kant. For humans to be free and autonomous, they must be willing to obey moral law:

> The autonomy of the will is the only principle of all moral laws and the duty to comply with them. (...) Therefore, the moral law is the very expression of pure reason, the autonomy of freedom. This autonomy of liberty is the only formal condition that brings all ratings in line with the highest practical law. (Kant V: 33)

Universality, according to Kant, is based on moral law. It is the moral law that every subject must willingly and unconditionally obey, and it is precisely in this respect that universality is sought.

[5] However, in the study of Kant, there is an attempt to understand this aporia in a consistent manner within the framework of Kant. For example, Tanida argues that Kant's educational thought is not fully developed in pedagogy, and that its true value lies in the concept of the 'establishment of character' in his theory of religion. Omori, however, argues that pedagogy has inherent value and focuses mainly on the concept of 'moralisation', but in so doing, he emphasises the difference between religious and educational theories in contrast to the position of Tanida and others. Koch, like Buck, focuses on the concept of 'inheritance' in his interpretation. However, Koch sees 'imitation' and inheritance as disconnected, and autonomy based on custom and freedom as opposed to each other. Hirose has also conducted an interesting study of Kant's 'Natural Geography' in which he seeks the possibility of reconciling the empirical and the ideal and attempts to discover the possibility of overcoming the aporia of autonomy and otherness in 'geography education', based on this. cf. Tanida 1994; Koch 2003; Omori 2013; Hirose 2017.

However, from a pedagogical point of view, moral law is fraught with substantial difficulty. If we follow this scheme, education is an operation to make unfree, trans-disciplinary beings obey moral law, yet it is the greatest paradox that pedagogy encounters in Kant. The question that arises is whether autonomy through education is possible in the first place. In other words, even if it were possible, through education, to achieve autonomy through the actions of others, does it not go beyond the state of transitivity because it is not caused by the self, but by others?

Kant does not believe that the transition is smooth from the empirical realm (heteronomy) to the ideal realm (autonomy). Rather, this transition is characterised as a ‘revolution, a leap’ (Suzuki 2006: 24).

What makes the transition from trans-regulation to autonomy a ‘leapfrogging revolution’ is that there is a gap that must be bridged between experience and ideology. If taken to the extreme, this could lead to the negation of education, which is what Kant’s position in his critical period seems to be approaching. The transition from transitivity to autonomy is not a gradual process of education, but it is instead a spontaneous renewal of the spirit.

Kant’s position is for strict dualistic separation of ideas and phenomena to ensure the purity of morality. The ‘aporia of autonomy and heteronomy’ can also be understood to be superimposed on it.

Gadamer critiques this separation of Kant’s experience and ideas. Hence, although his argument does not directly address education, it contains important pedagogical issues.

1.2 Gadamer’s Criticism of Kant and his Defence of Convention

Gadamer critiques Kant in terms of the ‘historicity’ in which his philosophical hermeneutics is grounded. Gadamer establishes ‘historicity’ as an omnipresent and defining concept of existence. In his article, ‘Über die Möglichkeit einer phisosophischen Ethik’, he attempts a critique of ethics based on Kant’s concept of dualism from the standpoint of this historicity. Here, Gadamer’s position suggests the possibility of a transition from heteronomy to autonomy being a gradual process that is distinct from a ‘leap’ or a ‘revolution’.

First, Gadamer characterises Kant’s ethics as a ‘dialectic of exception’ (GW4: 178) regarding obligation and tendency. In other words, in Kant, morality is said to exist in the opposition between ‘duty’, which is based on moral law—an idea—and tendency, which is rooted in the empirical and sensible and on which duty triumphs.

However, Gadamer considers this to be an ‘exception’ to the rule. According to

Gadamer, duty and propensity are not necessarily in opposition to each other. Rather, it is Gadamer's position that the two are in conflict in exceptional cases and that the self-imposed obligation of propensity via reason does not necessarily arise.

Gadamer argues against Kant's 'dialectic of exception' by arguing for the ethical importance of 'Sitte' (customary virtues) as mediators between obligation and propensity:

> I think there is another avenue worth examining. That is, a moral-philosophical consideration that chooses the usual case of customary compliance rather than the exceptional case of conflict. (GW4: 180)

What Gadamer emphasises here is the rational character that conventions possess. In Kant, conventions are seen as being opposed to reason because they offer an opportunity for heteronomy, but Gadamer sees conventions and reason as harmonious.

The interpretation that Gadamer offers here is a critique of Kant's ethics, which seek to eliminate the empirical element from morality by contrasting Aristotle with Kant[6]. The pedagogical significance of this critique is central to this study. According to Gadamer, to respect duty, one needs to respect convention. It is not a 'leap' or a 'revolution' that occurs here. This therefore allows room for pedagogical intervention.

Addressing the issue of education here does not seem to be out of Gadamer's own interests. In the postscript to the sixth volume of his German translation of *Nicomachean Ethics*, Gadamer writes:

> The question that incidentally motivates us from the very beginning is: What is ethical reflection? What is ethical reflection and how can it simultaneously serve education? Aristotle's writings repeatedly return to such questions. (Gadamer 1988: 65)

Gadamer emphasises the relationship between ethics and education, and his criticism of Kant relates to this relationship, in accordance with Aristotle. By following such a scheme, Gadamer attempts to ensure the possibility of morality prior to reflection. This position is consistent with Gadamer's emphasis on the workings of preconceptions in understanding, and it simultaneously suggests the possibility of a transition from heteronomy to autonomy as a gradual process, unlike Kant's position. Although Gadamer does not develop this issue pedagogically, Buck explicitly assumes this position.

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[6] Cf. Gutschker 2002: 189–254.

However, even if we disregard the issue of education here, one major question remains: is there a situation in which the universality of morality, as guaranteed by Kant, has been recovered in Gadamer in favour of historicity? In other words, has universality been recovered in historicity, and has it fallen into relativism?

Unfortunately, Gadamer does not provide a clear answer to this question. However, as I see it, Buck attempts to answer it in his theory of 'Bildung'. This theory is a pedagogical answer to Gadamer's unresolved conflict between universality and historicity. From this perspective, the following section serves as a discussion on Buck's theory of 'Bildung'.

2. The Structure and Universality of the Concept of Experience in Buck's Theory of 'Bildung'

In this section, I clarify the inner workings of the concept of experience in Buck's theory of 'Bildung', mainly in relation to universality. The problem discussed above of the conflict between universality and historicity is an important motif in Buck's theory of 'Bildung', and it relates directly to the problem of 'Beispiel', which is the subject of this paper. However, before delving into the issue of 'Beispiel', the purpose of this section is first to clarify the concept of experience, which is a cornerstone of Buck's theory of 'Bildung'. Buck adopted this concept of experience from Gadamer, but he modified it considerably. Here, we can see traces of thought generation in which the philosophical hermeneutics from Gadamer are drawn into pedagogy and reinterpreted through the figure of the 'conflict between universality and historicity'.

Buck concentrates on the concept of experience in his book, *Lernen und Erfahrung*, in which he presents a discursive history of the structure of experience in relation to the concept of learning by referring to various thinkers.

As I examine above, Buck's concept of experience receives its template from Gadamer. More specifically, in *Wahrheit und Methode*, Buck uniquely incorporates into his theory of 'Bildung' the 'hermeneutische Erfahrung' (hermeneutic experience) that Gadamer describes as 'occupying a key place' (GW2: 445) in this major work. Therefore, I will begin my discussion by exploring Gadamer's interpretive experience and how he recasts it.

In Gadamer's concept of experience, the occasion of negativity is the first issue that

is important for the current paper. Relying on Hegel[7], Gadamer says the following:

> When we say that we have had an experience in a subject, what this means is that we have not seen things correctly before and now know better how they are. Thus, the negativity of experience has an inherently productive meaning. Negativity is neither a mere deception to be detected nor a correction in that regard. Rather, it is a more expansive knowledge that will be acquired. (GW1: 359)

Negativity is not only viewed as an opportunity to correct the conventional way of perceiving things, but it is also taken as an opportunity to make possible the acquisition of a wider range of knowledge. Hence, negativity is not the end. Negativity also opens up possibilities for new experiences, as follows:

> The truth of experience is always linked to new experience. A person who is said to have experience is not only made so by experience, but is also open to new experience. (GW1: 361)

Negativity and openness are two key elements of Gadamer's interpretive experience. This includes a critique of the teleological view of experience in which there is a pre-existing purpose, and experience arises accordingly. Therefore, although Gadamer relies on Hegel to elaborate his concept of 'interpretive experience', he breaks with Hegel on the last point. He holds that the perfection of experience lies not in closed knowledge but in 'the openness of experience, which is unleashed by experience itself' (GW1: 361).

Buck's concept of experience is essentially an inheritance of Gadamer's interpretive experience. However, 'inheritance' is not merely 'appropriation'. Rather, it is to use the language of hermeneutics, an 'application'. Buck's application of hermeneutic experience to 'Bildung' seems to contain some very important pedagogical implications.

In contrast to Gadamer, who seeks universality in the openness of experience, Buck brings to the fore the opportunity of universality in experience. Buck's concept of experience as 'epagogic' (induction), expressed in the subtitle of the third edition of *Lernen und Erfahrung*, points to universality. However, it does not imply a linear path

[7] The following is a detailed study by Grondin on Gadamer's relationship with Hegel regarding his concept of experience. According to Grondin, by relying on Hegel, Gadamer picks up the dimension of the historicity of experience and attempts to rescue the concept of experience that has been trivialised into the methods of modern science. cf. Grondin 1982: 51–58.

from the individual to the universal as a methodology in modern science[8]. The hallmark of Buck's concept of experience is the seemingly contradictory situation in which the individual is simultaneously given a universal. That is, Buck does not think of experience as purely discrete, but rather that for it to be possible, the universal must be given in advance, even if in an uncertain form:

> Rather, we accept the individual in terms of the universal first. We do so even if, in doing so, we do not perceive the universal as clearly universal, and, on the contrary, we are uncertain about whether it is really universal in the first place[9]. (Buck 1989: 39)

In other words, for Buck, the universal is not only an objective, but it is also an enabling condition for experience; thus, 'to relate to the universal is the essential function of experience' (Buck 1989: 49). However, in Buck, as in Kant's epistemology of categories, the universal does not act only as a condition that makes experience possible; the universal is also dependent on experience (Buck 1989: 45). They are not unilaterally interdependent; rather, they are conditioned by each other.

Thus, experience is not, according to Buck, a process of mastering only the new. After all, every new and unknown thing is already understood in some way. Such a priori experience is recognised in Buck, as he emphasises these seemingly contradictory features of the concept of experience and turns them into the foundational concept of the 'Bildung' theory. First, he points out the double meaning of experience as follows:

> The expression 'experience' actually has a double meaning. This means, on the one hand, an individual experiences and, on the other hand, the experience that takes place behind this individual experience. (Buck 1989: 51)

To extend this, experience is both the experience of an unknown object and a new way

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[8] Yet, in this respect, Buck is not so far apart from Gadamer. As aforementioned, Gadamer's concept of experience also resists the trivialisation of scientific method, and he states in the introduction to *Wahrheit und Methode* that 'the concern of this book is to search for the experience of truth beyond the sphere of control of scientific methodology in the omnipresent places where it is encountered' (GW1, S. 1). This is consistent with Schenk's characterisation of the book's concept of experience as 'a non-empirical, natural, every day, pre-disciplinary or extra-disciplinary experience of methodological and (natural) scientific experience' (Schenk 2017: 180).

[9] Buck illustrates this with an example of a linguistic expression used by children. According to Buck, children refer to all men as 'daddy' and all women as 'mommy'. From this, they learn that the words 'dad' and 'mom' do not refer to 'men in general' or 'women in general' but to specific individuals. cf. Buck 1989: 39.

of experiencing a known entity, since ‘every individualised horizon implies a broader and more ambiguous horizon of universality’ (Buck 1989: 64). In other words, experience is not just an encounter with new horizons; it is also the process by which the universality contained therein becomes apparent.

‘Bildung’ can be depicted as a process of experience in which universality is gradually revealed. What is important in this case, as in Gadamer's, is the ‘negativity of experience’. However, Buck emphasises a different point here than Gadamer:

> The work of negative experience is that one becomes aware of oneself. What one becomes aware of are the motivations that have guided one in one’s previous experiences and of those motivations that have not been questioned. Negative experiences, therefore, have the character of self-experience, which is first and foremost qualitatively open to new experiences. (Buck 1989: 80)

It is on this opportunity of ‘self-experience’ that Buck places stronger emphasis than does Gadamer. The self, the subject of experience, can be inferred to be extremely important to Buck, who took pedagogy as his discipline. Here, Buck follows Gadamer’s scheme of thought but simultaneously develops his own ideas in a different realm.

This tendency becomes more apparent when Buck uses this concept of experience as the basis for his discussion of ‘Bildung’, as follows:

> Bildung is structured by its own interpretation in two ways. The first is that it acquires and acquires the practice and meaning of action relations by acting on itself, and the second is that it takes the form of an interpretation of practice to make the interpretation premised on it more its own, to make it certain. This makes the actor self-aware in a reflective way and makes him aware of his own practice. (Buck 1981: 14)

A step forward from ‘self-experience’ that is grounded in experience, or what might be called ‘self-reflection’, has occurred in ‘Bildung’. In contrast to Gadamer, who follows the position of subject criticism of Heidegger, Buck again takes the subject-oriented position. This is only because Buck develops his own thought in pedagogy, which takes the subject as an essential category rather than philosophically. In this way, we can see a transformation of thought that is inevitable for pedagogy.

While receiving such opportunities as ‘negativity’ and ‘openness’ from Gadamer, Buck’s concept of experience is reinterpreted in terms of the subject’s ‘self-experience’.

Furthermore, the concept proceeds to 'self-reflection' when the subject becomes 'Bildung'. Buck's theory of 'Bildung' can be characterised as a constant process of the subject's self-reflection, within the conditions of historicity and towards universality.

The difference between Gadamer and Buck seems to lie in the difference between the background philosophy and pedagogy of interest, rather than in the choice of which of the two is correct. While Gadamer does not necessarily need the category of the subject, the subject is essential to Buck as a pedagogue. In this sense, he differs from Gadamer in his emphasis on 'self-reflection'.

For this self-reflection by experience, the role of 'Beispiel' is to serve as a medium for raising the subject to universality. However, the dimension of universality that 'Beispiel' possesses is not limited to the theoretical dimension but also includes a moral dimension. That is, Beispiel serves to ensure the normality of actions in addition to mediating the universality of experience. In this process, Kant's interpretation plays an important role. In the following section, I will explore Buck's concept of 'Beispiel', which ensures the universality of experience with a moral dimension, in light of his Kantian interpretation.

3. Buck's Interpretation of Kant and the Concept of 'Beispiel'

Buck discusses 'Beispiel' in *Lernen und Erfahrung*, in which it functions as a mediator of universals for individual experience and learning[10]. Moreover, the universals that 'Beispiel' mediates, according to Buck, are not theoretically or conceptually exhaustive:

> Kant at least acknowledges how important it is that the Beispiel must be understood in terms of its power to convey universals, which cannot be fully explained conceptually. At least Kant acknowledges how important it is that we must be understood from that power which conveys universals and which cannot be fully explained, in that he gives to the example a special significance for aesthetic judgment. (Buck 1989: 133)

[10] According to Pauls, a model is an 'induktion' that mediates between teaching and learning and makes understanding possible. In relation to this, Imai focuses on the 'convincing introduction' (einführende Verständigung) in Buck's thought and acknowledges the argument questioning the conditions that make learning possible. Although Imai does not directly refer to exemplars here, he states that 'exemplars are convincing introductions' (Buck 1989: 98). cf. Pauls 2010; Imai 2012.

Here, Buck implies the moral dimension of the universality of 'Beispiel'. He discusses this intensively both in the first edition of *Lernen und Erfahrung* and in Kant's Lehre von Exempel, written in the same year. As the two would need to be read as complementary, so to speak, Buck sought to clarify the moral significance of exemplars that could not be fully discussed in *Lernen und Erfahrung*.

Buck, like Gadamer, criticises Kant's philosophy from a position that emphasises historicity. However, Buck takes the pedagogically specific perspective of 'How can a child, who is not capable of rational reflection, reflect on moral law?' He states:

> Kant's axiom excludes children from the possibility of being truly moral because they are not capable of reflecting on moral law. This is because children are excluded from the possibility of listening to moral law and reflecting on it in order to abide by it. The axiom of Kant's axiom excludes children from the possibility of being truly moral. (Buck 1985: 7)

Here, Buck's discussion of 'Kant's axiom' can be interpreted as a solid dualism of phenomenon-ideology in the critical period. However, Buck, like Gadamer, attempts to admit the possibility of approaching morality from the empirical realm of 'convention', which, in Kant's case, is limited to the realm of transcendental freedom (cf. Buck 1985: 7). As such, the possibility of access to morality is also ensured for children who do not yet have the capacity to reflect. In other words, the possibility of a transition from heteronomy to autonomy—one that is distinct from 'leaping'—is opened here. By restoring the significance of 'convention' from a pedagogical perspective, Buck critiques Kant's philosophy from the standpoint of emphasising Gadamer's historicity while attempting to protect the 'pre-reflective' realm of morality.

However, if it is to be localised in convention rather than in principle, it will remain in the realm of the sensible and empirical and will not break free from the state of heteronomy. Kant expresses his criticism of this position. 'Beispiel' and 'Exempel' have long been an important part of education before Kant[11]. However, Kant criticises the moral significance of 'Beispiel' in the following passage:

> If one were to borrow morality from a paradigm, nothing could be worse for morality than this. This is because every exemplar so presented must be judged

[11] For more on this, see Buck's description in *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie*. cf. Buck 1971: 818–823.

> beforehand to be worthy of a fundamental exemplar, or muster, according to the principle of morality. And the exemplars do not give us the concept of morality in the first place. (Kant IV: 408)

Kant does not reject 'Beispiel' altogether[12]; rather, he makes 'the viability of what the (moral) law commands unquestionable' (Kant IV: 409) and provides the opportunity for one to become aware of the moral law. Although there is a subtle difference, the emphasis in Kant is not on examples, but on awakening oneself to moral law. An example is only a trigger for this problem. This is clearly stated in *Kritik der praktischen Vernunf*t (cf. Kant V: 92).

Buck, however, takes the position of reemphasising the moral and educational significance of 'Beispiel'. It is important to point out here that Buck attempts to do this by relying on the *Kritik der Urteilskraft*. Unlike Gadamer, who relied on Aristotle to criticise Kant, Buck attempts to overcome the problems of Kant's philosophy by interpreting Kant intrinsically, and by focusing on the ethical possibilities in the discussion of aesthetic judgments. In connection with this, Buck reviews 'Beispiel' that was not given positive meaning in the *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* and *Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten*. The difference between Kant's and Buck's positions on imitation is of particular importance. Kant dismisses imitation as a cause of heteronomy, while Buck asks whether imitation causes transitivity. Buck states:

> To be sure, mere imitation in the sense of copying behaviour is heteronomy, and in the first place, conforming oneself to currently accepted conventions is not free obedience to a grounded norm. But is the behavior of a child imitating a model before he or she knows the principle in any case merely a crude reproduction of that model? (Buck 1967: 180)

In other words, the act of imitating 'Beispiel' lies in the possibility of initiating moral reflection, and it is certainly not a reflective act. In that sense, according to Buck, imitation is not mere copying but 'already contains a stage of free succession' (Buck 1967: 180).

In order to establish that the 'Beispiel' of this imitation is not merely individual and

[12] Yamaguchi emphasises the significance of 'Beispiel' in Kant's practical philosophy, stating that 'the deepest significance of the example in Kant is that it makes possible the 'comparison of ideas of how things should be'" (Yamaguchi 2005: 34). Guyer, on whom Yamaguchi also relies, states that 'the essential role of example in moral education is to teach that while children are indeed morally free, they must also struggle with human limitations' (Guyer 2012: 133). Both arguments focus on 'Beispiel' but differ from Buck's in that they do not recognise the inherent value of 'Beispiel' itself; rather they emphasise it as a trigger for a child's 'own' moral awakening.

empirical but is linked to the moral and universal, we need to return to the discussion of beauty in the *Kritik der Urteilskraft*. Buck states, referring to Section 59 of the *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, that

> What is important for Kant here (...) is the application of the notion of analogy to the relationship between beauty and the moral good, that 'beauty is a symbol of morality'. (Buck 1989: 118)

In *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (Section 59), beauty is positioned as a symbol of morality. That is, beauty is empirical, even as it contains an orientation toward morality. Moreover, the current study significantly notes that Kant's statement that 'hobbies make possible the transition from sensible stimulation to habitual moral concern without a forced leap, so to speak' (Kant V: 354) suggests the possibility of a transition from experience to ideas without a leap.

For Kant subjective universality is what underpins the universality of beauty. Subjective universality is said to have a basis in subjectivity, as opposed to moral law. However, this simultaneously 'entails a demand on all others' (Kant V: 353). Kant introduces this peculiar concept of subjective universality in the *Kritik der Urteilskraft* to ground the universality of beauty, which is different from morality.

However, Buck sees the ethical potential of this subjective universality and explains it concretely through the concept of exemplars, as follows:

> To be sure, no empirical exemplar can determine with certainty whether or not an action has been done because of (moral) law. But 'if it cannot be disproved', it is 'fair' to assume the sincerity of sentiment. (...) 'Encouragement' by Beispiel is based on trust in the sentiments of others, and the behavior of others again becomes an example. (Buck 1967: 177-178)

'Beispiel' certainly does not constitute moral law but provides a 'direction' to moral law. Thus, 'Beispiel' and 'Exempel' are manifestations of this direction, if not of moral law itself, and in that sense they deserve to be called 'exemplars'. They do not have 'objective universality', yet they do have 'subjective universality' in the sense that those who receive 'Beispiel' can approve of them. As shown in the above quotation, the logic used here clearly has more affinity with the *Kritik der Urteilskraft* than with the *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, despite the fact that it is concerned with morality. That is, Buck attempts to apply Kant's concept of subjective universality for aesthetic judgement in the

realm of morality. Certainly, at this point, reflection on moral law has not yet arisen. However, this raises the possibility that it will do so. Buck believes that this would allow him to avoid the 'aporia of autonomy and heteronomy'.

'Beispiel' is equipped with the passage to moral law. That is, 'Beispiel', which is supported by subjective universality, contains both empirical and ideological elements simultaneously. The relationship between 'Beispiel' and moral law can be superimposed on the relationship between 'Idee' and 'ideals' in the *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (Section 17), as follows:

> Idee essentially mean the concept of reason, and ideals mean individual representations that are suited to ideals. (Kant V: 232)

In contrast to Idee, which is a transcendental rational concept, ideals contain Idee and are at the same time individual representations. That is, the moral law and 'Beispiel' correspond to ideals and ideals, respectively.

From the perspective of a pedagogue such as Buck, an 'ideal' is needed for this ethical realm. Here, then, lies the question of how to awaken a child, an entity not yet knowing the proper use of reason, into realising that direction. The concept of 'Beispiel' was introduced for this purpose. 'Beispiel' is rooted not only in the realm of transcendental freedom but also in the realm of historical experience. For Buck, historical 'Beispiel' is positioned as a mediator of experience and the Idee that allows for the transition from heteronomy to autonomy.

Conclusion

This paper takes the conflict between universality in Kant and historicity in Gadamer as its starting point, and it explores Buck's attempt to mediate it in his theory of 'Bildung'. It can be concluded that the problem has been brought into pedagogy, and through the deepening of the notion of 'experience' and the reinstatement of the notion of 'example', it has led to the solution of the special pedagogical problem of autonomy and heteronomy aporia.

Although I have focused on Buck in this paper, the 'consistent mediation of historicity and universality' seems to be a challenge for the post-Gadamer generation in

general, not solely for Buck[13]. However, I refrained from investigating this wider perspective in detail due to space limitations. This paper confirms the argument that Buck takes a more historically based approach than does Gadamer, consolidating it as a basic pedagogical theory by emphasising the opportunity of 'self-experience' within the concept of 'experience'. Furthermore, by accepting Kant in his unique way through the concept of 'Beispiel', Buck has attempted to avoid the label of 'historical relativism', answering the question of normativity and universality, which are essential to the concept of 'Bildung'.

This paper argues that Buck's perspective views the transition from heteronomy to autonomy as a 'gradual process' rather than as a 'leap to the point of revolution'. This means that he does not take a strict phenomenon-ideology view of dualism, as Kant does.

However, this does not mean that Buck attempts to take a monolithic view of everything. Gadamer's overemphasis on historicity—even if unintentional—risks falling into 'historical relativism' that recovers all things into it. To be sure, not everything escapes historicity, as Gadamer says. Nevertheless, this does not indicate a kind of nihilist worldview in which there is no universality and no distinction between autonomy and heteronomy. As a pedagogue, Buck must avoid the possibility of nihilism caused by historical relativism, the equivalence of all values. Through the concept of 'Beispiel', Buck seeks to mediate both universality and historicity without falling into historical relativism and dualism, forces which could make education impossible.

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[13] One of the leading thinkers is Manfred Riedel. A disciple of Gadamer, like Buck, Riedel's interpretation of Kant explores the possibilities of Kant's philosophy of history. Like Buck, he focuses on the arguments in the *Kritik der Urteilskraft,* but his focus is on the argument of teleological judgement. He refers to the distinction between 'final purpose' and 'ultimate purpose' in Section 83 of the *Kritik der Urteilskraft* and interprets the former as 'culture' and the latter as 'moral law'. Here again, as in Buck, we see the 'idea of medium', which emphasises both empirical and ideological elements. cf. Riedel 1978.

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A Summary Report of the Symposium on "Psychoanalysis and Education: Freudian Thought as an Educational Theory"

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1. Symposium's Implementation Status for This Year

First, due to the global situation in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the 63rd Annual Meeting was shifted to an online format for the first time in the history of the Philosophy of Education Society of Japan (PESJ). This step was taken to avoid gatherings at the host university, Nihon University, College of Humanities and Sciences. The in-person symposium was replaced by manuscripts posted on *the Collection of Presentation Manuscripts*, which, in turn, were sent to the conference participants. Questions from the participants were accepted online on October 17th and 18th, the dates of the conference. Four members—three reporters and a designated debater—exchanged comments, questions, and replies through e-mail. The contents were sent online at a later date, along with replies to the participants' questions. We would like to express our gratitude to Prof. Akira Geshi, who worked as the planner, reporter, and organizer of the symposium; Prof. Deborah P. Britzman, who worked as the reporter and who was unfortunately unable to come to Japan; and Prof. Takeru Mashino and the members of the Conference Preparation Committee for their great effort in providing a liaison and coordination between the members of the symposium. We would like to sincerely thank them for their efforts.

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2. The Purpose of the Symposium

The purpose of the symposium is as follows:

> Sigmund Freud's psychoanalysis is one of many major movements that have shaped the academic world since the 20th century. Although its scientific and therapeutic credibility is sometimes called into question, the idea of psychoanalysis has become part of our paradigm and lifestyle. One cannot think of modern philosophies and ideas without considering Freud's influence. Education is no exception. Understanding children using depth psychology, beginning with psychoanalysis, is deeply ingrained in modern educational discourse and practices. Nonetheless, educational studies have rarely considered Freud and his psychoanalysis as a central research topic. Pedagogists have argued that psychoanalysis has only had a partial impact on education. This underestimation may be regarded as *resistance* to psychoanalysis in education. Education that holds a romantic view of children—for example, that they are born good—is an idea that is incompatible with Freud's theory of infantile sexuality. Moreover, we may argue that Freud's philosophy radically differs from Japan's postwar education, which sought to envision a peaceful future by reflecting on the war with regret. In contrast, Freud espoused the pessimistic idea that war cannot be eradicated because it is ingrained in human nature. These conflicting views are founded on opposing perceptions regarding childhood, such that while education looks at the future of children, psychoanalysis looks back at the cause of pathology in early childhood. As such, there have been few meeting points between these two positions. Considering the above, we would like to re-examine the relationship between psychoanalysis and education and attempt to argue that Freudian thought has a place within educational theory, as well as in this symposium.

The reporters were as follows: Prof. Deborah P. Britzman (FRSC/York University), a leading researcher in theoretical and practical research on psychoanalysis and education; Prof. Minako Nishi (Kyoto University), a psychoanalyst who is also known for her study on the history of psychoanalysis in Japan; and Prof. Akira Geshi (Nihon University), the organizer of this symposium. They were joined by Prof. Tadashi Nishihira (Kyoto University), a designated debater.

3. Summary of the Symposium

We had a profound discussion because the comments, questions, and replies among the four debaters, the queries from the general members, and the reporters' replies were all conducted in writing. Please refer to *the Collection of Presentation Manuscripts* for the summary of each report. Here, we would like to summarize the discussion (the sections inside quotation marks were quoted from "Collection of Questions, Comments, and Replies").

(1) Comments and questions for the Britzman Report and their corresponding replies

Prof. Nishihira first focused on the connotation of "otherness," as suggested by Prof. Britzman. It is something "mysterious, uncanny, and unknowable"; "we cannot control it, but [it is] definitively essential in the current situation." Prof. Nishihira supported Prof. Britzman's theme that teachers should stand with the students while acknowledging their own and the students' otherness, and that such an acknowledgement encourages mutual growth. While supporting this idea, Prof. Nishihira also asked whether this theme could be connected with the trust in otherness and whether the Eastern philosophy involving the affirmative and constructive role of non-articulation could be explored. Prof. Nishi asked about the connection between learning and otherness, perceived as something dynamic that "may not always exist, but may be transient." She likewise inquired about the relationship between otherness and libido. Prof. Geshi asked how the "pain of education for otherness" could be tolerated and how it could be conveyed. The general members asked: 1) whether there is transference specific to education that differs from psychoanalytic treatment (Mr. Yuho Goto), and 2) Prof. Britzman's opinion on teachers attempting to escape exhaustion by shutting out their emotions (Prof. Nana Hatano). Other questions were about Prof. Britzman's view on the relationship between the theory of queer pedagogy and psychoanalytic research (Prof. Masato Fukuwaka). They also inquired about her motives for becoming interested in psychoanalysis (Prof. Nana Hatano).

Prof. Britzman provided a comprehensive response to individual questions. The content of the reply covers her own research history, supplementary explanations, and perspectives for considering the relationship between psychoanalysis and education and the redefinition of keywords. The following are the topics that we found interesting and suggestive:

(i) Psychoanalysis suggests the approach of "we feel before we know and learn before we can understand." Such an approach is different from "we understand and then learn," which is often found in education. This approach understands the emotional experiences that underlie the relationships with others. It likewise examines "negative capability" as "tolerance to otherness" (i.e., "not knowing" and "uncertainty"). It can also be used as a "means for handling one's countertransference or urgent feelings to act out and even to destroy contact with an actual other." (ii) Prof. Britzman stated that "the link between psychoanalysis and education is both fragile and hopeful." While psychoanalytic knowledge echoes fate and is not easily received, it demonstrates the importance of the teacher's attention to their own and students' past mental lives. Through an understanding of the bodies and eros, it teaches that "the right to have a mind of one's own and to freely associate to people and memories can take on importance." (iii) Emotional situations in learning can be considered at two levels. The first is the level at which teachers recognize the difference between reality and ideals and respond to unknown situations. The second level is the creation of resources and vocabularies for us to pay attention to our mental lives. For example, what Prof. Nishihira called "non-articulation" and Koichi Togashi formulated as "the psychoanalytic zero" can also be regarded as an expression of the dynamics to know, despite the existence of translation and communication gaps and other uncertainties. (iv) "Anxieties are a significant experience in education." A violent child's game of teacher may be "reaction formations or defenses against both anxiety and the otherness of learning." Furthermore, one of the factors that student teachers blame themselves for not becoming an "ideal" teacher may lie in the harsh model of classroom teaching that leaves them with the choice to either "sink or swim." (v) The reply concludes as follows: "I don't see otherness so much as a self-possession, or as something to teach others. I think of otherness as a situation with others that has the quality of a nonrelation (…)."

(2) Comments and questions for the Nishi Report and their corresponding replies

The general members asked questions around three topics: 1) the Freudian understanding of human beings (Prof. Keiko Nakano), 2) the fact behind "educational attitudes" that many analysts try to avoid (Mr. Yuho Goto), and 3) whether transference takes place through intervening factors such as letters and IT equipment (Prof. Nana Hatano). According to Prof. Nishi, the point of Freud's understanding of human beings is that "he had made it clear that human beings do not know much about themselves." Moreover, the "educational attitudes" that analysts warn people about refer to the

superiority of those who know over those who do not know. This state of affairs leads to idealizing the analyst and, conversely, strengthening their patients' intellectualization by providing them with too much advice. Concerning the last question, Prof. Nishi answered that she continues to ask herself the following questions amid the COVID-19 pandemic: "will transference occur" and "what has been lost" in the context of clinical practices where people wear masks?.

Prof. Nishihira's comment developed from a situation "that cannot be helped" (i.e., otherness) in which Heisaku Kosawa and Seishi Shimoda had found themselves. According to Britzman Report, even though teachers do not want a sense of otherness to emerge between them and their students, they have no choice but to manage it and somehow survive in that situation. On the other hand, analysts attempt to "facilitate clients' otherness unknowingly" and "experience it together, scrutinize it, and try to survive." As to this difference between psychoanalysis and education, Prof. Nishi argued that while much of the transference between teachers and students is slowly diffused and eliminated, psychoanalysis (especially Kleinian psychoanalysis) creates and facilitates the transference to turn the situation into one where they can discuss it. She described this as a storm in which we work, and we have to throw ourselves into the storm even if we want to escape from it.

Prof. Geshi asked two questions. The first asks why Japanese psychoanalysis emphasizes mother–child relationships. The second asks about the validity of educational consultations conducted through the media (e.g., television and magazine). Regarding the former, Prof. Nishi explained that she could attribute the emphasis of Japanese psychoanalysis on mother–child relationships to the development of the object relations theory in Japan's postwar psychoanalysis and the reflection of men's Oedipal complex. Regarding the latter, she replied that, while educational consultation involves providing professional advice, psychoanalysis is a special type of communication that goes far beyond the help that the client in need could imagine.

Prof. Britzman recognized the relationship between the "demonic fate of human nature and education" in Nishi Report. When an analyst says, "Let's get started," the phrase sounds heartless to the patient: "There is something that cannot be started because it already happened. It's as if the analyst's words threw the patient back into childhood (…)." With this in mind, Prof. Britzman asked two questions based on the clinical practice of psychoanalysis, where a situation will "repeat what cannot be remembered." The first question is: "What kind of education and what kind of resistances are we calling on?" The second question is: "In discussing the disparities between advice and life, (…) how may we understand the urgency of affect carried out as in conflict with our

theoretical claims?" In response to the first question, Prof. Nishi answered that understanding the "educational attitudes" of analysts is an aspect of education and requires reconsideration. Replying to the second question, she said that "a storm of urgent affections may always be brewing behind our calm world." As such, it may be "the overwhelming power of the unconscious that cannot be helped by advice."

(3) Comments and questions for the Geshi Report and their corresponding replies

The questions from general members concerned both the criteria for measuring the positive and negative aspects of "retroactive education" (Prof. Hiroaki Sekine), and the view of education that promotes "retroactive learning" (Prof. Hiroaki Sekine and Mr. Yuho Goto). Prof. Geshi answered these questions by organizing his replies into three statements. First, what constitutes an experience that can lead to retroactive learning more easily?— It is something beyond our understanding when we experience it, and it settles like sediment at the bottom of one's unconscious mind. Second, what kind of secondary experience activates initial experience?— It requires similarities with the initial experience, but it is difficult to standardize. Third, what criteria can be used to evaluate self-transformation?— Generally, there are two criteria; the person himself/herself and the community to which the person belongs. However, these two factors do not always agree. Moreover, individuals belong to multiple communities, and therefore, there are multiple criteria. In addition to these factors above, the criteria are constructed afterwards and may change.

Prof. Nishihira recognized the logic of eschatology in *Nachträglichkeit*. This logic denotes that the meaning of every event in (life) history will be revealed at the end. In response to Freud, the Britzman and Nishi Reports emphasized the retroactive act of "touching the darkness and digging up the shadowy part" to aid in human development. Further, Geshi Report considered the retroactive act to suggest a kind of education that "cannot be predicted in advance and can only be confirmed after reflecting on later." However, Prof. Nishihira indicated that such a perception may lead to relativism, skepticism, nihilism, and populism: "There are 'no foundations,' 'no guarantees' in education. In spite of having shared that reality, how much 'courage to educate' can we have? While feeling confused about asking such a question to myself, I cannot help but think about what is being asked today." On the other hand, Prof. Geshi admitted that it is a "gamble" whether "retroactive education" will happen. Moreover, he argued that we need to be vigilant toward "barbarism," which has lost the perspective of uncertainty: "It must be the sensibility that perceives education as something incomprehensible that

enables teachers to broaden their horizons when they stumble in educational practice and support children and people who cannot get used to education."

Prof. Britzman asked two questions. First, "how can we narrate the significance of uncertainty in learning?" Second, "how can those who direct education accommodate a psychical reality in their theories of transmission and reception and thus go beyond the stasis of education as screen memory?" Prof. Geshi replied by redefining the ambiguous meaning of "retroactive education." He said that it would enable the learning that accompanies a philosophical sensibility. This would create educational systems that differed from the present one, which would not be constrained by the desire for "immediate effects." Second, it would overcome a view of education that tends to arrive at topics, such as "the content to be communicated" and "better technology." Lastly, he argued that to have the understanding that "education is accompanied with 'uncertainty' could well prepare him/her to effectively address something that is difficult to understand during his/her future educational practice."

Prof. Nishi said that "every event associated with the trauma we experience has the potential to create a meaning." She suggested the possibility of "education to create *Nachträglichkeit*," which prompts the "symbolization of trauma." Prof. Nishi argued that "psychoanalysis can learn a lot from education" in regard to "thinking," which is indispensable for this symbolization. While affirming her argument, Prof. Geshi acknowledged the need to overcome endless enlightenment and the threat of "Es" with "our own intelligence and the courage to step away from dependence on specialists such as teachers and analysts." At the same time, he suggested the need to explore "a way to co-exist with others while keeping a certain amount of dependency on them."

4. Issues and Prospects

As discussed previously, "otherness" was the keyword in this symposium. In the philosophy of education, otherness has been discussed in a wide variety of contexts, such as "inner others," "children as others," and "transcendence." However, the issues of otherness in this symposium ranged from the emotions between the educator and the educated to cultural events that are difficult to understand with the individual's inner storm of emotions as a starting point.

Psychoanalysis focuses on the emotional storm that suddenly blows up from individual unconsciousness. Furthermore, psychoanalysis has theorized otherness and has dealt with it clinically. Prof. Nishi argues that within psychoanalysis, education can

be found both as a cause of the storm and an opportunity to reveal the storm. Prof. Britzman argued that for education, psychoanalysis stimulates inquiries into the nature of storms and ways to deal with them. They are storms within a child, within a teacher, and those that suddenly blow violently in a place when they face each other. As we can see in the exchange between Prof. Nishi and Prof. Nishihira, while psychoanalysts throw themselves into the storms of their patients, the best that a teacher can do is manage their own and their students' storms. If we look away from the storms, we will allow the violence that exists everywhere in society and schools to continue. One of the roles of education is to pay attention to one's own storm and that of others, to give appropriate expressions to them, and to seek ways to relieve them.

Prof. Britzman's discussion on "otherness" and Prof. Geshi's discussion on *Nachträglichkeit* included various cultural phenomena and cultural heritages, such as the global political youth movement, precarious situations involving violence and inequality, and the contemporary significance of classics. These discussions could be considered as educational variations of Freud's criticism of culture. Historical catastrophes, such as genocides, disasters, and pandemics can be added to these cultural phenomena. Education that could cause a catastrophe must survive without escaping otherness and *Nachträglichkeit*. If that is the case, how does education carry the weight of surviving a catastrophe, facing the emotional storms of the dead, and supporting those who have experienced the catastrophe and those who later speak about it? I think that educational philosophy is required to show uncompromised hope in the form of constant questioning without assisting the hasty symbolization or the oblivion of the storm, while staying in its difficulties and uncertainty. It seems to us that the "*Nachträglichkeit* of educational philosophy" was suggested in this year's symposium, which was held amid the coronavirus pandemic, and in last year's symposium entitled "*Inheritance of HIROSHIMA Memory and Emerging Reconciliation*."

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In the Midst of Things:

A Freudian Turn to Otherness for Educational Theory

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Abstract

A Freudian turn to otherness is introduced to discuss experiences in learning as stepping away from the attractions and defenses of certainty, regimentation, omnipotence, and compliance and stepping toward encountering the relativity of unknown life. I picture life in education as *in media res* in order to regard learning as getting to know imperceptible and hardly expressible yet deeply influential impresses of experiences. Such an approach calls upon a problem and an interest in surrendering to the excesses of subjectivity and intersubjectivity. The interest belongs to receptivity to unknown life. The problem is that excess involves unknowability not easily claimed as these are situations of otherness that broadcast human incompleteness, dependency, and uncertainty.

Part one considers a theory of learning through its difficulties, failures, and receptivity. It asks, how do responses to the unknown affect the fields of education and psychoanalysis? Part two presents four psychoanalytic entanglements of learning *in media res* and so, *as situation*: 1) the emotional situation (Bion); 2) the anthropological situation (Laplanche); 3) the transference situation, (Klein); and 4) the ethical situation (Togashi). They propose scenes of otherness as natality, inherited histories, the limits of language, and primal unspoken wishes for love and fear of breakdown. This view of life follows from Sigmund Freud's discovery of the unconscious as the heart of subjectivity with his insistence of consciousness as the exception to mental life and human activities. The argument then develops a Freudian philosophy of learning to characterize the *umwelt* of education as affected with the Kantian thing that can be neither controlled nor known yet can, nonetheless, be the most important threshold of existence.

Key words

Freudian thought, otherness, emotional situations, learning, ethics

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Umwelt: An Atmospheric Education

A great deal can happen to our conceptions, hopes, questions, and awareness of experience in education if we work within Sigmund Freud's discovery of otherness as the heart of learning that issues from his insistence that consciousness is the exception to mental life and human activities. We can become interested in the unconscious in the midst of things. *It* appears when least expected, veers from dreams to the dailiness of loss of attention, and is inexplicable in tendencies, variabilities, and entanglements. I understand these situations as creating a perpetual "*umwelt*" of education whereby untold experience is a feature of atmospheric life and is itself in antagonistic with this life (Jacobson 1964). How all this may be accepted and studied is the heart of my research.

A Freudian turn for education involves a way to think of learning and its myriad relations to knowledge, others, and objects as stepping away from the attractions and defenses of certainty, regimentation, omnipotence, and compliance and a step toward encountering the relativity of unknown life. Education is treated as the steps toward that which is not known in order to regard learning as getting to know imperceptible and hardly expressible yet deeply influential impresses of experiences, all of which call upon an interest in surrendering to the excesses of subjectivity and intersubjectivity. Such excesses, or what is left over from the immediacy of felt encounters, are not easily claimed since these situations broadcast human incompleteness, dependency, and uncertainty. Otherness plays along these lines of human incompleteness.

My discussion has two parts. Part one considers difficulties, failures, and response. I ask how do responses to unknown life affect the fields of psychoanalysis and education? What kind of education can then be thought? Part two attempts to picture life in education through four psychoanalytic entanglements that propose learning *in media res* and so, *as situations*. These entanglements are: 1) the emotional situation (Bion); 2) the anthropological situation (Laplanche); 3) the transference situation (Klein); and 4) the ethical situation (Togashi). I treat them all as relational scenes of otherness and themselves as enigmatic features of learning. All propose scenes of existence as natality, as inherited histories, as the limits of language, and as primal unspoken wishes for love and fear of breakdown. All these forces compose the *umwelt* of education as affected by a Kantian thing that can be neither controlled nor known yet can, nonetheless, serve as the most important threshold of existence.

A Special Charge

Psychoanalytic theory admits into its practices, knowledge, and representations the fluidity of otherness as an unknowable quality of human psychology. Otherness is also considered as its own method needed to dissolve the façade of certainty and the fixations to timelessness. Freud's sudden and disruptive discovery of his own otherness occurs in the midst of dreams. There, meaning is inexhaustible, inadmissible, objectionable, and inexplicable. For these dimensions of thinking, there are no objective means to measure, depict, predict, or stabilize the causes of either subject or object. Due to a constitutive uncertainty that permeates understanding, reasons too are affected and can become mired in tautologies, anxiety, defenses, and language games. And while all of this affects psychoanalysis, it may also be felt as alienating the surface activities of education.

As difficult as it may be to admit, a failure of translation is a quality of psychoanalytic work and a condition of its education. The handling of failure is ever present in clinical discussions, although not from a measure of success or best practices. The kind of advice on offer is counter- intuitive to professionalization. Freud (1915) urged modesty in practice while Lacan (2006) suggested the analyst's position as dummy. Winnicott (1996) expected to be mainly wrong in his interpretations to the patient while Bion (1987) warned that whenever two people meet, there would be bad jobs and emotional storms. Kohut (1982) argued that empathy can only occur when analysts accept the relativity of knowledge as also affecting their views of development. McDougall (1992) urged analysts become affected by the limits of their practices with others. Admissions of failures of translation are deepened by the fact that there is no objective reality to reach.

What is left is the charge of psychoanalytic vocabulary, used as both mirror and refractor to unconscious life also made from receptivity, translation, and visitation. The vocabulary is itself an enactment of situations made from those barely remembered features of learning that emanate from susceptibility to unknown life. These psychoanalytic ideas lend a special charge to philosophy's turn to emotional experience since so much of our lifeworld is out of our sight and proceeds without memory, consent, or control. Questions of how the world is registered, felt and perceived as communication open philosophy to consider the suppleness of inner life as issuing from a place it must also comment on.

Responsiveness to the unknown, however, brings with it the weight of reflections on our practices, limits, resistances, repetitions and failures to learn. And transitions in the

psychoanalytic field of thought preoccupy such varied contemporary analysts such as Donna Orange (2020), Togashi Koichi (2020), Julia Kristeva (1991), and Michel Émile de M'Uzan (2019). Each has taken an ethical turn in their consideration of why the power of uncertainty and vulnerability in the lifeworld of the mind is related to an acceptance of otherness and the capacity to stand experience. They draw from philosophical debates, compelling myths and literary fiction, and from analysis of the cost of humanness, political divisions, trauma, and psychosomatic incompatibilities. Their ethics stem from the priority of the other and all propose the desire to think and be receptive to scenes of both suffering and pleasure. They urge us to read and write.

If One Only Knew!

Receptivity to the unknown gives to birth a new sense of temporality, where time is always passing and must also include its retrospective accounts of experience. Scarfone (2015), for example, considers the antinomy between presence, absence, and meaning. He observes that gap made from event, situation, and remembering, where 'a matter of time' becomes a dilemma for knowledge and a problem of belief. Freud (1914) identified disjuncture as a perpetual *umwelt* of mental life when he drew his analysis of infancy, childhood, and family into the conundrums of love and hate in education and when, looking back, had to treat his own education as a disturbance of memory.

Receptivity to the unknown would also turn psychoanalytic practices back on itself and do so with acknowledging the limits and difficulties of learning from the pain of human incompleteness. Here then is the birth of an affected science, touched by the procedures it names. Its knowledge of subjective life would be subject to an opening Certeau (1993) described as "jeopardized and wounded by its otherness (the affect, etc.)" (27). It cannot be otherwise since the object of psychoanalysis is a subject that forces, invents, deceives, loves, worries, interprets, repeats, sleeps, cries, laughs, desires, and retreats. This subject of otherness serves as a specimen of knowledge while becoming the source of its own inquiry. Laplanche (1999) offers psychoanalytic geometric: "a method of free association polarized by the transference. . ." (162). Through this entanglement of speech and desire, psychoanalysis is emotional because its theory is "not only confronted with an object" but also remains a method instructed by its situation (83).

Psychoanalytic methods then are in touch with and touched by obstacles to knowing and may well repeat what memory has fractured and buried. Its methods are particularly dedicated to the work of getting to know those barely perceptible, influential, affected,

ignored, and often unaccounted for qualities of experience that could not have been known at the time of their unfolding. The speculation is that in the midst of learning something resists its own unveiling. For psychoanalytic views, there are unknown qualities of psychical life that drive enactments and exchanges of affect and, while rooted in anxiety and frustration, may also be expressed through displacements and resistance. The trouble begins with not knowing what experience in learning can feel when meeting with needing to know, knowing without having to learn, and learning before one can understand. For this sequence to sustain its own emotional logic and then to break such logic open, there would still have to be feelings of frustration, denial, anxiety, remorse, guilt, and ordinary resistances to the pain of incompleteness. One cannot ever know one's incompleteness. There would then have to emerge from such discord new emotional ties. We would have to accept that creativity, as well, is located in the midst of such incomplete things.

Kant's approach to antimony in thinking is often cited by the fields of psychoanalysis and critical theory when commenting on the problem of unreachable reality while being in the midst of it. One of Kant's (1965) many arguments pictured human knowledge from two irreducible sources: objects given to perception and thoughts about them. Kant wrote: "Without sensibility no object would be given to us, and without understanding, no object would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty and intuition without concepts are blind" (93). What then can exist between a thought and reality? Freud might reply, anxiety.

This difficulty for existence, that is, accepting the difference between perception and the object and between the source and representation of perception, was a key problem for Freud. Laurence Kahn (2018) traces the aporia to Freud's exasperation, "If one only knew *what* exists" made after Charcot's famous claim, "Theory is good, but it doesn't keep things from existing" (122). It is not only that theory comes too late. It is also that theory cannot stop reality. Freud (1900) acknowledged this otherness in his work on dream interpretation when he admitted that no interpretation can reach the navel of the dream and when he argued for two realities: psychical and material. In Kahn's (2018) wise view, while no one can know reality as such, one can, at least, try to understand its consequences (146). And, trying to understand what has happened is what constitutes our educational situation.

Wilfred Bion (1993) has written extensively on experience with his focus on the consequences of having psychical reality while trying to know this. He can be read as working from the proposition, 'well, if one only knew what exists with a thought!' His answer is surprising. Bion linked the otherness of thoughts and intuition to estranging

situations that he called "thoughts without a thinker" and "empty thoughts" (91). Thoughts are prior to their thinking. He proposed three kinds of experiences tied to thoughts that required the containment of an apparatus in order to think. The first kind of experience is with the mother who provides containment for the infant's chaotic thoughts, screams, and bodily urges. The second kind of experience is created by the mother's reverie of returning the chaos back to the infant in a manageable way. It is as if the mother's reverie said, 'You can relax for there is meaning.' The infant can then use that wish to develop an apparatus of thinking, needed to contain the mind in the midst of its own thoughts. A third kind of experience that the apparatus of 'thinking' needs to contain thoughts are the relational situations of love, hate, and knowledge. That is, the experience of thoughts and affects must have a thinker to think them. In Bion's view, a thinker would have to be willing to handle the frustration of experience and tolerate not knowing.

Critical theory would take a different tact by focusing on obstacles to representation as opposed to confusion within perceptions and appearance of objects. Adorno's (2001) lectures on Kant introduced his students to the challenge of abandoning their idealization of the self-enclosed subject described as the "I think that accompanies all of my representations." (176). The self is not an isolate of enclosed meaning but is always in the midst of things. Adorno proposed this something as "the Kantian Block" that he eulogized as "a kind of metaphysical mourning, a kind of memory of what is best, of something we must not forget, but that we are nevertheless completed to forget" (178). We know there is something more, but we cannot reach it. Or, if there is something more, it can only be an empty space that will not exist if entered (Britzman 2009).

The Lateness of Early Situations

Melanie Klein's (1959) theory of the adult world and its roots in infancy provides some clues as to the entangled destiny of subjectivity, intersubjectivity, and history. It is a theory of an adult in the midst of very early things. Her early theories are visceral and the mind as emotional can come as a shock. Perhaps just as shocking is her claim that the contingencies and destiny of early anxiety situations and their phantasies have a second life in the fields of education, law, politics, medicine, and parenting and that major edifices of authority contain infantile reality. What do we really know about the infant's psychical life and the fate of the ego that emerges from the profundity of helplessness, dependency, care, love, vulnerabilities and the phantasies that follow from these situations with the other? How can one get in touch with that other Kantian Block that

Klein (1930) early on described with *umwelt* of anxiety, namely our attraction to "unreal reality?" (221). Klein placed into the midst of things early anxiety situations over loss of love, then defenses against loss made by retaliatory and paranoid activities, and then reparation and gratitude. It is a sequence that eerily forecasts the difficulties of having to learn before one can know.

Klein considered mental life as an emotional situation, made from crowds of others. It would be a tiny inchoate theatre of otherness staring a series of introjected part objects as figures and their relations. There would be the stranger, the foreigner, the uninvited, the lover, and the disturber. I take these figurations as affects, situations and memories of learning, and the raw material for symbolization, analysis, and creativity. They are also the delegates of anxiety and defense. In Freud's (1924) terms, such imagos are reflections of identifications in the world of others:

> To the imagos they leave behind there are then linked the influences of teachers and authorities, self-chosen models and publicly recognized heroes, whose figures need no long be introjected by an ego which has become more resistant. The last figure in the series that began with the parents is the dark power of Destiny which only the fewest of us are able to look upon as impersonal. (168)

Parents, infants, teachers, heroes, cultural objects, lost objects, and knowledge seem like helpers until there comes disruptions, accidents, starkness, mistakes, coincidences, illness, and disasters. Even then, when all seems lost, we are never finished with elaborating our beginnings with others and do so each time we love, learn, hate, turn away, and reach for more.

The Emotional Situation

There are plenty of variabilities within emotional situations, although the dominant tendency involves anxiety over loss. Bion's (1994) insight was to join knowledge with the problem of trying to know and the pain of evasion. He argued that difficulties in learning are intimately tied to one's theory of knowledge and preconceptions that seem to dictate how knowledge should be acquired, transmitted, felt, received, recognized, and transferred. Imagine a teacher who can do without these preconceptions and implicit *how-to* instructions. Being instructed and having to instruct have a long history: they are ready-at-hand in the child's game of 'let's play school' where the omnipotent child

teacher dominates those other bad children due to a theory of knowledge as possession and a will to punish. The 'child teacher' is a dictator who yells and hits misbehaving others. The phantasy is that only one person can be in charge and others must obey. The child who plays teacher may not have been humiliated but was once a witness to the humiliations of others.

A situation, then, is emotional when it is felt as if it can forecast destruction. Bion (1993) argued that every encounter with unknown ideas or what one has not expected carries threats of catastrophic change because new knowledge may destroy the valence of deeply held beliefs and shake one's foundational myths to the core. His conception of knowledge, or what he termed as "K," simply means getting to know the emotional experience of frustration. The constellation of "K" contains elements of Freud's (1905) confrontation with the figure of the child as sexual researcher who links phantasy with theory. "K" also leans on Klein's (1928) notion of states of being as our most radical relationality constituted through phantasies and the early sadistic epistemic instinct for curiosity. When Antonio Ferro (2017) surveyed the psychoanalytic field with Bion in mind, he pointed out that the emotional situations of trying to know constituted "the development of psychoanalysis, where every change could be experienced as turbulence to be avoided, even though we cannot evolve without disturbing what we know" (177). To be subject to the tenders of its own theoretical disturbances is, perhaps, the only means by which receptivity to unknown life can even be considered. And this admission preoccupied Freud.

Freud's (1937) most difficult claim for psychoanalysis appeared near the end of his life. With some irony the problem he presented may also be a mirror to the anxieties of education as they involve the length of treatment and running out of time. Freud had to acknowledge, almost forty years into his psychoanalytic theory, that more was unknown than known and that even the work of trying to know—thought of as interpretations and transferences—were subject to intersubjective failings and the defense of ideality. A matrix of miscommunication is also a part of the analytic relationship since communication is disrupted by desire. But there is another problem that Freud's (1937) late essay, "Analysis Terminable and Interminable" had to admit. A gain in knowledge does not necessarily translate into affective change. One can hold a great deal of knowledge in store and still not know what has happened to the self. One can hold a great deal of knowledge and still be playing the child's game 'Let's play teacher.'

Twenty years earlier, Freud wrote (1917) "A Difficulty in the Path of Psychoanalysis" and emphasized the defense of resistance that he understood as an emotional situation rather than as lack of knowledge:

> I will say at once that it is not an intellectual difficulty I am thinking of, not anything that makes psychoanalysis hard for the hearer or reader to understand, but an affective one—something that alienates the feelings of those who come into contact with it, so that they become less inclined to believe in it or take an interest in it … the two kinds of difficulties amount to the same thing in the end. Where sympathy is lacking, understanding will not come very easily. (137)

It is a grand paradox that interest in emotional life is still viewed as a suspicious activity. Freud understood that psychoanalytic views hurt people's feelings but that did not stop him from an emotional truth when he described our nervous conditions as in the midst of things, and so as beholden to upbringing, unconscious attitudes toward libidinal life, and egotistic fear of loss of love. Freud's (1917) discussion is memorable for its unrelenting description of a universal psychological blow to the illusion that consciousness is the sum of mentality and that sexual drives are unimportant: ". . .the life of our sexual instincts cannot be wholly tamed, and the that mental processes are in themselves unconscious and only reach the ego and come under its control through incomplete and untrustworthy perceptions—these two discoveries amount to a statement that *the ego is not master in its own house*" (143).

The Anthropological Situation

The ego is not master of its own house because others are already living there. Laplanche (2017) presented the problematics of the experience of life "as fundamental anthropological situation" of every human (20). It begins at birth when the infant is confronted with the world of adult desire it knows nothing of. What is unconsciously conveyed between the infant and adult is a radical gap in communication, ability, and intent. It is our original asymmetry and our situation as care and the primacy of the other opens onto sexuality, curiosity, and the life of the mind. For both infant and mother, the meaning and destiny of acts of care and love are enigmatic and in the midst of things. Laplanche considered relations of dependency and love and the mother's desire as transmitted to the infant in the form of an enigmatic message that neither party can fully translate.

Domonique Scarfone (2018) painted the anthropological situation with the outlines of broad brush-strokes. The situation is one of "compromised messages to which each of

us is exposed, from birth by way of the infant's unpreparedness with regard to the sexually saturated adult universe" (89). And yet, everyone is ill-prepared for the human condition and no one can predicate what becomes of the fate of the anthropological situation. There cannot be a complete translation of desire because no completeness can be made. Instead, our earliest relationships leave erotic traces, impressions, and yearning. Communication carries this affective disturbance or excitement and a failure of translation. The anthropological situation is one of ill- preparedness for culture, birth, sexuality, and education, and a sense of otherness.

The Transference Situation

Transference, always in the midst of things, is another term for the enigmas of communication carried by feelings of having to translate relationality. Klein (1952) coined the term "transference situation" to point out that even the most banal utterance of her patients and even when they complained they have nothing to say, even then, these seemingly empty utterances carried on persuasive forces of love, hate, and ambivalence into phantasies of reception. Through her focus on anxiety and defense in mental life Klein listened to what could not be said but could be acted out between her and the patient as conflict, demand, compliance, hatred, and wish. She thought the self's paranoid perception of the other and the depressive worry over destroying the other characterized the make-up of the mind's oscillations and affected the ways the self could deny or get to know the pain of incompleteness. And interpreting transference gave her this clue. She found that the patient transferred to the analyst an imagined and real history of learning in the form of object relating that blurs the line between inside and outside, between perception and object, and between current and past experiences.

Betty Joseph (1996) described transference as both a means to understand and a quest for and disrupter of relationality. Her focus was with the contrary transmissions of unconscious attempts at influence:

> Much of our understanding of the transference comes through our understanding of how our patients act on us to feel things for many varied reasons; how they try to draw us into their defensive systems; how they unconsciously act out with us in the transference, trying to get us to act out with them, how they convey aspects of their inner world built up from infancy—elaborated in childhood and adulthood, experiences often beyond the use of words, which we can only capture through

the feelings aroused in us. (62)

Transference situations signify not so much why we feel anything at all. Rather, as situation, transference carries the additional element of acting as attractors to the feelings of the other. The teacher's affects are a complex of matters, beholden to frustration, competing investments, and projections of the introjected accumulation of the teacher's educational biography and imagos. All of this is conveyed each time a teacher acts, each time a teacher worries over the loss of knowledge, and each time the teacher listens before they can understand. The transference situation then may contain the *umwelt* of education and so, for example, the teacher's sinking feeling of something not right may well be in contact with the silent student who feels wronged. Transference situations are our means of relationality but also of resistance to that connection.

The Ethical Situation

Koichi Togashi (2020) has made the claim that psychoanalysis consists of a number of turns: structural, linguistic, subjective, intersubjective, relational and, the ethical turn that he attributes to the late work of Hans Kohut (1982) who came to the understanding that there is no objective reality to perceive, but only "the unknowability, in principle, of reality" (400). And this incapacity to dominate reality and even the ways one can insist on how reality should then be perceived, Kohut argued, is a challenge to static knowledge. Unknowability has, as its principle, a psychological subject that is also in the midst of its own development and growth. The ethical turn, as Togashi understands, is an empathic one that has more to do with accepting the relativity of knowing and the relativity of perception than it does with any intuitive understanding of the other.

Togashi adds to the ethical turn the movement toward decolonizing psychoanalysis. He describes Eastern values as a way to open, render as variable, and even overcome the dominance of Western views of the individual subject. For Togashi, "there are many patients we cannot describe" and he goes on to ask, "How shall we understand our work and our patient's sufferings?" (109). From Togashi's perspective, how our work is understood is the area to analyze.

Decolonizing psychoanalysis is also discussed in Sally Swartz's (2019) Winnicottian analysis of political protest movements in South Africa and in Orange's (2020) discussion on the radical ethics of listening. They both seek the means to challenge psychoanalytic orthodoxies, cultural overreach, and entrenched intolerance. Their interest

is with the priority of the other as a means to affect change within psychoanalytic practice and the wider world. A clue that both lean on resides in the psychoanalytic taboo against suggestion in clinical practice where its main ethic is the autonomy of the patient and the analyst's willingness to reflect on her own affectations through an interest in countertransference.

Togashi's question, however, exceeds technical orientations when he asks, "Can we be open to our patient's accounts without formulating stories about it?" (8). His question is a stunning alteration and challenge to the history of psychoanalysis and its transference desire for speaking subjects who narrate their stories. Of course, we wish for expression and of course we wish for the analysand's desire to speak. And yet many experiences born of unspeakable pain and horror, specifically those of social violence, natural catastrophes, accidents, war, and profound loss of life—many humanly induced catastrophes and untold loss cannot become a story. From this awareness and respect for suffering, Togashi formulates "the psychoanalytic zero," as emptiness that expresses a fundamental void without consent or will: "The psychoanalytic zero requires us to be in this vulnerable position when we see our patients who are themselves afraid to be vulnerable" (110). All this is prior to assuming the roles of patient and analyst. He described the ethical situation as beginning in the midst of things, in the meeting of two humans that occur before the frame is explained, before the presenting problem is placed between the analyst and analysand, and before there is any knowledge of either party. The psychoanalytic zero is in the midst of things, belonging to no one, and there without consent.

Togashi asks analysts to attend to the ways patients are encountered. It is advice well suited for educators since, after all, encountering and receiving groups of students they do not really know is what they do. And typically, educators do not begin their greetings by presenting themselves as vulnerable people meeting their students who are afraid to be vulnerable in their presence. This approach of privileging fallibility, vulnerability, and unknowability is quite other to Western discussions that urge both the analyst to focus on the patient's presentations and the teacher to focus on what they think students need before the student speaks.

What is striking for me is Togashi's emphasis on human beings, "prior to analyst's and a patient's awareness of their identities, their sense of self, and their professional, therapeutic, social and cultural roles" (17). It is almost as if we can be returned to a community of infants and to our anthropological situation. Whereas Freud suggested complete honesty with his method of free association, Togashi imagines an ethic of sincerity and not knowing in order to consider what cannot be chosen or given consent:

"The randomness of the world creates human vulnerability and loneliness" (37). He is moving close to an empty void, an unspeakable situation of otherness without a situation. For Togashi, the ethical turn depends upon acceptance of the analyst's vulnerability and uncertainty and so, "to surrender herself to the moment without any distinctions including right and wrong" (116). The analyst's ethical turn belongs to the work of facing her or his vulnerability, forgetting preoccupations, and accepting the limits of understanding as the ground for listening to otherness. It also depends on decolonizing the ways we study and having the faith to be influenced by what we do not know and by what is unknowable.

In Medias Res

Jacques André (2013) suggested why early contact with the other matters: "There is no such thing as human nature from a psychoanalytic point of view. Not that nothing is innate, but there is nothing human that is not subjected to the vicissitudes of early intersubjective relationships" (190). Even if our birth is inescapable and largely forgotten, it matters that we are born into a world of others. André provides a rough sketch of infancy as destiny rather than as nature. Nothing belongs to the subject yet there are no blank slates. The intersubjective fact begins with birth, a situation the neonate cannot give consent and of which we are ill prepared. Laplanche (2017) named this homemade cultural investment as the fundamental anthropological situation, where otherness and reception are nearly inseparable.

So it is that the field of education inherits and is itself an inheritance of unconscious experience that orients emotional expressions, wishes, anxieties, and attitudes toward the mental lives of self and other. These are our educational situations that broadcast human incompleteness, dependency, and unknowable life. But because we are also affected by randomness, the ethical situation calls on our vulnerability in the recognition of the other's vulnerability (Togashi 2020). Ethics on loan gives the self the fragile means to tolerate the frustrations of emotional experience that are readily expelled through preconceptions, rigid knowledge, and exhaustion. Lack of toleration can only lead to breakdowns and harsh defenses. These situations—emotion, transference, anthropological, and ethical—already an aspect of our daily lives, are a challenge for education to stop treating itself as if curriculum, modes of authority, theories of knowledge, and social arrangements took instruction from reality, as if reality was knowable, and as if there was no value to the situation of not knowing. What would it be like to take instruction from our vulnerability? And yet, what stands before education and the reason education seems to defend against

otherness is that its institutions are always beholden to life's uncertainties, to the randomness of life and death, to the histories inherited and denied, and our anthropological situation of ill preparedness. The dilemma for trying to represent all this anxiety and all this care is that words in the midst of otherness may feel as if they are delegates of abstract expressionism. There are so many brush strokes, erasures, over painting, textures, splashes, and so many layers that no center can be discerned.

So, what else can the field of learning become if we are in the midst of otherness and fragile life and, if our emotional situation is enlivened by vulnerability, dependency, care, ethics, the passing of time, and fallibility?

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Education from the Perspective of Psychoanalysis:

Based on Heisaku Kosawa's Educational Consultations Documented in the Magazine *Shogaku Ichinensei* (First Graders)

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Abstract

Clinicians often fail to pay attention to the relationship between such psychoanalytic work and education. Many clinicians espouse the deeply rooted notion that the psychoanalytic process will be adversely affected if they also play the role of an educator. Therefore, they tend to avoid opportunities to examine the relationship between these two domains. However, many cases in which the relationship between psychoanalysis and education is apparent are embedded within the history of Japanese psychoanalysis. Therefore, the objective of this paper is to examine education from the perspective of psychoanalysis based on Heisaku Kosawa's educational consultations that were serialized in the magazine Shogaku Ichinensei (First Graders) shortly after World War II.

Heisaku Kosawa (1897–1968) laid the foundations of present-day psychoanalysis in Japan. In 1932, when he was studying abroad, Kosawa met Sigmund Freud and received psychoanalytic training from Richard Sterba. In 1935, he became a member of the International Psychoanalytical Association (IPA) and opened a psychoanalytical clinic in Tokyo, where he practiced psychoanalysis. He published a series of educational consultations in the magazine Shogaku Ichinensei. His advice was characterized by a unique quality. He advised mothers to allow their children to be free and to spoil them a lot.

Between the prewar and postwar period, an educational scholar called Seishi Shimoda (1890–1973) proposed ideas related to the field of education that were similar to the advice that Kosawa published in the magazine Shogaku Ichinensei. He was Kosawa's patient. He received psychoanalytic therapy from him once a week between October 1939 and July 1942. Pertinent details were recorded in his book. This paper discussed the relationship between education and the demonic nature of human beings through these materials in the history of psychoanalysis in Japan.

Key words

history of psychoanalysis, Heisaku Kosawa, educational consultations

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1. Introduction

Let us start with a story about my patient. She often got angry with me and refused to lie down on the couch. Initially, I did not know why she was so angry with me. However, after a while, I realized that she felt angry with me whenever I gave a psychoanalytic interpretation. Soon, what she told me was that my interpretation intended to lead her to a certain goal or pattern while saying, "Speak freely." She said that this was the same tactic that was used by a teacher whom she disliked. After hearing her criticism, I reflected upon my words and behavior and realized that her criticism made a lot of sense. She was completely right. I instructed her to lie down on the couch and told her to engage in free association. As always, she pressed the intercom button on time. Then, she opened the front door, entered the room wearing the slippers, took off her bag, removed her coat, lay down on the couch, and started engaging in free association after I said, "Let's get started." In free association, one is required to freely speak about the things that come to mind. Subsequently, the therapist will give his or her interpretations. These interactions are quite different from everyday conversations. Anyone would feel confused the first time they participate in this experience because she or he is unlikely to have experienced this kind of communication in the past. However, patients eventually become acquainted with such kinds of psychoanalytic communication. They will begin to understand the relationships among the associations embedded within the interpretations conveyed by the therapist and eventually be able to independently discover unconscious links without the assistance of their therapist.

Clinicians often fail to pay attention to the relationship between such psychoanalytic work and education. Many clinicians espouse the deeply rooted notion that the psychoanalytic process will be adversely affected if they also play the role of an educator. Therefore, they tend to avoid opportunities to examine the relationship between these two domains. However, many cases in which the relationship between psychoanalysis and education is apparent are embedded within the history of Japanese psychoanalysis. McWilliams (2003) has noted that psychoanalysis is more educational than it is believed to be, and this has certainly been confirmed in the history.

Therefore, the objective of this paper is to examine education from the perspective of psychoanalysis based on Heisaku Kosawa's educational consultations that were serialized in the magazine *Shogaku Ichinensei* (First Graders) shortly after World War Ⅱ. Kosawa laid the foundation for psychoanalysis in Japan.

2. Education in Japanese psychoanalysis

(1) Heisaku Kosawa's educational consultations

Heisaku Kosawa (1897–1968) laid the foundations of present-day psychoanalysis in Japan. In 1932, when he was studying abroad, Kosawa met Sigmund Freud and received psychoanalytic training from Richard Sterba. In 1935, he became a member of the International Psychoanalytical Association (IPA) and opened a psychoanalytical clinic in Tokyo, where he practiced psychoanalysis. In Japan, psychoanalysis flourished during the 1920s and 1930s, and several organizations, including the Japanese branch of the IPA, were instituted. As the war intensified, these organizations disappeared, and members left. However, Kosawa continued his psychoanalytical practice and became the chair of the Japanese branch of the IPA after the war. He founded the largest psychoanalytical organization in Japan, namely, the Japan Psychoanalytical Association.

It is not well known that Kosawa published a series of educational consultations in the magazine *Shogaku Ichinensei* shortly after the war. *Shogaku Ichinensei* is a comprehensive magazine that targets first-grade elementary school students, and it is published by Shogakukan. Anyone who has grown up in Japan is likely to have read this magazine at least once. When this magazine was first published in March 1925, it was called "*Seugaku Ichinensei*". It has since been published for approximately 100 years. "Educational consultations for your beloved child" and "Educational consultations for mothers," which were authored by Kosawa, were published between November 1949 and August 1951 (four years after the end of the war). A total of 26 counseling cases were documented across 21 issues. Those who sought consultations were largely mothers, and the reasons for which they sought consultations ranged from concerns about their children entering elementary school to concerns about their children's personality (e.g., being bossy at home but timid outside, being greedy, and being disobedient) and physical problems (e.g., stuttering and ear discharge). Kosawa answered the consultations not with title of Psychoanalyst but as Doctor of Medicine. Although the term "psychoanalysis" was not used, the contents of his answers clearly reflect psychoanalytic perspectives. Moreover, his advice was characterized by a unique quality. He advised mothers to allow their children to be free and to spoil them a lot. Despite the wide range of clients he served, he provided similar advice to more than half of all individuals (to whom specific advice was provided). The different kinds of advice that he provided included the following: "Go easy on your child's selfishness as though you were trying to compensate for the lack of care (love) received during childhood," "Try to submit to your children" "Afford

your child greater freedom when he or she becomes selfish," "Adore your child in all ways possible until he or she feels satisfied," and "Allow your child to do the things that you think are bad." He provided this kind of advice because he believed that their children had experienced a lack of care and affection from mothers during childhood, and he emphasized the role of failures to wean from breastfeeding. As he has illustrated, "If we use weaning from breastfeeding as an example, the mother's breast is the place where an infant can rest and feel safe. However, with the birth of the next child, the breast must be given up to that child. This task is very difficult for infants." He highlighted the effects of breastfeeding experiences on the mental development of children and the problems caused by separation, which are regarded as the causes of various problematic behaviors in children.

In 1951 (when Kosawa was also discussing this issue), a compilation of John Bowlby's studies on the mental and physical responses of infants separated from their mothers and the effects of separation was published. The effects of deficient maternal rearing practices on the mental and physical development of infants, which were delineated by Bowlby, drew much attention from scholars in Japan. Subsequently, maternal deprivation, which was examined by Bowlby, was reconceptualized as not only a one-dimensional problem that involves the presence or absence of a mother but also a problem that is caused by a series of more complex psychological events. For instance, research continues to progress across multiple dimensions (e.g., comprehension and development of multiple attachment objects other than the mother and the role of separation in mental development). At first glance, Kosawa's advice appears to have overlapped with the latest findings on the mother-child relationship that were published at the time. However, is this observation valid?

(2) Heisaku Kosawa and motherhood

Keiko Kida underwent psychoanalysis with Kosawa three times a week for approximately six months. She began receiving therapy in 1941—a few years before Kosawa began to write for *Shogaku Ichinensei*. Kida continued to receive guidance from Kosawa and maintained detailed records about him. These records include several statements that are resonant with Kosawa's advice documented in *Shogaku Ichinensei*. For example, Kosawa often proclaimed that the mercy of Buddha is his unconditional love and that the purest form of unconditional human love is shown by mothers, who nourish their children with their milk. Moreover, he often cited an anecdote, according to which Buddha first attained enlightenment not in an extremely difficult situation but

when he consumed a milk-rice pudding that he had received from a young woman who was passing by.

Kida has also described Kosawa's own childhood. Kosawa was the ninth child, and it was difficult for his mother to care for him. Therefore, all caregiving duties were assigned to a wet nurse. According to her records, Kosawa had described his childhood in the following manner:

> *I feel that the reason why my eyesight got worse (blindness in one eye) has something to do with the fact that I was brought up by a wet nurse. While giving a sidelong glance to retaliate against the hostility of the other child, which I feared would make me feel as though I were being stabbed, I fought fiercely and took the other child's milk away. There is a sense of guilt and fear that stems from the fact that I gave that child a sidelong glance. I think my eyes were punished.*

He may have addressed these problems when he underwent psychoanalysis. Kosawa maintained very brief notes about his psychoanalytic sessions with Sterba. However, his records narrate an interesting episode. Kosawa always felt the urge to purchase something when he stood in front of a candy shop. He experienced obsessive thoughts and felt as though someone were telling him, "You are a greedy person." This happened in Vienna when he saw chocolates stacked against the store window. On the third night after he had started undergoing psychoanalysis, he suddenly experienced the need to have a bowel movement. He ran into the bathroom and had severe diarrhea. The next morning, when he passed by the store window as usual, he was surprised to find that his obsessive thoughts had completely disappeared.

Kosawa's eyes looked at the chocolates wishfully, but his inner voice said, "You are a greedy person." The eyes of the baby (Kosawa) who is desperately fighting for his wet nurse's milk, the other baby whose milk has been taken away, and the baby (Kosawa) who gave the other baby a sidelong glance all overlap with one another. This is reminiscent of the advice that he provided to mothers in *Shogaku Ichinensei*: "The breast must be given up to the next child. This task is hard for an infant." This was nothing but a statement that stemmed from Kosawa's heart.

Kosawa has recounted that, when he was a high school student, he felt overjoyed whenever he returned to his parents' house because his mother would be waiting for him with a sweet fermented rice drink that she had prepared for him. It is very likely that milk-rice pudding and sweet fermented drinks reminded him of breast milk. Kosawa said to Kida, "Those battling emotional pain (including those who have had mothers) have not

received the kind of love infants experience when their mothers breastfeed them. Therefore, no one other than a therapist can give this to them." Kida has noted that Kosawa devoted his life to the pursuit of an answer to the question of "how he could help those who had not enjoyed their own mothers' milk sufficiently (including himself) and compensate for this deficiency in their lives."

When preschool education is discussed in Japan, it is often indicated that psychoanalytic theory underlies the "myth of a child's first three years," which is still strongly endorsed even today. In other words, it refers to the notion that mothers should devote themselves to child-rearing activities until their child reaches the age of three years. For example, when addressing the issue of the modernization of families, especially during the postwar period, Ochiai (2019) has referred to the fact that the myth of a child's first three years is rooted in psychoanalysis and has introduced insights propounded by Freud and Erickson. It cannot be argued that this perspective is entirely wrong. Certainly, psychoanalysis emphasizes the early childhood years. Freud's psychoanalytic theory, however, is fundamentally phallocentric and paternalistic. However, Japanese psychoanalysis has focused on mother-child relationships since the beginning. What is hidden in the background is not only the perspectives of psychoanalysis but also identification with the notion of Buddha's mercy and the relationship between Kosawa and his mother. In postwar Japan, Gertrud Schwing's "A Way to the Soul of the Mentally Ill" (1940) gained great popularity. Even at present, it is a piece of classical literature to which students of not only psychoanalysis but also clinical psychology and nursing are introduced. This book presents the case of a patient with mental illness who was bedridden and had been plunged into desolation but had begun to recover. The centrality of motherhood experiences within Schwing's therapeutic framework is resonant with Kosawa's therapeutic theory.

The historical context in which such ideas gained popularity cannot be ignored. During the war, women were encouraged to become mothers through the national policy, "Have children and raise them for the nation." After the collapse of fatherhood following Japan's defeat in the war, women were encouraged to become full-time housewives and play a primary role in child-rearing activities during the postwar high-economic growth period. Motherhood was emphasized during this period. As a result, perspectives that emphasized the role of motherhood in early childhood contributed to the formulation of the concept of the Ajase complex by Keigo Okonogi, who inherited Kosawa's idea (Nishi, 2020). This concept further developed its educational meaning as a problem of mothers' own egoism in child rearing.

(3) Heisaku Kosawa and Seishi Shimoda

Between the prewar and postwar period, an educational scholar called Seishi Shimoda (1890–1973) proposed ideas related to the field of education that were similar to the advice that Kosawa published in the magazine *Shogaku Ichinensei.*

Shimoda was known within the prewar Japanese psychoanalytical community, and he was interested in psychoanalysis from a very early stage. In 1928, Shimoda met Alexander Sutherland Neill and visited his school. Neill practiced education grounded in psychoanalytic theory in Summerhill School in England. After the tour, Shimoda immersed himself in Neill's latest book, "The Problem Child," while returning to Japan on a ship that sailed across the Indian Ocean. He was struck by a story about Neill, according to which he was beaten by a rebellious child and endured it for three hours without getting angry. According to him, Affording children the freedom to do what they want to do will help them learn to accept and forgive others. Strongly influenced by Neill's ideas, Shimoda published several translations, including those of a collection of Neill's books. He also wrote many books based on Neill's idea of "free education" and conducted educational programs to spread these ideas within Japan. His book "Practice of Education without Scolding" (1954) became a best-seller.

There was a period during which Shimoda was Kosawa's patient. He received psychoanalytic therapy from him once a week between October 1939 and July 1942. Pertinent details were recorded in what can be considered to be an autobiography that he wrote at the age of 80 years. He has written that, during psychoanalysis, he experienced strong feelings of affection toward his mother who had died when he was only 10 years old. Shimoda has described this experience as follows:

> *The analysis started with something close to me and gradually progressed to issues related to deeper unconscious areas. Various problems had risen there, but most important of all was that my love for my mother and my affection for my mother had dominated my life for many years.*

By undergoing psychoanalysis with Kosawa, Shimoda appears to have gained greater insights into not only himself but also education. However, after undergoing psychoanalysis for almost three years, a serious problem had emerged. According to Kosawa, Shimoda sought freedom and endorsed a scolding-free educational paradigm because he had not experienced Amae during childhood. Shimoda was able to accept this interpretation. However, they had different opinions about what caused the emergence of

this need. Shimoda believed that human beings are fundamentally good. In contrast, Kosawa believed that human nature is characterized by conflicts between good and evil. Subsequently, he scolded Shimoda by "blasting his voice throughout the entire room" and argued that Shimoda's claim was nothing but the rationalization of his desire to experience Amae. However, Shimoda refused to change his mind. He tried to prove his theory in a calm manner by offering real-life examples. However, Kosawa was not willing to change his mind about his theory either. After several such exchanges, Kosawa told him, "A stubborn fellow like you has paranoia. I can no longer analyze a fellow like you. Leave!" Consequently, psychoanalysis was terminated. Shimoda has described this incident as follows:

> *Dr. Kosawa, w*ho dismissed the notion of education without scolding, t*ried to change my mind by scolding me, but I did not budge even an inch.*

This is the event during which a transference had taken place. This is the time point at which psychoanalytic development appears to have occurred. It is not an exaggeration to state that modern psychoanalysis aims to answer the question of how these transferences can be facilitated and how one can survive them. The transference relationship, as we can see here, is something that has been thrown in and drowning without noticing. According to Kosawa, "Those with mental illnesses (including those who have had mothers) have not received the kind of love infants experience when their mothers breastfeed them. Therefore, no one other than a therapist can give this to them. Moreover, Kosawa wrote a paper entitled, "The Two Kinds of Guilt," and presented it to Freud. This article discussed the guilt caused by the state of being forgiven. Forgiving others and being forgiven were issues of great interest to Kosawa. However, there was a time when he scolded another person so loudly that his voice reverberated throughout the room. The objective of this discussion is not to question whether Kosawa's attitude is right or wrong. Transference can plunge a therapist into a helpless situation that differs from the one for which he or she had prepared. Then, a therapist will be able to accurately understand what is really going on in his or her patient's mind.

Based on his psychoanalytic process with Kosawa, Shimoda wrote about the events that had led up to his marriage to his wife. It appears as though he was trying to associate them to his experiences with Kosawa. Shimoda's wife was his former student. After graduating, she became a teacher, faced various difficulties, and had come to Shimoda for advice. Shimoda enthusiastically provided advice and guidance to his former student. When they eventually decided to get married, Shimoda thought to himself, "From now

on, I will teach and guide her for the rest of my life. I will also help her become a sensible and respectable person." However, his wife resisted his efforts in this direction. After several years of conflict with his wife, he realized that it was wrong for him to arrogantly believe that he could teach and guide his wife. Since then, he tried to remind himself, "If someone resists, I will accept their resistance. I will never try to teach and guide them." Shimoda wrote about this episode within the context of his criticism of Kosawa for trying to eliminate his resistance by scolding him. Furthermore, it was an illustration of how resistance should be addressed in psychoanalysis. However, it is evident that his relationship with his wife was similar to the one he shared with Kosawa across three years. It was a relationship in which neither one was willing to compromise. Instead, they continued to demonstrate resistance toward one another. One relationship ended when the two parties decided to part ways out of anger, whereas the other relationship lasted a lifetime.

3. Summary

This paper presented Kosawa's desire for motherhood and a psychoanalytic process with Shimoda, starting with a series of educational consultations he provided in *Shogaku Ichinensei* after the war. These events illustrate the relationship between the demonic nature of human beings and education. Freud has described this as follows:

> *…we may say that the patient does not remember anything of what he has forgotten and repressed, but acts it out.1 He reproduces it not as a memory but as an action; he repeats it, without, of course, knowing that he is repeating it.*

Psychoanalysis places paramount value on such unconscious repetitive acts (i.e., understanding through transference). In "Beyond the Pleasure Principle," Freud focused on those who repeat their unfortunate fate as though they have been possessed by a demon. Unfortunately, we always repeat the same mistake. With regard to their educational beliefs, both Kosawa and Shimoda believed that it is important to give the other person the freedom to do what he or she wishes to do without scolding him or her (i.e., to forgive and accept the other person). This can certainly be found in what both of them have left behind. However, what actually happened between the two of them was different. It was completely the opposite of what they had been teaching mothers.

However, this may be the very reason why they passionately endorsed similar

educational beliefs. During psychoanalysis, they failed to demonstrate maternal forgiveness, which is what they were desperately seeking. The educational advice that they provided to mothers was also a reflection of their demonic fate and possibly their desire to escape their fate.

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Beyond the Trauma Principle in Education:

Does Freud's Concept of *Nachträglichkeit* Imply the Possibility of Retroactive Education?

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Introduction: Beyond the Trauma Principle?

From their birth to the present day, Freudian theory and psychoanalysis have been the subject of both intense praise and criticism. Sigmund Freud's conceptualization of the unconscious mind has had a profound impact on various fields of the humanities and social sciences, in addition to psychiatry and clinical psychology. For example, the "trauma theory" originally proposed by Freud, which holds that psychic trauma that occurs between infancy and childhood can have serious consequences, is widely accepted, shared, and understood in our society. However, despite its significant influence, Freudian theory has been severely criticized for its lack of rigor and consistency, while Freudian psychoanalysis has been questioned for its low reproducibility and failure to satisfy scientific requirements.

This study focuses on Freudian theory because it has the potential to transcend these criticisms. In particular, Freud's concept of *Nachträglichkeit* is still open to reconsideration in the context of educational theory; thus, this study applies the concept of *Nachträglichkeit* to educational theory and presents a new model of education, called "retroactive education." In their excellent dictionary of psychoanalytic terms, *The Language of Psychoanalysis*, Jean Laplanche and J.B. Pontalis explain *Nachträglichkeit* (après-coup or deferred action) as follows: "[This] term [is] frequently used by Freud in connection with his view of psychical temporality and causality: experiences, impressions and memory-traces may be revised at a later date to fit in with fresh experiences or with the attainment of a new stage of development. They may in that event be endowed not only with a new, meaning but also with psychical effectiveness" (Laplanche and Pontalis 1973: 111). Since *Nachträglichkeit* is often described in relation

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to etiology, it is generally considered to have negative implications; however, I propose that it may be possible to apply Freud's *Nachträglichkeit* theory to education and human formation (*Bildung* in German) theory in a positive manner.

At the outset, I would like to raise two questions regarding the foundations of modern educational theories. The first relates to the model of causality in educational theory. The model of causality discussed in this paper means the influence that a particular cause contributes to the production of a particular result. In general, in the social sciences, it is thought that there are complex factors and processes involved in the cause-effect relationship. However, a number of educational programs and policies in Japan continue to be based on the simple model of causality. In addition, there are many examples of such policies and programs in which the distinction between causality and correlation is unclear. One of the most famous illustrations of this confusion in recent years is exemplified by the national campaign, "Hayane, Hayaoki, Asagohan" ("Early to Bed, Early to Rise, and Don't Forget Your Breakfast"), promoted by the Japanese Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT).[1] Moreover, in recent years, the successful operation of the plan-do-check-act (PDCA) cycle, based on the causality theory of learning, is assumed to be the primary proof of excellent education. For instance, in "The Second Basic Plan for the Promotion of Education" (provisional translation), MEXT clearly states: "In preschool, compulsory (elementary and lower secondary), and upper secondary school education, the government aims to develop in all children a definite zest for life by promoting collaboration and cooperation among schools, families, and communities and by completing the PDCA cycle in order to examine and improve educational contents and methods, educational environments, and the educational system, based on objective data" (MEXT 2013).

The other question relates to gradual learning theory, which is based on

[1] This campaign has been implemented by MEXT in cooperation with a private organization called "Hayane, Hayaoki, Aasagohan Zenkoku Kyougi-Kai" (National Council for the Promotion of "Early to Bed, Early to Rise, and Don't Forget Your Breakfast"), which was established in 2006. While there may be a correlation between a healthy lifestyle and academic achievement, this cannot be explained by simple causality; numerous studies indicate that children's academic achievement is determined by complex factors such as economic power, social and cultural capital of families, and parents' interest in their children (Kariya *et al.* 2004). Nevertheless, in several brochures and websites, MEXT repeatedly appeals to students to follow these three habits, especially eating breakfast, implying that doing so will surely lead to an improvement in academic achievement. For instance, see the two official brochures published by MEXT for elementary school students, "'Hayane, hayaoki, Asagohan' te Shitteru kana?" ("Do you know 'Early to Bed, Early to Rise, and Don't Forget Your Breakfast'?") (available online: https://www.mext.go.jp/kids/find/kyoiku/mext_0020.html), and "Dekiru Kotokara Hajimetemiyou 'Hayane, hayaoki, Asagohan'" ("Let's start with what you can do, 'Early to Bed, Early to Rise, and Don't Forget Your Breakfast'") (available on https://www.mext.go.jp/a_menu/shougai/asagohan/__icsFiles/afieldfile/2020/1324879_1.pdf).

developmental stage theory, and relies on the assumption that education should be provided according to a child's developmental stage and the readiness of the learner. This schema, in general, is said to have been discovered by Jean-Jacques Rousseau and developed by Jean Piaget, and is the foundation of the "Courses of Study" (the school curriculum criteria) in primary and secondary education in Japan.[2] Furthermore, the recent university reform movement in Japan has also advocated for a gradual and standardized curriculum that will enable the "quality assurance" of university education.[3] Here, I question this assumption and argue that some knowledge and experiences which are far beyond the learner's development stage and understanding can sometimes have important implications for them later in life, and question whether such a view of education deprives learners of the opportunity to break their own framework of understanding, thereby robbing them of the great opportunity of learning.

To this end, this paper will reexamine trauma theories and present a new concept of learning called "retrospective education." In accordance with the principle of causality, trauma theories postulate that trauma (i.e., the cause) leads to disease (i.e., the result). In response to this assumption, the concept of "retrospective education" presented in this paper criticizes the causal scheme in which the implementation of a particular educational practice at particular developmental stage is believed to lead to a particular result. Thereafter, I propose a model in which a present or newer stimulus (new experience) activates a cause (old or preceding experience) that occurred in the past to retroactively produce education in the present. Moreover, unlike developmentally appropriate practice (DAP) in educational theory, this model demonstrates the possibility that experiences beyond the learner's understanding can be retroactively (ex post facto) processed, and these experiences can also be characterized as educational.

It may become possible to reconsider the theoretical premise of modern educational theories, and to re-examine the common understanding of education with the affirmation of two aforementioned hypotheses. I believe that it is one of the missions of the philosophy of education to challenge the assumptions of our own educational theories just as Freud's psychoanalysis highlighted the limitations of conventional psychology.

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[2] The Courses of Study, first formulated in 1947, which regulate the educational goals and content of elementary and secondary schools in Japan, are based on Piaget's developmental stage theory (Geshi 2013). Even in recent years, developmental stage theory has continued to form the basis for the Courses of Study. The Curriculum Division of the Elementary and Secondary Education Department of MEXT has provided an appendix document with the Courses of Study in 2021 that states "supporting students' development" is one of the most important aspects of education, and requires each school to "enhance instruction based on the developmental stages" (MEXT 2021: 23-28).

[3] See https://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/chukyo/chukyo4/houkoku/attach/1302346.htm (Japanese language)

I. Beyond the Model of Causality and Learning Stage Theory

1. Revisiting the Model of Causality

First, I would like to reconsider the model of causality according to which our shared understanding of education assumes that certain causes lead to certain results. As a typical example of causality, we will examine the "trauma theory" which evolved under the influence of Freudian psychoanalytic theories. It might be argued that the trauma theory, which posits that childhood trauma can lead to the development of mental diseases and disorders, has had more of an impact on education than any other psychoanalytic theory. For instance, Alexander Sutherland Neill's Summerhill School, which allows children a great deal of freedom with the aim of avoiding trauma and repression among students, could be considered a clear application of trauma theory (Neil 1972). A more extreme example is the work of Alice Miller who, after criticizing "poisonous pedagogy," rejected education in all its forms, deeming it inherently traumatic for children (Miller 1983). These two examples present variations within the trauma theory model. It should also be noted that the trauma theory of PTSD (Post Traumatic Stress Disorder) was formally included in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Third Edition (DSM-III) published by the American Psychiatric Association in 1980, and has continued to appear as such, even in the updated DSM-V, published in 2013.

As is well known, some scholars consider Freud's early "seduction theory" (*Verführungstheorie*) to be a precursor of PTSD as it was defined in the DSM-III. Freud initially believed that sexual seduction (which would be regarded as sexual assault and abuse by today's standards) was the cause of neurosis. However, from the autumn of 1897 onward, Freud began to change his thinking by indicating that seductive scenes that were narrated contained phantasies and, therefore, began focusing on the psychic reality itself. In 1950 (English translation 1954), Ernst Kris coined this development as the "abandonment of the seduction hypothesis" (*Verzichts auf die Verführungshypothese*) and hailed it as a great step in the birth of psychoanalysis (Kris 1950: 36; 1954: 29).

However, toward the end of the 1970s, in response to trends such as anti-psychiatry and anti-pedagogy, many observers began to criticize Freud's transition strongly. Alice Miller, for example, criticizes Freud's psychoanalytic theory for masking real sexual abuse by understanding the patient's traumatic memories as an expression of the Oedipus complex (Miller 1984). Similarly, Judith Lewis Herman, who popularized the concept of psychological trauma, also strongly criticized Freud's abandonment of the seduction

hypothesis, stating that it regularly led to the assessment of actual abuse as a patient's phantasies, which also resulted in the concealment of criminal acts (Herman 1992).[4]

Nonetheless, while some researchers contend that Freud's seduction theory was the forerunner of trauma theory or PTSD, I insist that it could never be categorized as a simple trauma theory. The variations of trauma theory by Neill, Miller, and Herman described above were all based on the concept of causality, according to which the past defines the present. However, it is not commonly known among non-specialists that there are aspects of Freud's theory of trauma, which extend beyond simple causality. As mentioned above, from the autumn of 1897 onward, Freud abandoned his belief that the seduction scenes which his patients mentioned were correct memories or accurate reflections of real events, and began to emphasize "psychical reality" as distinct from external reality: "fundamentally what is involved here is unconscious desire and its associated phantasies," as Laplanche and Pontalis explain (Laplanche and Pontalis 1973: 363). Thereafter, advancing from the naive theory of trauma, Freud developed his psychoanalytic theory and the concept of *Nachträglichkeit*.

The idea of "retroactive education" presented here, based on Freud's concept of *Nachträglichkeit*, might open the possibility of the theory of education and human development that extends beyond the model of causality based on linear temporality, even if that model can explain some educational practices. The first question posed in this paper is: Can the entire practice of education be understood within the reductionist framework of a cause-effect paradigm or the model of causality?

2. Revisiting Learning Stage Theory

The second question I would like to pose relates to learning stage theory. It is commonly believed that there are different stages of children's learning, and modern educational theory assumes that education should be based on children's developmental stages. Freud asserted that childhood sexual experiences tend to manifest as trauma later in life, as sex cannot be understood before puberty. In "Beyond the Pleasure Principle" (1920), he compared the psychic apparatus to a "living vesicle" with a "receptive cortical layer" that protects the subject from external stimuli (Freud 1920, S.E. 18: 27; G.W. 13: 26). When a strong stimulus breaks through this protective surface and invades the interior, it causes "traumatic neurosis" (Freud 1920, S.E. 18: 31; G.W. 13: 31). This

[4] How Freud reached his abandonment of seduction theory, as well as the issues pertaining to the formulation of the abandonment of seduction theory, is summarized in Geshi (2006).

protective shield is reminiscent of the "pedagogical barrier" described by German pedagogical theorist Klaus Mollenhauer. According to Mollenhauer, education does not simply "present" but rather "represents" the reality in which adults live, as it is, to protect children from real, visceral violence by adding a "filter" to the world and reconstructing it (Mollenhauer 1983).

The second question, then, is will an experience that ignores one's developmental stage and readiness, breaks through Freud's so-called "protective shield" and Mollenhauer's "filter," and goes beyond one's comprehension only have negative consequences? In other words, can there be so-called "positive traumatic" experiences or any positive impact associated with trauma?[5]

II. The First Formulation of *Nachträglichkeit*: The Case of Emma

1. *Nachträglichkeit* and the Model of Causality

Freud discussed deferred action in relation to etiology; however, *Nachträglichkeit* is not a simple causal theory. Laplanche and Pontalis describe the significance and advantages of *Nachträglichkeit* in the following manner:

> The first thing the introduction of the notion does is to rule out the summary interpretation which reduces the psycho-analytic view of the subject's history to a linear determinism envisaging nothing but the action of the past upon the present (Laplanche and Pontalis 1973:111-112).

However, the English translation does not fully reflect the nuance of *Nachträglichkeit*. In *the Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud (S.E.)*, edited by James Strachey, the translation of *Nachträglichkeit* is "deferred action." Helmut Thomä and Neil Cheshire insist this choice of terminology may lead to a reading of Freud's concept of *Nachträglichkeit* as a simple direction of causality (Thomä *et al.* 1991). As a starting point in the search for the traumatic event, Freud assessed the result of the disease or disorder and then sought the cause in the past.

[5] It has been claimed that positive personality transformation can occur after experiencing psychological trauma (Jayawickreme *et al.* 2014); however, this concept differs from that of the "retroactive education" that I present in this paper.

In this way, the causality of Freudian psychoanalysis can be considered the "backward causation" that Japanese philosopher Masaki Ichinose presented after examining the discussion of causality in Western philosophy. According to Ichinose, "Our causal inquiry begins with the recognition of the result as an extraordinary event, and then the cause that is considered to have caused the result is revealed" (Ichinose 2001: 130–132, 173, translation by the author).

Gregory Bistoen *et al.* also suggested that the English translation of "deferred action" does not adequately capture the retrospective connotation of the German *Nachträglichkeit*. "Deferred action suggests that something is deposited in the individual at T1 that suddenly detonates, like a time bomb, at T2" (Bistoen *et al.* 2014:674). The authors then examined Freud's *Nachträglichkeit* theory in one of his earliest works, "Project for a Scientific Psychology*"* (Freud 1950, written in 1895). "Emma," a case that appears in this unpublished work by Freud, has a compulsion that prevents her from going to the shops alone. When she was eight years old, a shopkeeper had touched her genitals through her clothes (T1), although she did not understand the implications of this act at the time. However, upon reaching sexual maturity at the age of twelve, an event during which two shop assistants in another store laughed at her (T2) caused her memory of the previous experience (T1) to resurface, thereby activating a trauma response. Such activation is known as "deferred action." It should be noted that the modern-day diagnosis of PTSD only focuses on the second traumatic experience (T2) while often failing to take into account the first trauma (T1) (Bistoen *et al.* 2014: 674).

2. Retrospective Construction of Traumatic Scenes

Though we have already seen that Freud's method of exploring etiology is a form of "backwards causality," his *Nachträglichkeit* theory is somewhat more complex in its temporal nature. Freud described Emma's case as "typical of repression in hysteria" and as "a memory [that] is repressed that has only become a trauma *by deferred action* [*Nachträglichkeit*]." In Freud's words, "Now this case is typical of repression in hysteria. We invariably find that a memory is repressed which has only become a trauma by *deferred action* [*Nachträglichkeit*]. The cause of this state of things is the retardation of puberty as compared with the rest of the individual's development" (Freud 1950[1895], S.E.1:356; G.W.nb:448).

However, when we read "Project for a Scientific Psychology," we find that the descriptions of the events that Emma is said to have experienced are arranged in an opposite order to the arrangement presented by Bistoen *et al.* (2014). These authors

described the trauma that Emma sustained at the age of eight as "T1," and her trauma at the age of twelve as "T2" on the time axis, whereas Freud described Emma's trauma at twelve years of age as "Scene I" and at eight years of age as "Scene II," according to the order of recall in the analysis (Freud 1950 [1895], S.E.1: 353–354; G.W.nb: 445–446).

The question of where to place the starting point becomes important in the development of *Nachträglichkeit* theory. The trauma that Emma sustained at the age of eight was believed to have actually occurred. However, as described above, Freud overturned his position in 1897 that traumatic memories reflect reality. Freud's so-called "abandonment of the seduction theory" led to the development of the view that childhood memories are not necessarily a reflection of reality, but rather a mixture of both phantasy and reality. In "Screen Memories" (1899), he observed that the scene of trauma does not "emerge" but is "formed" at the time of recall:

> Our childhood memories show us our earliest years not as they were but as they appeared at the later periods when the memories were aroused. In these periods of arousal, the childhood memories did not, as people are accustomed to say, *emerge*; they were *formed* at that time. And a number of motives, with no concern for historical accuracy, had a part in forming them, as well as in the selection of the memories themselves (Freud 1899, S.E.3:322; G.W.1:553-554).

However, even if the scene of trauma could be reconstructed through analysis, Freud claimed the trauma itself existed before the analysis and became a disorder after the second event. This *Nachträglichkeit* theory was further refined in the case of the "Wolf Man."

III. The Second Formulation of *Nachträglichkeit*: The Case of the "Wolf Man"

1. The most famous example of *Nachträglichkeit*

There are two main periods in which *Nachträglichkeit* (or *nachträglich*) appears frequently in Freud's writings. The first is in the work he published during the period of his initial contemplation, which lasted until 1902. The second is in "From the History of an Infantile Neurosis" (1918), which is also known as the case of the "Wolf Man" (Thomä *et al.* 1991: 408-409).

As Freud himself recognized, he needed to rethink the concept of *Nachträglichkeit*

in the "Wolf Man" in order to clarify the theoretical differences to his former colleagues, Alfred Adler and Carl Gustav Jung, who broke away from Freud between 1911 and 1913. Both Adler and Jung regarded trauma as a reflection of a patient's current conflict, and not as a real event in the past. James Strachey, the editor and principal translator of *the Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (S.E.), notes "The primary significance of the case history in Freud's eyes at the time of its publication was clearly the support it provided for his criticisms of Adler and more especially of Jung" (Strachey 1955, S.E.17:5), who asserted that early childhood memories were merely a reflection of a patient's current situation:

> The greater part of the psychoanalytic school is still under the spell of the conception that infantile sexuality is the *sine qua non* of neurosis. It is not only the theorist, delving into childhood simply from scientific interest, but the practicing analyst also, who believes that he has to turn the history of infancy inside out in order to find the fantasies conditioning the neurosis. A fruitless enterprise! In the meantime the most important factor escapes him, namely, the conflict and its demands in the present. In the case we have been describing, we should not understand any of the motives which produced the hysterical attacks if we looked for them in earliest childhood. Those reminiscences determine only the form, but the dynamic element springs from the present, and insight into the significance of the actual moment alone gives real understanding (Jung 1913, C.W.4:167).

In opposition to Adler and Jung, Freud emphasized the significance of the past experience in etiology, describing the points of the dispute between them as "the significance of the infantile factor." For Freud, the "Wolf Man" was a clear case that proved "the influence of childhood" as an etiology:

> I am of opinion *that the influence of childhood makes itself felt already in the situation at the beginning of the formation of a neurosis, since it plays a decisive part in determining whether and at what point the individual shall fail to master the real problems of life.*
> What is in dispute, therefore, is the significance of the infantile factor. The problem is to find a case which can establish that significance beyond any doubt. Such, however, is the case [Wolf Man] which is being dealt with so exhaustively in these pages and which is distinguished by the characteristic that the neurosis in later life was preceded by a neurosis in early childhood (Freud 1918, S.E.17:54; G.W.12:83).

The "Wolf Man" was a Russian man whom Freud began analyzing when the subject was twenty-three years old. This man had developed an infantile neurosis just before his fourth birthday, which lasted up until approximately the age of ten. He had also suffered a breakdown at the age of seventeen, triggered by gonorrhea (Freud 1918, S.E.17: 121; G.W.12:157). The analysis revealed that the cause of his symptoms was not an external trauma, but rather an anxiety dream of a wolf (Freud 1918, S.E.17: 28; G.W.12:53).[6] The Wolf Man recalled:

> *I dreamt that it was night and that I was lying in my bed. (My bed stood with its foot towards the window; in front of the window there was a row of old walnut trees. I know it was winter when I had the dream, and night-time.) Suddenly the window opened of its own accord, and I was terrified to see that some white wolves were sitting on the big walnut tree in front of the window. There were six or seven of them. The wolves were quite white, and looked more like foxes or sheep-dogs, for they had big tails like foxes and they had their ears pricked like dogs when they pay attention to something. In great terror, evidently of being eaten up by the wolves, I screamed* and woke up (Freud 1918, S.E.17:29; G.W.12:54).

This dream occurred immediately before his fourth birthday, which was on Christmas Day. Thereafter, Freud supposed that before the anxiety dream of the wolf took place, there must have been an original element, i.e., the primary scene, that was distorted and represented as the dream. The scene was that of his parents copulating, which the "Wolf Man" had witnessed at the age of eighteen months:

> If, however, the effects of a scene of this sort appear in the child's fourth or fifth year, then he must have witnessed the scene at an age even earlier than that (Freud 1918, S.E.17:56; G.W.12:85).
>
> What sprang into activity that night out of the chaos of the dreamer's unconscious memory-traces was the picture of copulation between his parents, copulation in circumstances which were not entirely usual and were especially favourable for

[6] In the Wolf Man's case, the threat of castration by his babysitter and the seduction of his older sister can be recognized between the primal scene and the anxiety wolf-dream. Although these events may have formed part of the etiology, they are not considered in this paper.

observation (Freud 1918, S.E.17:36; G.W.12:63).

This primal scene that the Wolf Man had witnessed at the age of one and a half years finally became understandable at the age of four as a result of his maturing. During this time, as with any trauma and/or seduction, the event gained an etiological significance due to "deferred operation [*nachträgliche Wirkung*]":

> We have now carried our account down to about the time of the boy's fourth birthday, and it was at that point that the dream brought into deferred operation [nachträgliche Wirkung] his observation of intercourse at the age of one and a half. It is not possible for us completely to grasp or adequately to describe what now ensued. The activation of the picture, which, thanks to the advance in his intellectual development, he was now able to understand, operated not only like a fresh event, but like a new trauma, like an interference from outside analogous to the seduction (Freud 1918, S.E.17:109; G.W.12:144).

However, Freud avoided casting judgment on the reality of the primal scene at this stage of the analysis since determining whether the primal scene was an actual experience or a phantasy would not yield significant results:

> I should myself be glad to know whether the primal scene in my present patient's case was a phantasy or a real experience; but, taking other similar cases into account, I must admit that the answer to this question is not in fact a matter of very great importance. These scenes of observing parental intercourse, of being seduced in childhood, and of being threatened with castration are unquestionably an inherited endowment, a phylogenetic heritage, but they may just as easily be acquired by personal experience. [....]
> All that we find in the prehistory of neuroses is that a child catches hold of this phylogenetic experience where his own experience fails him. I fully agree with Jung in recognizing the existence of this phylogenetic heritage; but I regard it as a methodological error to seize on a phylogenetic explanation before the ontogenetic possibilities have been exhausted (Freud 1918, S.E.17:97; G.W.12:131).

At first glance, it appears as if the position Freud is describing here is similar to that of Adler and Jung, who saw memory as a reflection of the present. However, Freud maintained that even if a trauma scene is reconstructed through analysis, or the scene

itself is a phantasy, it is still a trigger from the past that operates after the event took place.[7]

2. The second example of *Nachträglichkeit*

It should be noted that in the case of the "Wolf Man," Freud is discussing "another instance of *deferred action.*" Going back in time, according to the analysis process, it is possible to recall the anxiety dreams (S2) of a four-year-old in the analysis of a twenty-five-year-old (S1), with the primal scene witnessed by a one-and-a-half-year-old (S3) forming the basis of such dreams. When the Wolf Man becomes conscious of the primal scene (S3) that he witnessed at the age of one and a half (S1) and understands it during the course of the analysis, he returns to his "self" at the age of four (S2). In other words, the time between S3 and S2 disappears, and the infantile neurosis is resolved.

> We must forget the actual situation which lies behind the abbreviated description given in the text: the patient under analysis, at an age of over twenty-five years, was putting the impressions and impulses of his fourth year into words which he would never have found at that time. If we fail to notice this, it may easily seem comic and incredible that a child of four should be capable of such technical judgements and learned notions. This is simply another instance of *deferred action* [*Nachträglichkeit*]. At the age of one and a half the child receives an impression to which he is unable to react adequately; he is only able to understand it and to be moved by it when the impression is revived in him at the age of four; and only twenty years later, during the analysis, is he able to grasp with his conscious mental processes what was then going on in him. The patient justifiably disregards the three periods of time, and puts his present ego into the situation which is so long past (Freud 1918, S.E.7:45; G.W.12:72).

The sequence of the recollection and timeline of events, based on Freud's description, are presented in Figure 1 below. If we were to elaborate on Freud's description, there would be two *Nachträglichkeit*.

[7] The discussion between Freud and Jung on the possibility of the primal scene originating from phylogenetic heritage is discussed in Geshi (2006: I-3).

【Figure 1: The sequence of recollection and timeline of events in the "Wolf Man" case】



IV. Application: The Pedagogical Turn of Freud's *Nachträglichkeit*

1. An Educational Theory of *Nachträglichkeit*

Based on these examples, this study presents an educational theory that re-envisions the Freudian concept of *Nachträglichkeit* in the form of a theory of "retroactive education." First, this educational theory of *Nachträglichkeit* assumes the occurrence of an extreme experience that breaks through "protective shield" identified by Freud, or "filter" to borrow the term used by Mollenhauer, to block out the harsh (extreme) reality, and the experience leaves only a memory trace as a result of its going beyond the realm of an individual's understanding at the time (S1). Nevertheless, it acts a posteriori, through later experience (S2). Second, in this theory, the original traumatic experience (S1) operates after the later traumatic event (S2), and these experiences are not limited to the sexual domain, as in Freud's theory. As Freud observed, the reason a sexual experience in childhood can become a posttraumatic event is that sexual maturity has not yet been reached. Similarly, events or experiences that are beyond the understanding of a child or an individual in an immature state can also be processed retroactively, and this can lead to retroactive learning. Furthermore, as Britzman (2010) indicated, there is an unconscious drive behind learning and education; thus, besides the narrowly defined sexual experiences of Freud's theory, other non-sexual experiences can also come to have

retroactive and educational value after the fact. Third, such "retroactive education" does not necessarily require psychoanalytical therapy. Freud understood his early childhood through his own self-analysis, which he described in letters to Wilhelm Fließ (Freud 1985; 1986). Even if one does not conduct a thorough self-analysis like Freud's, it is possible that deferred understanding and transformation can still be brought about through introspection, dialogue with others, and new experiences.

In summary, past experiences of which individuals are unaware because these experiences were, at one point, beyond the realm of their comprehension, can eventually be understood through the occurrence of similar experiences after puberty. In this way, responses to past events are activated afterward and bring about changes in the self. The self is then reconstructed by linking and understanding the two separate experiences that occurred, after the point at which these experiences took place. However, it is impossible to predict in advance what kind of experience will be activated at a later time.

Thus, it is necessary to explore the kinds of experiences that are recognized as "educational" upon later reflection. The work of Jacques Lacan is relevant in this regard. While the training standards of the International Psychoanalytical Association (IPA) require "a training analysis" that differs from "a therapeutic analysis," Lacan criticized this institutional distinction. "For Lacan, there is only one form of analytic process," as Dylan Evans (1996: 210) observed. Lacan established his own school (the École Freudienne de Paris) and created new training criteria called "the pass" (*le passant*). However, in the Lacanian system, there are no pre-established criteria for deciding whether to admit a candidate as an analyst: "The jury then decides… whether to award the pass to the candidate. There were no pre-established criteria to guide the jury, since the pass was based on the principle that each person's analysis is unique" (Evans 1996:135). Lacan states that whether an analysis is considered a training analysis or not can only be determined after it is complete. As the Japanese psychoanalyst Kosuke Tsuiki observed, the Lacanian "pass" is, thus, not merely a certification system for psychoanalysts; rather, certifying an individual as an analyst must be also an affirmation of the psychoanalytic process (Tsuiki 2008: 348–349). However, institutional stability in psychoanalysis cannot be guaranteed if the nature of psychoanalysis itself is re-examined every time an analyst is born, and such issues may be at the root of the long-standing dispute between Lacanian groups as to the definition of psychoanalysis.

2. Examples of "Retroactive Education"

At this point, I would like to provide some examples in relation to the theory of

"retroactive education" described above. I believe that many of those who study philosophy and the philosophy of education have experienced "retroactive education." Such experiences might involve the reading of complex documents, including classical texts, which often require a re-reading. The experience of re-reading is a good example of deferred learning. For instance, a book that was impossible to understand at first can be retroactively understood by the act of re-reading, or a reader might sometimes understand the meaning of a text only after they have matured. If the meaning of the text is restructured by a later (re-)re-reading, the event of the first reading will still function as the determining factor that leads to changes in the present self after the event. Encountering the unknown – in the example above, a text that is not understood at the time of reading it – has important implications for the future.

Going on the Grand Tour (traveling abroad), which John Amos Comenius (1967 [1633–1638]: Chap.31) and John Locke (1989 [1693]: Chap.23) recommended as the finishing touch of education, might be another example of retroactive education. The main purpose of traveling abroad during the Middle Ages in Europe was to go on a pilgrimage; however, this practice gradually came to be understood as an important activity for broadening an individual's knowledge in general. Such journeys could be unpredictable and beset by danger (Chard 1999; Black 2011). However, that is exactly why they were thought to hold significance in helping individuals understand the world, as they forced the traveler to go beyond the existing realm of their own understanding. An encounter with a different part of the world can also make it possible to (better) interpret an impression of a former experience that one might have had in the past, which could not be understood at that point in time, thereby reconstructing the self. Furthermore, recalling a past journey may have the effect of reconstructing the self retroactively.

In addition, when we read essays on school life, we often come across episodes detailing how the authors were shocked by people and/or texts they could not seem to understand. One such example is an essay by the famous Japanese writer Morio Kita, in which he reflects on his life in the old high school system that was equivalent to the liberal arts program of today's universities and abolished in 1950. In his essay, Kita recalls his admiration for the seniors and their intellectual knowledge, and his amazement at their casual use of academic terms he could not understand at all: "It[intellectual awakening] first appeared to me in the form of senior students. How great they seemed to us! They seemed to have been taught directly by people like Kant, Hegel, and Kierkegaard, whose names I only knew, and they seemed to be friends with Shakespeare, Goethe, and Dostoevsky. They spoke bewildering words like *Gemeinschacht*, *Aufheben*, *Logos*, *Pathos*, and so on… We admired them and wished we could be like them. Good or bad,

this is what we call the tradition of high school under the old system of education" (Kita 2000: 36, translation by the author).

These accounts then explain that while the authors were unable to deduce the meaning of something that they could not understand at the time of the encounter, they were able to understand its significance later. In other words, the experiences that they could not understand in the past were later understood, given meaning to, and contributed towards the formation of a sense of "self."

Conclusion: Revisiting the Concept of Education from the Perspective of "Retroactive Education"

As mentioned in the introduction, traditional educational theories have compared education to the process of developing a seed into a plant by providing it with water and sunlight at the right time.

This assumption relies on the model of causality (stimulus-response) and the model of developmentally appropriate teaching.

This study critiques these assumptions by examining Freud's concept of *Nachträglichkeit* and attempting to apply it to educational theory, proposing a new model called "retroactive education." Experiences (sometimes "traumatic") that go beyond the realm of understanding at the point of their occurrence can transform an individual's personality by becoming comprehensible later on. If such a transformation is a negative one, then it becomes a disease or a disorder (e.g., PTSD); however, if the transformation has a positive effect, such as Kita's episode, it can be characterized as educational (i.e., a "positive" traumatic experience).

However, the reader might wonder whether "retroactive education," should be regarded as "education" at all. This is because education is generally considered to be a planned practice, the outcome of which can be predicted to some extent. In other words, education is an activity that is planned based on the prediction of learning outcomes based on teaching strategies/practices/methods/methodologies.

On the other hand, "retroactive education" presented in this paper is entirely unpredictable. No one can predict whether an experience that can only be understood after the event will have a positive effect, nor is it possible to determine which experience will turn out to be positive in the first place. As mentioned earlier, Bistoen *et al.* compared "deferred action" to a "time bomb." In keeping with this analogy, the concept of "retroactive education," presented in this paper may be likened to a "land mine" – no one

knows where it might be and when it might explode, or in fact whether it exists at all.

In spite of this, or perhaps because of it, I believe that "retroactive education" is a form of education that has not received any attention. The concept of "retroactive education," enables us to better understand phenomena related to education and human formation (*Bildung)* that we have not been able to make sense of within the framework of traditional educational theories. Let us be more ambitious and let our imaginations run wild without hesitation. If we do so, we may find that many phenomena that have been understood within the scope of "education" can in fact be classified as "retrospective education," but were analyzed in terms of traditional educational theories such as theories of developmental stages and causality.

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[A Comment on the Symposium]

Acceptance of "Otherness":
The Uncanny, Helplessness, and the Unpredictable

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Abstract

Despite the fact that psychoanalysis and education are adjacent academic fields, they each have a different way of looking at things. The objectives of the two fields are different, and what they emphasize are also different. As such, discussions between the two do not tend to align well with each other. Moreover, when the issue of translation is taken into consideration, the discussion becomes even more complex. Without a careful choice of language, the discussion will go nowhere.

This paper will examine three reports that were presented at an online debate titled "Psychoanalysis and Education: Freudian Thought as an Educational Theory" in the 63rd Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society of Japan (PESJ). I will assume that the reader has already read the articles compiled in the reports, and I shall extract a few points for consideration here.

1. What is "Otherness"?

The keyword for Prof. Britzman's ideas is "otherness", which has been translated as "*tashasei*" in Japanese. While this is not a mistranslation, this kind of convenient translational equivalent using the word "*tashasei*" does not convey the chaotic depth of the unknowability that the original term tries to highlight. Given the nature of chaos, it cannot possibly be explained in a single word. It has been rephrased in various ways: "the unknown," "unconscious situations," "that which cannot be wholly tamed," "the uncanny," and so on. Prof. Britzman states that no one is immune to such otherness. It is always something unknowable to us, it is an uncontrollable strangeness that disturbs the stability and instills apprehension. Furthermore, otherness is also spoken of in connection with the "helplessness in infantile life." Otherwise, it is also spoken of with "the influence of the other" or "the primacy of fantasy life." Traditional depth psychology has called this "the unconscious," or "unconscious energy." Freud called it "Es." In any case, we are

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unable to know its true character, and we can neither recognize nor become conscious of it. That unknown something that we cannot become conscious of is what Prof. Britzman calls "otherness."

On Being Helpless

What is exceedingly interesting is the word "helpless." This is that "which cannot be controlled but can nonetheless be the most important scene of existence." Prof. Nishi speaks of this exact matter as "transference and countertransference" in psychoanalytic relationships: "Transference can plunge a therapist into a helpless situation that differs from the one for which he or she had prepared." The expressions that convey delicate situations such as these are subtly different in English and Japanese. The subject in the Japanese sentence is "therapist," and the intransitive verb "to fall into" is used. In the sentence that Prof. Nishi herself wrote in English, "transference" is the subject, and the line continues, "Transference can plunge (...)." Perhaps she was not satisfied by either expression. Instead, she is probably thinking of a situation that bears both of these. The word "helpless" has the aspect of passively being subjected to the influence of external factors, where one suddenly finds oneself in a situation before one realizes, as well as another aspect where the therapist involved intransitively inventing.

When it comes to psychoanalysis, this transference is treated with much importance. If anything, "it is not an exaggeration to state that modern psychoanalysis aims to answer the question of how these transferences can be facilitated and how one can survive them." This verb "survive" is remarkably interesting. When expressing this verb in Japanese, Prof. Nishi uses the direct translation of "*ikinobiru*." This is a word usage not found in ordinary Japanese conversation. The expression "surviving human relationships" is odd in Japanese; however, in this case, there does not appear to be any fitting expression other than this one. To talk about a sense of otherness which transcends ordinary senses, there is a need to follow the trail of foreign expressions and use language that deviates from the ordinary usage of our mother tongue.

2. Transference and Resistance: Otherness as Helplessness

Prof. Nishi states that "the psychoanalytic process will be adversely affected if the therapists also play the role of an educator," and many therapists seem to think this way. Well, what is "the psychoanalytic process" in the first place? Prof. Nishi says plainly that it is transference. Then, she introduces an interesting anecdote about Japanese pioneer of

psychoanalysis, Heisaku Kosawa, and his protégé Seishi Shimoda, calling the episode "the event during which a transference had taken place," and stating, "This is when psychoanalytic development appears to have occurred". Transference is "a helpless situation that differs from the one for which he or she had prepared."

The above episode can also be understood as a discrepancy in understanding that arose from the process of analysis. Shimoda (the analysand) is unable to accept Kosawa's (the analyst) interpretation. Perhaps losing his patience, Kosawa tried to demonstrate the correctness of his own interpretation, and scolded Shimoda, "blasting his voice throughout the entire room." However, Shimoda does not give way: "Dr. Kosawa, who dismissed the notion of education without scolding, tried to change my mind by scolding me, but I did not budge even an inch." This is exactly the kind of battlefield scene that plays out over transference and countertransference. The two of them fall into a helpless relationship, as if they "had been thrown in and were drowning without noticing." However, naturally, "modern psychoanalysis aims to answer the question of how these transferences can be facilitated and how one can survive them." This is the core of Prof. Nishi's understanding of psychoanalysis. On this point I agree. However, as a non-analyst, I thought about the following issues, from the point of view of an observer.

How does an analyst facilitate transference? That is to say, the job of the analyst is to 1) before they realize it, 2) facilitate a situation with the client such that they seem to be swallowed up by and are drowning in a helpless situation, and 3) to survive this. The word "survive" expresses a compelling state of affairs, as seen above. However, what I want to pay attention to here is the verb "facilitate." Since this is meant to be facilitated before one realizes it, it is not intentional. The English phrasing is "how these transferences can be facilitated," and the causative meaning of *facili-tate* is not strong here, but it is expected that the process will be heading in some direction. Or perhaps the analyst faces the client so as not to obstruct the process that is supposed to arise inevitably in the psychoanalytic relationship. In other words, they both head toward the helpless situation and deepen the transference/countertransference relationship within that. Prof. Britzman depicts such helpless situations as otherness, as well. In teaching–learning relationships, this "otherness as helplessness" arises. It is unavoidable. However, Prof. Britzman does not think of leveraging it. It would be preferable to avoid it, but since it cannot be avoided, the idea is to engage with it skillfully. On the other hand, psychoanalysis requires this "otherness as helplessness." Not only that, but psychoanalysis tries to facilitate it. It tries to experience otherness together with the client, work through it, and then survive it. In short, these conversations intersect. School teachers embrace "otherness as helplessness" between themselves and their students,

even though it is not desirable, and somehow just barely survive that battlefield. In contrast, analysts hope that such a situation will arise and stay by the side of their clients while both sides survive that dense battlefield.

These two fields are different somehow, perhaps the things they hope for and expect are different. However, on a profound level, they reverberate with each other. Both teachers and analysts try to survive. Then, they see some kind of growth in that process. Regarding the substance of that growth, teachers, and clients may have different points of view and assessments. They are different, but both recognize "otherness as helplessness" within relationships between people, and I think that surviving this while feeling helpless or out of control, has some kind of important significance.

Resistance

In this way, Prof. Britzman does not have the idea of "facilitating transference." There is no need to go out of their way to deliberately facilitate transference, it is something which inevitably arises in the relationship between teacher and student. Instead, she focuses on the resistance that arises in that relationship. In many cases, that resistance arises unconsciously. Perhaps we could think that they do not notice it, but to be precise, that would be the mechanism of repression. We pretend that there was never any "otherness as helplessness," or we forget about it. Prof. Britzman sees this tendency in the classroom, especially on the teacher side. This is a tendency to unconsciously resist "otherness as helplessness." Teachers have a tendency to defend against otherness. Therefore, she recommends that teachers accept otherness. Of course, this is not easy. It arouses both conscious and unconscious resistance. This is because teachers must then recognize that their own selves are torn. They must recognize that the integrity and completeness of their selves is broken, and admit the unknown, uncontrollable otherness within themselves. Teachers cannot control themselves on their own. With this self-awareness in hand, they stand in front of students.

Incidentally, in this context, Prof. Britzman has the following to say about growth. The acceptance of otherness changes one's understanding of the concept of growth. Growth carries with it potential, but it also has the power to cause disruption. Growth brings about misalignment. Foreignness is uncanny. It perplexes, annoys, and confuses people. To grow is to accept exactly such foreignness into oneself. In other words, it means transforming into something that is not the self: "The self is the stranger unto itself." If we think about it this way, growth is none other than the acceptance of that situation. Prof. Britzman understands education as the business of accepting otherness as a stranger into oneself. On this point, I completely agree with Prof. Britzman's view.

3. Nachträglichkeit: Otherness as the Unpredictable

Prof. Geshi discusses *Nachträglichkeit* in the following way. The meaning of an experience is only understood afterward. In other words, it is a troublesome issue in which an experience is re-interpreted *after* an event has already happened. I learned the word *Nachträglichkeit* about 30 years ago, when I was thinking about field study reflections. After going on a field trip with students, we came back to the classroom and have time for reflections. In response to student impressions such as "I didn't understand it at the time" and "I won't understand it until I get a little distance and time," I made the counterargument that "Aren't you adding a deferred embellishment?" and "Aren't you just attaching meaning to the event after it has occurred?" *Nachträglichkeit* is a word I first learned about when making arguments such as these.

Prof. Geshi formulates this issue as follows: "Learning matters, which a child is not ready to understand, are believed to act after the event" or "Past experiences of which individuals are not aware, because they were, at one point, beyond the realm of comprehension, can eventually be understood by the occurrence of similar experiences after going through puberty." We might not understand something in the turmoil of an experience, but we might only understand its meaning afterward. When I contemplated this, the concept of the hermeneutic circle came to mind. But beyond that, I thought of eschatology. To take a grand historical viewpoint, *Nachträglichkeit* has the same vector as eschatology. Only after arriving at the end-times is the significance of all the history leading up to that point revealed. In the end-times, even tragic events are shown to all have been a part of God's plan. In other words, it is a time vector of anticipating a future point in time, and speaking in the perfect tense from a future point in time (its differences with the reincarnation time vector are a fascinating topic).

Prof. Geshi's attempts focus on trying to apply this *Nachträglichkeit* in a positive form. That is, its point of view is to reconstruct the deferred feeling that something went well. If we can think that something went well after the event has been completed, that would mean we have succeeded. When we are experiencing something, we do not know if the experience is "good" or "bad." Only by being able to reflect back on something having gone well afterward do we decide that it was "good." However, the results are unpredictable. While we are working on trying to bring about good results, we cannot decide beforehand what must be done in order to obtain good results. We are placing a bet. If the standards for what is seen as positive are decided *afterward*, even if we work

with the thought that something is good, we cannot guarantee that the standards set afterward will judge that work to have been good. Prof. Geshi thought of this kind of groundlessness of education as otherness. Education does not have a reliable foundation. It is built on otherness. He took up the issue of how to approach that otherness.

By the way, it is precisely because Confucian wisdom understands this issue which is why it constructed built a system of striking first and not permitting changes later on. It is a system in which the successors are compelled to follow the same standards up to the present day, and the standards have all been indicated in the founders' ideology. People must not destroy these standards, or deviate from them. It is a system that is passed on to the next generation exactly as it was inherited from the previous generation. Seen from the perspective of this kind of cultural transmission (or emphasis on tradition), *Nachträglichkeit* is a frame of mind that acknowledges changes. Even better, we could say that it is a frame of mind that encourages new generations to take new ways of viewing things. If that is the case, it would be an idea that falls under the same corollary as the ideology of new education that has advocated for child-centered education.

Negative and Positive Aspects of *Nachträglichkeit*

Now, Freud also paid attention to *Nachträglichkeit*. However, Prof. Geshi's perspective is a different one. Freud highlighted the negative aspects of *Nachträglichkeit*. What Freud thought of was a situation of falling into a more negative understanding through deferred comprehension. This is the exact opposite of the hopes of eschatology; it is a state of becoming more and more miserable by understanding something anew after it has happened. Even though it would have been better to just forget, by stopping for a moment and re-understanding afterward, one experiences darkness and uncovers his or her dark side. In short, "it becomes a deferred trauma." Freud himself thought that this was a necessary process for psychoanalysis. For the sake of personality growth, one must experience deferred understanding on at least one occasion. To be precise, Freud believed that in the protected transference/countertransference relationship of the psychoanalytic relationship, confronting this dark side made people grow or at least progress to the next step. If we think about it this way, Freud's treatment theory also included the potential to apply *Nachträglichkeit* in a positive way in the long run. However, Freud did not advance the topic in that direction. Instead, he continued to focus on the potential or danger in experiencing one's negative dark side. It amounts to staying in the dangerous realm that Prof. Britzman called "otherness" and Prof. Nishi called a "helpless situation." Should we regard this dangerous realm as the core of education, or as noise (or an obstacle or impediment)? It may be fine to understand this in various ways,

but I will at least include that realm within the area of expertise of the word "education." That was the main focus of "An Educational Theory for Otherness" in Prof. Britzman's paper.

However, Prof. Geshi goes even further than this. It does not merely look at otherness. It attempts to look at the potential to apply otherness in a positive way. This is the point of assessing something as good when looking back afterward. Rather than seeing the negative aspects of *Nachträglichkeit*, as Freud does, he tries to see its positive aspects; "If this transformation acts negatively, it becomes a disorder; however, if such transformation has a 'positive' effect, it can be deemed educational (i.e., *a positive traumatic experience*)." This is, so to speak, "Beyond the Trauma Principle." Prof. Geshi experimentally brings up "education when reflected upon later." In other words, it is an argument made in three steps, seen from Prof. Britzman's line of thought toward otherness. First, it considers otherness to be unpredictable. Second, it considers Freud's perspective on *Nachträglichkeit*. Third, it observes the positive aspects of *Nachträglichkeit* rather than its negative aspects. In this way, Prof. Geshi ultimately tries to accept otherness as a positive thing, but nevertheless, what this inquiry digs up on its way to reaching that point, is the profound difficulty of education's groundlessness.

Education has no foundations. Education cannot be planned. This is because even if we hope for better education, what is good is decided only after reflecting back on the event. Thus, the standard for better itself does not hold. Only when we reflect back does education become valid as education. If that is the case, teachers cannot judge whether their work is a form of good education at the point in time when they are working on their students. There is nothing to guarantee that what one is doing will be for the sake of the other person. There is no guarantee that either way that one will be thanked, or criticized, when looking back afterward. Furthermore, at what point in time will students reflect back? Their evaluation of the effect of education will change depending on its time. If that is the case, the standards are completely fluid. The assessment standards are not only "relative" but also "relativistic." If we think about it this way, we end up with the conclusion that no matter what we do, it is all the same. We cannot help but fall into relativism, skepticism, nihilism, and finally populism of finding futility even if we strive. I am apprehensive about the argument advancing in that direction. Perhaps Prof. Geshi is also trying out a theoretical dispute for that inclination.

The business of education has an aspect of "only understanding its significance when reflecting about it later in time". Therefore, there are no foundations, no guarantees in education. In spite of having shared that reality, how much courage to educate can we have? Prof. Geshi, who saw a link between psychoanalysis and education in the concept

of *Nachträglichkeit*, is trying to hold out for the courage to educate in a tight space by highlighting aspects of that concept that were different from Freud's thinking.

4. What is the "Acceptance of Otherness"?

By setting otherness as a keyword, a great many fascinating discussions and topics arise in the themes of psychoanalysis and education. While reading the papers of the presenters, I thought of the following two topics.

On Trusting

The first topic is about the meaning of "accepting" in the context of accepting otherness. Prof. Britzman emphasizes that otherness threatens the self. Otherness is something that antagonizes the self. Otherness confronts the self, and amounts to a menace to the self. In spite of this, she wants people to accept it. However, doesn't otherness also have a complementary role for the self? In other words, doesn't it sometimes also function in a positive way for the self?

For example, Jungian psychology puts confidence in unconscious energy. Above all, in the individuation process, the analyst trusts otherness, and recommends that the client leave things up to it. Does the word "accept" also include these meanings? That is to say, is the acceptance of otherness the reluctant acceptance of something hostile, or does the concept instead include the idea of trusting otherness? In Prof. Nishi's discussion, when she mentions "facilitating transference," does that include trusting the otherness that arises there? Under the appropriate conditions, can we expect that it is alright to trust the helpless and uncontrolled things that arise, as is bound to happen? Since this is a process that occurs inevitably, does this mean that it is alright to leave everything up to otherness? This is also related to Prof. Geshi's argument. He saw hope in the potential for *Nachträglichkeit* to operate positively. Can we consider this to mean trusting in otherness? Or is it impossible to declare trust after all? Is accepting an ambivalent event premised on the presence of resistance? In this way, we are faced with the necessity of digging into this concept and examining what "accepting" really means. Furthermore, what is the subject of the verb "accept"? Is the subject "the ego" or is it "consciousness" or "the subject," or is it "the self, including the unconscious"? Not to mention, if we include the perspective that the subject will change, the discussion gets even more complicated.

Otherness and "*Mu*" (Nothing, Zero, Empty)

The second topic is about the link between otherness and Eastern philosophy. Japanese philosopher Toshihiko Izutsu understood such otherness as non-articulation. Properly speaking, he understood the self as articulation, and otherness as non-articulation. To put it more precisely, he understood the opposition of the self and the other as one phase of a grand framework of articulation and non-articulation. Eastern philosophy called the extreme end of this non-articulation "*Mu* (nothing, zero, empty)." Furthermore, Eastern philosophy has clarified aspects in which "*Mu*" works on "*Yū* (existence)" in negative and de-constructive ways, and aspects in which it works in positive and re-constructive ways. If we think about it from the perspective of otherness, this means that both the aspects in which the otherness works on the self in negative and de-constructive ways, and the aspects in which it works in positive and re-constructive ways, have both been clarified.

When we consider the issue from the perspective of Eastern philosophy, otherness is understood as one phase of "*Mu*." To put it the other way, this means that when we examine Eastern philosophy with modern language, the concept of otherness becomes a valuable clue. In this way, the word "otherness" is a promising intermediary between psychoanalysis and Eastern philosophy. The "acceptance of otherness" is an important research topic. It has the potential to become a new ontological epistemology that will enable an understanding of "education" that differs from modern education. I hope that discussions of otherness will trigger the opening up of new alternatives in the context of modern education.