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The Challenges for the Philosophy of Education in a "Data-Driven Society"

Reconsidering "Data," "Information" and "Knowledge" for the Future of Education

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The Dynamics between Quality, Subject, and Meaning in Dewey's Naturalism: Rebuilding Agency as Medium

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Abstract

After the linguistic turn led by R. Rorty, recent pragmatism has assumed a dichotomy between social language and experience, and has neglected the latter, which is now taken to be ineffable, private, and qualitative. However, as various researchers and thinkers have suggested, the possibility of reconstructing social norms seems to exist in what has not yet been named. Therefore, this paper aims to elucidate the dynamic interactions between quality and meaning in J. Dewey's naturalistic philosophy. To start this inquiry, it is necessary to remove the stigma of such qualitative immediacy. The qualitative is supposed to work as an eternal foundation or a "given" for knowledge, so this turns into an epistemological problem. However, if experience is understood in terms of its temporal and transitive character, the problem is dissolved, because we can then properly treat experience as a field in which knowledge develops. The concept of meaning in Dewey's theory shows us mainly two facts: 1) meaning connects the qualitative actuality and its potentiality, and changes immediacy itself, and 2) meaning works as a method or rule to enable collaborative behavior and support the system of social customs and normative standards. In addition, the theory of qualitative thought shows that qualitative situations direct and control the thinking that reorganizes meanings or statements. The discussion above indicates the interactive linkage of language (meaning) and experience (quality). This paper claims that Dewey's naturalism defines a human subject as an agency that rebuilds the preexisting objective order. Moreover, because the agency is located in the intermediate status between the qualitatively formless mode and publicly new objects, such a subject is termed a medium.

Keywords: John Dewey, naturalism, quality, meaning, subject

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Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between experience and language—or, following the terminology used in this paper, between quality and meaning—in John Dewey's (1859-1952) empirical naturalism. In other words, the aim is to draw out the logic inherent in Dewey's naturalistic philosophy of weaving words and speaking in contact with sensitively given and ineffable experiential reality, and the dynamics of such activities that operate through the world, the individual, and society.

In setting this objective, the following background is involved: (i) the question of the boundary between experience and language is closely related to the way the individual and society are connected and to the question of the subject; (ii) nevertheless, in the context of pragmatism, especially in the post-linguistic turn led by Rorty, there are difficulties in questioning the boundary between experience and language. I will further elaborate on these points.

(i) Why can the boundary between experience and language be a pedagogical issue? First, it stems from the fact that language plays a central role in the introduction (socialization) of the individual into the community. In a few recent issues of *Studies in the Philosophy of Education*, the connection between language action, society, and education has been discussed with reference to the ideas of Ludwig Wittgenstein and Judith Butler (e.g., Miyadera, Okuno). Through language use, individuals internalize the rules of the community and are included as participatory members. However, since this socialization through language use is at the same time a subordination of the individual to the existing system (cf. Foucault), this argument is connected to the issue of the subject.

For example, Okuno sees the possibility of "resistance" to the situation in which the subject is constructed as the subordinate through social institutions. The possibility arises from the "instability of language itself," which fixes "I" in the same existence (Okuno 95). What this "instability" implies is the predominance of inherent existence over language and meaning. This leads to the second point of contention. As language functions as the law of the community, its renewal requires the role of experience beyond language. In addition to Okuno's point above, the discussion of Jacques Rancière by Kawakami, for example, shares the direction of this hypothesis. Kawakami states that linguistic activity as the "translation" between consensus and silence is an important occasion for "Le partage du sensible" (the distribution of the sensible) that opens the dimension of "politics" in Rancière's theory of education. These suggest a perspective that questions the possibility of subjectification, as distinguished from subordination, in the movement for the creation of a new language. The importance of such an inquiry

becomes even more pronounced in the contemporary context of what Bernard Stiegler calls "misère symbolique" (symbolic poverty). This is an age in which the "decline of individuation" is becoming more common, and the individual is losing their subjective opportunity because they can no longer participate in the production of the symbols that make them unique. In close proximity to these problem areas, Toraiwa's research can be cited as an application of Dewey's philosophy. Toraiwa sees in "the ineffable" in Dewey's reflective thought the possibility of re-creating a new self that does not fall into the mere reproduction of existing dominant discourses or one's own discourses.

Taking its cue from this discussion, this paper focuses on the concept of quality in Dewey's philosophy as the equivalent of "the ineffable." Quality is the direct experience of things and situations enjoyed sensuously as "feeling," which is "irreducible, infinitely plural, undefinable and indescribable" (EN 74). At the same time, meaning refers to this quality. The boundary between the non-cognitive, aesthetic, sensory, and bodily experience of the pre-meaning realm and the language-based, cognitive experience of meaning and the dynamics of its crossing is the decisive moment in which what is sensed in a "private" and singular way in the individual passes onto the social and the public. To question this aspect of the logic of Dewey's naturalism is to question the core of naturalism's intrinsic logic. Dewey's *Experience and Nature* (1925), in which he developed his empirical naturalism, focuses on quality as one of the key concepts. In the overall picture encompassing the discussion, there is a cyclical progression from primary experience, which occurs in a state of subject-object inseparability, and secondary experience, which is intelligently compartmentalized.[1] Of course, there are many studies in Japan and abroad that discuss naturalistic thought in relation to both experience and quality (e.g., Kaga, Alexander, Boisvert, Sleeper). However, the relationship between quality-subject-meaning, which is encompassed in the logic of Dewey's naturalism and will be discussed in details in this paper, has not necessarily been elucidated.

(ii) When we approach Dewey's philosophy from the above mentioned perspective, we are forced to confront the problems presented by today's currents of pragmatism. Richard Rorty is especially significant in this case. While Rorty placed himself in the pragmatist genealogy, as the leader of the linguistic turn, he adhered to the dichotomy between experience and language, seeking to dissociate the concept of experience from philosophical discussion.

This paper, therefore, first presents a way to resolve the dichotomy between experience and language and to rescue the status of qualitative experience (Section 1).

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[1] On this point, see, for example, Nishimoto and Tanaka.

Then, while confirming the various characteristics of the concept of meaning in Dewey's naturalism, it examines the intersection of the two terms presented in the concept (Section 2). The intersection of the two brings up the following point as the aspect of the subject in Dewey's naturalism is examined (Section 3). In other words, what Dewey called subject is the function of a medium that responds to the qualitative orientation that comes historically beyond the personal framework of "I" and throws it back into the public world through a reorganization of the semantic order.

1. Experience and Language after the Linguistic Turn

1.1. Elimination of the Concept of Experience: A Foundational Given?

In contemporary pragmatism, the influence of Rorty, who led the linguistic turn, remains significant despite its numerous detractors. Its influence remains, for example, in the form of the "experience-language dichotomy" that Richard Bernstein has critically noted (Bernstein 128-29). The implications of this dichotomy are straightforwardly expressed by Rorty when he states that "Dewey should have dropped theterm 'experience'. . ." (Rorty 297). In other words, it is an assertion that the concept of experience, which should have occupied a central position in the philosophy of James and Dewey, and which constitutes the source of pragmatism, should now be replaced by language as a social practice, and linguistic and prelinguistic activities should be viewed as fundamentally discontinuous.

This dichotomy is supported by the idea that direct, qualitative experience can play an abject foundational role in an epistemological context. From an anti-representationalist, anti-essentialist, and anti-foundationalist standpoint, Rorty repels epistemological assumptions that recognize ultimate and universal foundations of knowledge, such as empirical directness and natural properties common to all human activity (Yaginuma 154-57). In his essay "Dewey's Metaphysics," Rorty criticizes the metaphysical aspect of Dewey's naturalism, finding in it the residue of transcendental idealism. He asks, "Have we solved the problem of the relation between the empirical self and the material world only to wind up once again with a transcendental ego constituting both?" (83). There is, at the same time, a condemnation of the ambiguity of the concept of experience, which is unnecessarily brought out as an all-powerful and mystical solution. As Koopman states, when experience is an epistemological given, it heads toward the deadlock of foundationalism, as the endorsement of the given principle implies rampant

foundationalism (696).

However, Dewey's prelinguistic experience is not posited as the measure of truth of cognitive experience, as Rorty's critique implies. Qualitative directness is had, not known. That is, directness does not become a cognitive experience without it being named, linguistically distinguished, and "objectified" (EN 198).

Therefore, as Richard Shusterman states, we can be sure that "in insisting that only language constitutes qualities as objects of knowledge, Dewey has already taken the linguistic turn which requires that the realm of cognitive justification be entirely linguistic." Nevertheless, Shusterman asserts that there are still aspects of Dewey's metaphysics that move toward an a priori metaphysics, pregnant with foundationalism, which is still justified by transcendentalist arguments. This is because, in Dewey's argument, the quality of experience ensures the coherence of all argumentative thought and determines its validity by grounding and orienting thought in every situation (Shusterman 163,165 = 250, 254). Drawing on Dewey's *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry* (1938) and the article "Qualitative Thought" (1930), Shusterman analyzes the following five logical functions that direct experience serves for thought: (1) to bring together the contextual situation on which thought depends and forms a discrete whole; (2) to control the objects and things that thought recognizes, selects, and uses within the situation; (3) to provide a sense of adequacy, sufficiency, and validity of contextual judgment; (4) to provide unity and direction to inquiry, allowing it to be maintained and carried out as a procedure; and (5) to enable the intellectual association of thought objects (Shusterman 162-65 = 251-54). These, he says, invite a subtle grounding in the way that prelinguistic qualitative experience provides guideposts and criteria for all thinking.

By accepting this criticism, can direct experience in Dewey's philosophy still be positioned as a kind of a given that introduces transcendentalist arguments and cannot escape the approach to foundationalism? Hence, should Dewey's line of reasoning, that is, the quality of experience that gives a certain orientation to thought, be dismissed as a bad singularity in his own philosophy, which is consistently anti-foundationalist?

1.2. Defending Immediate Experience: From its Historicity

The above issues cast doubt on the very thematic setting of this paper— the interaction of experience and language—if not directly questioned from an epistemological context. However, as Bernstein states, reducing the scope of inquiry from experience to language not only fails to take into account the extrinsic and resistive constraints that experience imposes on us, but also significantly narrows the broad field

of human experience (historical, religious, moral, political, and aesthetic experience) that philosophy is to address (Bernstein 152 = 229). Thus, it is necessary to defend the qualitative directness of experience without falling into foundationalism. This paper, therefore, responds to this issue by supporting Colin Koopman's argument. That is, given the historicity and temporality of the concept of experience that Dewey's naturalism embraces, this direct experience is not valid for a given, which provides an invariant epistemological foundation.

In Koopman's view, the philosophies of James and Dewey could not be sufficiently anti-foundationalism in their statements because they had no theoretical tools after the linguistic turn. Similarly, defenders of the concept of experience in the present day, who support them, are not always sufficiently alert to the danger that their arguments run toward Givinism (Koopman 696-702). Hence, though the significance of paying heed to neopragmatist voices arises, the approach of the linguistic turn has its limitations as well. This is because it is difficult to respond to the critique of whether the consensus of sociolinguistic practice it presupposes as the sole limitation of inquiry can provide a more robust standard than relativism without falling into foundationalistic representationalism—as, for example, John McDowell has theoretically called for the existence of an object outside of judgment and beyond current practice. In addition, the criticism that Rorty's verbalism unfairly shuts out nonverbal experience is also invalid. Rorty merely states that there is a sociolinguistic domain of experience involved in the legitimization of knowledge and a domain of experience unrelated to it; but he does not state that the latter does not exist (Koopman 706-08).

However, Barry Allen criticizes that this argument of Rorty is silent about the fact that not only actual knowledge but also knowledge concepts are founded on the contribution of equally diverse skills and performances/techniques and that they cannot be reduced to linguistic, propositional, or doxa entities. Noting this, Koopman says that we need to find ways to reclaim the concept of supra-linguistic experience without reverting to its givenness as an epistemological foundation, and that "such a third version of pragmatism is made viable by focusing on the thoroughly temporal quality of experience" (709). The idea has its origins in the philosophies of James and Dewey, as illustrated by James' use of the metaphor of experience as a stream in motion to depict its transitive character.

This position, which emphasizes the historicity of experience, is named "transitionalist pragmatism." It states that truth is grasped as something that is situated and established within experience. In other words, knowledge is neither grounded in the ultimate, nor is it a mere consequence that we agree upon, but is redescribed as a relation

between prior and future experience. By positing experience as "a temporal field within which knowledge develops" (710), the concept of experience, like language, allows room for historical contingency. This position also considers language as a form of experience and de-privatizes it in an epistemological context. The fact that foundationalism and linguisticism have taken truth to be a property of sentences, propositions, and beliefs, amounts to an unjustified limitation of the domain of philosophy to such linguistic truths. By understanding language as a form of experience, the various non-linguistic phenomena included in experience can be encompassed within philosophical discussion as necessary tools for the success of human practice (Koopman 713-18).

By emphasizing the transitive character of experience, as described above, the function of prelinguistic experience has been presented in a way that is not a universal given. This perspective on the historicity of direct experience is—although not elaborated in Koopman's argument—also in keeping with Dewey's naturalism, which defines quality of experience as the dynamic consequence of history in transition and persistence by regarding quality as both the singular and pluralistic ends of natural events (Inoue). These arguments resolve the problem of the "experience-language dichotomy" by encompassing language as a form of experience and defining the two as non-confrontational.

2. The Intersection of Quality and Meaning in Dewey's Naturalism

Through the previous section, we have secured a space in which we can argue the intersection of prelinguistic and "private" experience (i.e., quality)—though we will reserve some of this "privateness" for the end of this paper)—and social language without being accused of foundationalism. However, the relationship between the two, as outlined by Koopman in his introduction to the perspective of temporality, is limited in its content to a response to an epistemological context. If there is a back-and-forth relationship between the ineffable experience and the speaking experience, and if the private and the public interact in this back-and-forth, how does Dewey's naturalism depict this relationship? In what follows, instead of the concept of language itself, I will first focus on Dewey's description of meaning, which is the premise of linguistic activity (meaning makes linguistic activity possible), and explore the aspect of the linkage between the two.

In this section, relying on *Experience and Nature*, we will first confirm the point that meaning is posited as: (i) a transformation of direct reality through the insertion of

possibilities; (ii) generated from and functioning as a rule for cooperative action. Then, (iii) from Dewey's theory of qualitative thought, we may conclude that the generation and development of thought is executed in a correspondence with the silent quality that constitutes the situation. These establish that direct experience arises with a historical and social dimension (i.e., secondary experience) to it and pre-segmental qualities gain a pathway into the social dimension as they are embodied and represented into meaning through thought and communication.

2.1. Meaning as a Node of Reality-Potentiality: From Meaning to Quality

In Dewey's naturalism, meaning, which corresponds to secondary experience, transforms primary experience itself, which is bodily sensed as qualitative directness. This is because things and situations that are qualitatively present in the here-and-now are connected to the dimension of their potentiality through the intervention of meaning.

For specific consideration, let us reconstruct the example Dewey presents in line with this argument (EN 140-44). Consider a phase in which person A wants a flower at hand that is a short distance away. Person A then points out the flower to Person B. In response to A's action of pointing to the flower, B reacts by understanding that the action is not A's behavior per se, but that it means something specific. B will then act toward the future situation to be achieved, which is either to give the flower to A or to reject the proposal. At this point, a leap toward an absent consequence has occurred in the situation.

According to Dewey, meaning is firstly a property of movement, sound, behavior, etc. It is a sign that arises as an intent, which cannot be completed privately (the action of pointing to a flower first has meaning (EN 142)). However, "secondarily the *thing* pointed out by A to B gains meaning" (EN 142; emphasis Dewey), and meaning simultaneously becomes a property of the indicated object when it attains the phase of completion as possibility. In other words, the indicated flower, by being given meaning, is experienced beyond its own directness as something that can be carried in the future and as containing such potentiality.

This situation, in which things are experienced beyond themselves, can also be expressed as follows:

> If we consider the *form* or scheme of the situation in which meaning and understanding occur, we find an involved simultaneous presence and cross-reference of immediacy and efficiency, overt actuality and potentiality, the consummatory and the instrumental. (EN 143; emphasis Dewey)

Some qualitative immediacy, when it has meaning, will appear in a figure of reference, a means-object relationship, with other consequences tied to it.

> What a physical event immediately is, and what it *can* do or its relationship are distinct and incommensurable. But when an event has meaning, its potential consequences become its integral and funded feature. (EN 143; emphasis Dewey)

This statement suggests that primary experience contains within itself the secondary experience that mediates it.

The same is confirmed in the following explanation that this coexistence of meaning and quality gives things a "double life."

> Events when once they are named lead an independent and double life. In addition to their original existence, they are subject to ideal experimentation: their meanings may be infinitely combined and re-arranged in imagination, and the outcome of this inner experimentation—which is thought—may issue forth in interaction with crude or raw events. Meanings having been deflected from the rapid and roaring stream of events into a calm and traversable canal, rejoin the main stream, and color, temper and compose its course. (EN 132)

Here "events" is used synonymously with the qualitative directness of a being that has a history unique to itself. Such quality is likened to a rushing torrent that continues to pass away because of its recurrent characteristics, while meaning is depicted as emerging from the torrent of qualities, interconnected with it by being placed in the field of non-temporality and transforming it by returning to qualitative experience again. The domain of meaning experience, characterized as intellectual, constitutes and conditions affective and holistic qualitative experience.

2.2 Meaning as the Rule of Cooperative Action

The preceding discussion speaks to the ideas of Niklas Luhmann, who defined meaning as a form of processing of experience, where one possibility is selected from the horizon of possibilities. On the other hand, Dewey's second argument for meaning approximates the narrative of the late Wittgenstein, who viewed meaning in terms of use and described it in terms of phases of action rather than representations of nature. Hence,

Dewey presents language and meaning as methods and rules for establishing cooperative action.

To verify this point, we will again use the specific example of pointing to a flower mentioned earlier. When B reacts in this sense to A's movement of pointing at a distant flower, this reaction is based on the perspective of functioning in A's experience, away from B's own self-centeredness. Dewey sees the essence of communication, signs, and meaning in the commonality of something at several different centers of action, such as A and B.

> To understand is to anticipate together, it is to make a cross-reference which, when acted upon, brings about a partaking in a common, inclusive, undertaking. (EN 141)

> The heart of language is not "expression" of something antecedent, much less expression of antecedent thought. It is communication; the establishment of cooperation in an activity in which there are partners, and in which the activity of each is modified and regulated by partnership. (EN 141)

This explains the universality of meaning. The fact that meaning is a method of cooperative action is due to the generality or the capability of being diverted of the method itself, regardless of the individual concrete thing or situation to which the meaning is applied each time. "Meanings are rules for using and interpreting things; interpretation being always an imputation of potentiality for some consequence" (EN 147). "It [Meaning] is universal also as a means of generalization" (EN 147). Thus, meaning is rapidly and autonomously applied to new cases as well as for launching a community of action.

At the same time, meaning is a social register of relationships between things, regarded as an established pattern with objectivity.

> . . . essence [as an ulterior and permanent meaning] is the rule, comprehensive and persisting, the standardized habit, of social interaction . . . (EN 149)

Transitive natural events can only be intentionally utilized through the fixation of "some easily recoverable and recurrent act," such as "gestures and spoken sounds" (EN 146-47), and it is here that the ritualization and institutionalization of things through meaning is established. Meaning thus supports institutions, communal practices, and more comprehensively, cultural networks. The regular character and objectivity of meanings

are fundamentally involved in the constitution of social conventions and norms. This fact forms the premise for the individuality of the mind as deviance and deviation to be declared subjective in the reorganization of the meaning order, which will be discussed later.

2.3. Implications of Qualitative Thought Theory: From Quality to Meaning

At the same time in which meaning in the social phase transforms the qualitative directness of experience as it manifests itself in the individual, the quality that permeates the situation is reverted in the direction of the creation and reorganization of meaning. What Dewey calls qualitative thought is the description of a situation in which a totality of qualities in an undifferentiated state that is beyond language, evokes, develops, and governs the thought that accompanies speech. Again, these qualitative orientations of thought are not immutable but the result of historical consequences inherent in each moment of transition. This nature of thought represents the second brackish-water region where quality and meaning intersect in this paper.

Dewey, for example, layers quality onto what has been called the subconscious, working behind the thoughts. It is the feeling of a myriad of cognitively unnoticed organic actions—such as a sense of rightness or wrongness—that numerously influence thought and action (EN 227). At the same time, this pre-reflective quality, closely related to what has been conventionally named intuition, guides reflection, reasoning, and rational design prior to them (QT 249). What derives thought especially is the quality that permeates the whole situation that is vaguely held as problematic before being segmented into terms and relations.

> The sense of something problematic, perplexing, or to be resolved reveals the presence of something that permeates all elements and considerations. Thought is the operation by which it is transformed into a proper and consistent nominalism. (QT 249)

The qualities that are directly experienced before they are segmented into words in a narrative are not meaningful in themselves.

> [H]owever, it is recognized that predication—any proposition having subject-predicate form—marks an attempt to make a qualitative whole which is directly and non-reflectively experienced into an object of thought for the sake of its own

development, the case stands otherwise. (QT 253)

Dewey states that in this statement, the copula is as an active verb that contains the anticipation of a dynamic change and is understood in terms of its own consequence. In other words, what "that thing is sweet" means is "'that thing' will *sweeten* some other object" (QT 253; emphasis Dewey) and implicates consideration and attention to the imminent consequences of what it can do. The term also imposes a boundary on a quality that has, within itself, a dynamic transition, movement, and direction. In the preceding predication, the changing event is intellectually symbolized and transformed into an object of thought by the definition of its boundaries as "that thing" or "sweet" (QT 252-55). These reconfigurations of logic by Dewey are directed toward the recombination and creation of objects and new relations through the demarcation of their boundaries with the existence of dynamic qualities as a background for language.

3. Subject as Medium

So far, we have examined aspects of the linkage between quality and meaning encompassed by Dewey's naturalism. In light of the interest of this paper, we can say that the linkage is a cyclical movement that generates new quality by forming meanings and opening to others by figuring, expressing, and sharing experiences in response to the hyper-linguistically produced experiences. More importantly, if this movement is connected to Dewey's discussion below, it is the very condition for the existence of subjectivity.

Let us present the points in this section up front. The subject, in Dewey's sense, is the individuality of the mind, which has been discovered and utilized since the modern era as an originator and innovator reorganizing the existing order of meaning. The subject, as the one that renews, has an intermediate character and is a preliminary step before taking the form of a segmented meaning that can be publicly manifested. In the context of Dewey's argument, the paper positions the subject as a "medium" that connects the qualitative reality, which historically and uniquely arrives at the individual and directs each person's thinking, with the field of meaning, which opens up to social communication.

3.1. Subject as the Agent of Renewal

To begin with, it should be confirmed that Dewey, in *Experience and Nature*, refers to the subject as the moment of creation and renewal of order. The recombination is an event triggered by individuality, especially individuality of the mind. In what follows, I would like to extract this line of reasoning from Dewey, which has been buried under the convoluted arguments peculiar to *Experience and Nature.*[2]

In Dewey's naturalism, the personal individuality of human beings is considered to be both fundamental and continuous with the individuality of natural things in general. Such individuality is recognized not only in organic life, such as animals and plants, but also in the dimension of simpler natural events, such as physical and chemical phenomena. It is exemplified by the fact that atoms and molecules show and try to maintain their own specific preferences and centrality in their reactions and sensitivities.

> Personality, selfhood, subjectivity are eventual functions that emerge with complexly organized interactions, organic and social. Personal individuality has its basis and conditions in simpler events. (EN 162)

This individuality of things, including the personal and spiritual, when viewed in relation to the total order in which it is contained, implies a state of difference, deviation, and exception. There was a historical shift between antiquity and modernity regarding how to grasp and locate individuality as a difference from wholeness, and in these two contrasting shifts, Dewey sees the discovery of the subject.

In ancient Greece, individuality was positioned as a mere exception outside of the universal and systematic system, species, and familial kind of things. It was a failure to realize an objective aspect, a defect that was merely a source of ignorance, timidity, and error. This conceptual position given to individuality is permeated with the social experience of the time: "[s]uch a marked difference in the estimate of the status of individuality is proof of difference in the empirical content of ancient and modern culture" (EN 163). In primitive cultures, the individual had no more status than a part of the whole, and thus it was important to absorb the customs and traditions possessed by the group as a whole. Then, established patterns, standards, and methods were considered the objective nature of things to be accepted without question, and individuals' potentialities were viewed as dangerous deviations. In eliminating deviations and maintaining tradition,

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[2] Some of the discussion of the subject dealt with in Section 3 has already been organized by Hiroo Kaga as a naturalistic theory of *syukansei* (i.e., subjectivity, also see Note 4) (Kaga 347-50). This paper, on the other hand, takes the position that the renewal of order that the subject takes on is also a theory of *syutai*, as it requires the practical act of communication as a necessary condition for such renewal.

"[c]ustom is Nomos, lord and king of all, of emotions, beliefs, opinions, thoughts as well as deeds" (EN 164). Thus, individuality was grasped as a fixed part of a completed and established static system of order.

However, the individuality of mind as an exception to the established order can work constructively toward the inception and invention of new things. Even at a time when innovation was seen as a threat to the collective, human beings were not entirely subject to the demands of convention.

> Even in cultures most committed to reproduction, there is always occurring some creative production, through specific variations, that is, through individuals. Thus, while negatively individuality means something to be subdued, positively it denotes the source of change in institutions and customs. (EN 165)

Thus, Dewey raises the following proposition: "Empirically, it [subjective mind] is an agency of novel reconstruction of a pre-existing order" (EN 168).

It is noteworthy here that the concept of subjectivity thus formulated is founded on a critique of both ancient and modern views. In other words, there is a sublation of the two views: the ancient Greek view of individuality as a deviation from the universal order, and the post-modern view of the individual as an isolated and independent center of desire and thought.

After making a sharp distinction between "individuals with minds" and "individual minds" as fundamentally different, Dewey criticizes the concept of self and subject assumed since the modern era as an unburdened fiction of social and historical traditions. The mind, which is theoretically imparted to the modern subject, is such that it is directly and genuinely observable from a privileged position, isolated from historical and traditional burdens.

> But the whole history of science, art and morals proves that the mind that appears *in* individuals is not as such individual mind [that is responsible for the renewal of tradition]. The former [i.e., individuals with mind] is in itself a system of belief, recognitions, and ignorances, of acceptances and rejections, of expectancies and appraisals of meanings which have been instituted under the influence of custom and tradition. (EN 170; emphasis Dewey)

The mind in the "individual with mind" is solely a system of meaning-ordering that is shared historically and communally and is enforceable in both perception and practice.

3.2. Subject as Medium

This subject, which is responsible for renewal, departs from the restraints of the historically given order, which is an aspect missing from the modern subject. It adds something new to the existing order, which is an aspect of individuality that was ignored in ancient Greek thought, and is considered to have an intermediate character.

> The point in placing emphasis upon the role of individual desire and thought in social life has in part been indicated. It shows the genuinely intermediate position of subjective mind: it proves it to be a mode of natural existence in which objects undergo directed reconstitution. (EN 171)

Since the "objects" to be reorganized is the event that is endowed with meaning in the scheme of Dewey's naturalism,[3] what is occurring here is a recombination of public meanings.

The thoughts and desires held by this individual are subjective and a medium of transforming the old object and bringing it into a new public and objective object. The re-creation of the object involves imagination, which is not "mere reverie" but "terminates in a modification of the objective order, in the institution of a new object" (EN 170-71). This imagination "involves a dissolution of old objects and a forming of new ones in a medium which, since it is beyond the old object and not yet in a new one, can properly be termed subjective" (EN 171). These statements clearly indicate that subject is an intermediate medium in the process of construction that is being transformed into a new object that is accepted in the public world.[4]

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[3] This is confirmed in statements such as "[e]vents turn into objects, things with a meaning" (EN 132). Thus, Dewey's locating the object as an event doubled by meaning and the subject as the agent of a renewal of the meaning order indicates that the subject-object symmetry in Dewey's naturalism *hinges* on meaning. That is, subject and object correspond to the one that imparts meaning and the one that is imparted meaning.

[4] The discussion so far and Dewey's writing in the text suggest that this subject concept crosses the boundary of "*syukan*/*syutai*" that is distinguished in the Japanese translation of the word "subject." In light of this duplexity, I have literally used the term "subject" rather than *syukan* or *syutai* in the original paper. This different Japanese translation of the two generally corresponds to a difference in their epistemological (i.e., *shukan*) and practical (i.e., *syutai*) contextual emphasis—this distinction refers to Paul Standish's explanation, which depends on Naoki Sakai's discussion (Standish 31-32). However, as Dewey's instrumentalist theory of inquiry is a good example, the two are grasped as continuous, as his position rejects the dualism of epistemology and practice. This is logically demonstrated in the theoretical construct that subject is viewed from the function of modifying the objectively accepted order of meaning, and that the meaning being modified is at once cognitive and practical (cf. Section 2 "Meaning as a Node of Reality-Potentiality," "Meaning as the Rule of Cooperative Action").

Now, the subject as a medium presents a fluidity that straddles language (i.e., meaning) and non-verbals and continues to transform in an indefinite manner.

> There is a peculiar intrinsic privacy and incommunicability attending the preparatory intermediate stage. When an old essence or meaning is in process of dissolution and a new one has not taken shape even as a hypothetical scheme, the intervening existence is too fluid and formless for publication, even to one's self. Its very existence is ceaseless transformation. . . This process of flux and ineffability is intrinsic to any thought which is subjective and private. (EN 171)

Thus, Dewey portrays the sensing and thinking being as one who is representing a new object that can be shared in the public world. It is the process of adding and redrawing boundaries in response to an ineffable qualitative reality, as qualitative thought theory suggests.

However, the experience, which plays the role of an occasion for order restructuring by evoking thoughts and words, is not possessed privately and exclusively by an individual who is enclosed and isolated as the so-called "subjective," as distinguished from Dewey's use of the word. "It is absurd to call a recognition or a conception subjective or mental because it takes place through a physically or socially numerically distinct existence" (EN 171). Rather, qualitative sensation, which seems "private," is an event open within "objective" nature that arrives impersonally with an a posteriori appropriated self as its locus.

> . . . [I]t is not exact nor relevant [to the intent of Dewey's statement] to say "I experience" or "I think." "It" experiences or is experienced, "it" thinks or is thought, is a juster phrase. Experience, a serial course of affairs with their own characteristic properties and relationships, occurs, happens, and is what it is. Among and within these occurrences, not outside of them nor underlying them, are those events which are denominated selves. (EN 179)

In this way, experience, by its very nature, is not localized as someone else's, but arises historically as an event between the places involved. However, when it is virtually and fictionally attributed to an independent self, the subject stands a posteriori as a newly added social event. Therefore, the implication of making "I" rather than "it" the locus of thoughts, beliefs, and desires is the recognition and acceptance of the responsibility that is established there, and the identification of the self as the independent and external

origin of beliefs and feelings (EN 179-80).

The argument that what brings about a reorganization of meaning in a medium is the quality that precedes the self and arises as a historical consequence has allowed the subject as medium to be shifted even further, going a little beyond Dewey's statement. To reiterate, the subject was situated at the intersection of quality and meaning. The subject, guided by what comes historically in an impersonal way, takes on the utterance of that thought from the starting point of "I" and returns it to public society as a new meaning. This subject's way of being can be understood as a *mediumship* that listens to what can now be called the "voice of nature" and translates it into human language.

Conclusion

This paper has explored Dewey's naturalistic philosophy to depict the movement between the pre/supra-linguistic experience (i.e., quality) and language (i.e., meaning), which has been ignored in the face of the "experience-language dichotomy" that has been rampant in the thought context of pragmatism since the linguistic turn. In Section 1, we secured for this purpose the status of the directness of qualitative experience. The focus on the historicity and temporality of experience repels the epistemological problem of possibility as its foundational givenness. In Section 2, the character of the concept of meaning in Dewey's naturalism was examined to see how experience and language interact. Intellectually segmented and socially shared meanings expand and transform direct experience by inserting a dimension of possibility, and conversely, quality, which is always already historicized and acculturated, drives and guides thought, directing the reconstruction of new meanings and discourses. In Section 3, we have confirmed that Dewey's views subject as an agent of renewal of the meaning order that sustains conventions and norms. The subject, guided by a voice that arrives impersonally as a historical consequence of natural events, has an aspect of being a medium that gives meaning anew and returns that voice to a social dimension.

Finally, I would like to conclude by pointing toward two implications of this discussion. The first is the distance between Rorty and Dewey. Rorty's abandonment of the concept of experience may be related to the distinction between the public and private spheres, which is another gap between Rorty and Dewey, and to his liberal ironist arguments that are possible under this distinction; but I did not go that far in my analysis. On the other hand, in relation to that point, the following discussion by Ken McClelland suggests an interesting fact. McClelland points out that when Rorty speaks of "metaphors"

and "the invention of new idioms," he is effectively sheltering a place for the non-cognitive and nonverbal via linguistic devices, which is a qualitative starting point for re-creating the web of beliefs, desires, and practices that bind us. This point indicates that, considering the previous discussion, Dewey and Rorty, despite their presuppositional gap, are on the same track in that they are both open to the re-creation of society in the wake of their qualitative starting point.

The second is a response to Gert Biesta's criticism of Dewey. Biesta states that the understanding that Dewey's presentation of action, communication, and learning adopts, at its root, a hermeneutic worldview that continually brings the world back to an internal understanding on "my" part (Biesta 46 = 73). He says that it remains at the limit of a self-contained or, in Emmanuel Levinas' terminology, "egological" worldview that closes itself off to external voices by the world and the "other." However, this criticism is one-sided when we reconsider Dewey's naturalistic philosophy as a premise to support such a theory of education. The subject as medium in Dewey's naturalism is the very logic of world-centered activity that accepts and responds to what comes as an event.

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QT = "Qualitative Thought" (1930 lw.5)

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Summary Report on the Symposium "Emotion, Democracy and Philosophy of Education"

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1. About the theme

On January 6, 2021, a shocking incident occurred in the United States of America when the U.S. Capitol, a place of democratic decision-making, was destroyed by angry people who claimed that the results of the presidential election were invalid. According to a 2019 report published by the V-Dem Institute in Sweden, for the first time in 18 years, the number of non-democracies exceeds the number of democracies, indicating a clear trend of democratic decline. Considering these, it is apparent that emotions are often a major factor in politics today, and democracy is said to have failed in the face of the rise of populism and authoritarianism. Under these circumstances, reexamining the position and function of the irrational - emotion - in democracy is considered one of the important issues of today, which includes the philosophy of education. Based on this idea, "Emotion, Democracy, and Philosophy of Education" was chosen as the theme of the symposium at the 64th annual meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society of Japan.

Since the Enlightenment, pedagogy has been exclusively concerned with the development of the rational subject. Nevertheless, there is a rich lineage of thought that focuses on the significance of the irrational, including emotions. In this symposium, Mr. Natsuki Shirokane (Kwansei Gakuin University), a researcher of Adorno, Ms. Reiko Muroi (Iwate University), a researcher of Rousseau, and Ms. Mai Takahashi (Japan Women's University), who is studying the possibility of education for coexistence based on her research in Okinawa, served as symposiasts.

Mr. Shirokane proposed the concept of education that avoids evil and heteronomy

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as a means of resisting authoritarianism, the enemy of democracy. Based on the arguments of M. Foucault and A. Ferguson, Ms. Muroi pointed out that modern civil society has the character of an emotional community, and that Rousseau, in order to criticize this, advocated a political community based on a social contract and the control of emotions through pity ("pitié"). Criticizing the fascism inherent in democracy, Ms. Takahashi reported how the ideals of coexistence, such as *Nuchidutakara* (life is a treasure) and *Chimugurisa* (my heart suffers), were developed in Okinawa.

The annual meeting in 2021 was held online, same as in the previous meeting. The three symposiasts posted their reports both in video and in manuscripts on the meeting website in advance, followed by a discussion using an online meeting tool on the day of the meeting.

2. Discussion in the symposium

The discussion began with an exchange of views among the three symposiasts. First, Ms. Muroi asked Mr. Shirokane about the implications and limitations of resistance without setting goals, and Ms. Takahashi about the actual situation of fostering and passing on the *Nuchidutakara* philosophy. Mr. Shirokane, referring to Rosa Parks, who is called the mother of the American civil rights movement, answered that the significance of resistance of Adorno lies in the fact that it criticizes barbarism by focusing on the difference between goals and results. Ms. Takahashi stated that today, the *Nuchidutakara* philosophy is being learned throughout the prefecture through peace education in schools. She also stated that this philosophy could easily turn into praise for homogeneity, and that the concept of *Han* (resentment) has the potential to overcome this difficulty.

Mr. Shirokane then asked Ms. Muroi about the understanding of collective catharsis in Rousseau, and Ms. Takahashi about the possibility of mutual understanding among heterogeneous individuals or groups. Ms. Muroi responded as follows: Rousseau's task is to criticize the emotional community of fallen reality, and festivals that evoke collective catharsis do not appear in "Émile". The Clarin community depicted in "La Nouvelle Héloïse" has a different character from civil society as an emotional community. Referring to Okinawan thinkers and activists such as Mr. Minoru Kinjo and Mr. Shoichi Chibana, Ms. Takahashi said that questioning oneself may be an alternative condition for sharing the suffering of others.

Ms. Takahashi asked Mr. Shirokane about the possibility of communication with

authoritarian people, and Ms. Muroi about the possibility of collaboration through pity. Mr. Shirokane said that the approach of analyzing patterns of authoritarian discourse and critically enlightening people may be effective to some extent. Ms. Muroi responded that Rousseau was thinking of emotional education to control desires through pity.

Following the exchange among the symposiasts, the discussion took place between the symposiasts and online participants. First, moderator Keita Furuya pointed out the deceptiveness of the concept of "authentic learning" used in contemporary educational policies, and then asked the presenters if, based on Rousseau or Herder, authenticity is an important concept in ensuring the fulfillment of the inside of one’s mind. In response to this question, Ms. Muroi pointed out that in his autobiographical writings, Rousseau revealed his own feelings of authenticity, and stated that it may be possible to read it as a theory of self-formation in solitude as resistance to a corrupt society. Mr. Shirokane suggested that a utopian way of being that transcends both identity and non-identity could be considered as something close to authenticity. Ms. Takahashi said that it is important to question the imaginary character of the modern nation-state from the perspective of authenticity.

Mr. Sho Yamanaka (Hiroshima Bunka Gakuen University) then asked whether it is difficult to dismiss the function of emotion, as seen in populism, which seeks what one can identify oneself with. In response, Mr. Shirokane stated that, on the one hand, this is true, but on the other hand, a reflective approach to questioning political thoughts and discourses is effective to some extent. Regarding that, Ms. Takahashi expressed the view that, paradoxically, it is precisely because, in general, we are mutually heterogeneous that solidarity is possible.

Mr. Kanji Uechi (University of the Ryukyus) also asked whether we can consider the key to breaking the democratic deadlock to be found in virtue and emotion rather than in intellect. In response to this question, Ms. Takahashi responded as follows. Okinawa is pursuing a higher level of democracy through its struggle with the mainland. However, the way of pursuing democratic thoughts and ideas varies from culture to culture. In Émile's case, the refinement of his ideas led him to elite inequality. Further study is needed on the meaning of democratic thoughts and ideas. Mr. Shirokane stated that he believes education that avoids evil, which may be similar to human rights education or peace education, is more important than education that targets desirable virtues. Ms. Muroi said that, based on Rousseau, it is dangerous to look for clues to break through political blockages in pity, and that she would like to clarify the meaning of Rousseau's last move toward autobiographical writings.

3. Summary

This symposium has highlighted the complex relationship between emotion and democracy. Emotions are often destructive to democracy, but at other times they are the driving force in the struggle for recognition and can reinvigorate democracy. Emotions of suffering and sharing them are conditions for the possibility of coexistence that overcomes identification and division. As for the image of human beings, it could be said that the one who can reflect and reorganize themselves through encounters with others of a different nature, including emotions, is more worthy of exploration.

We look forward to continued discussions on this topic in the future. We would like to express our sincere appreciation to the three symposiasts for their thought-provoking presentations, as well as to all the participants who took part in the symposium.

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Rousseau's Dissent from "Civil Society" as Community of Emotion

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Abstract

How do we constitute our "society"? Is it by a "contract"? Does our society need a "social contract" as its basis? Some arguments on "civil society" in 18th Century Europe responded negatively to these questions and instead tried to construct a social theory based on an assumption that human social bonds are formed within spontaneous (natural) occurrences, in which the principle or ties to connect individuals are found in "emotion/sentiment."

However, Jean-Jacque Rousseau (1712-1778) critically confronted such arguments in those days and their concept of "civil society as it exists" as a community of emotion. For Rousseau, human emotions are brought about by society, therefore "natural emotions" as natural (spontaneous) social bonds never exist. Rather, emotions caused by societies have led humankind to corruption; the peak of human historical corruption has been reached with civil society as an emotional community.

Rousseau also worked on how a human being can exist as a "natural person," without degradation in a corrupted "civil society as it is," in his book on education *Emile, or On Education* (1762). Rousseau attempts there to describe how Emile is taught the art to survive in a civil society as a corrupted community. This art consists of controlling emotions by other emotions, as though fighting evil with evil. This art of survival is discussed in section 3. Section 1 reviews the transformation of civil society in the 18th century. Section 2 examines Adam Ferguson's argument on civil society as a community of emotion/sentiment. Michel Foucault's works are utilized throughout this article.

Key words: J.-J. Rousseau, M. Foucault, A. Ferguson, civil society, emotion, sentiment

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Introduction

How do we constitute our "society"? Is it by a "contract"? Does our society need a "social contract" as its basis? Some arguments on "civil society" in 18th Century Europe responded negatively to these questions and instead tried to construct a social theory based on an assumption that human social bonds are formed within spontaneous (natural) occurrences, in which the principle or ties to connect individuals are found in "emotion/sentiment."

However, Jean-Jacque Rousseau (1712-1778) critically confronted such arguments in those days and their concept of "civil society as it exists" as a community of emotion. For Rousseau, human emotions are brought about by society, therefore "natural emotions" as natural (spontaneous) social bonds never exist. Rather, emotions caused by societies have led humankind to corruption; the peak of human historical corruption has been reached with the civil society as an emotional community. In one of his main books *On Social Contract* (1762), Rousseau searched for and planned a civil society as a legitimate political community which is governed under people's sovereignty grounded by a social contract. At the same time, he also worked on how a human being can exist as "natural person," without degradation in a corrupted "civil society as it is," in his book on education *Emile, or On Education* (1762: hereinafter *Emile*). Rousseau attempts there to describe how Emile is taught the art to survive in a civil society as a corrupted community. This art consists in controlling emotions by other emotions, as though fighting evil with evil.

I will treat this art of survival in Section 3 of this article. Section 1 will review the transformation of civil society in the latter half of the 18th Century. Section 2 will examine the argument of Adam Ferguson on civil society as a community of emotion/sentiment. Throughout this article, I will make use of Michel Foucault's works as references.

1. Transformation of Civil Society in the Latter Half of the 18th Century

In the latter half of the 1970's, Foucault shifted the priority of his argument on "ruling power" from "disciplinary power" to "bio-power" and began to study the nature of social ruling (governmentality). He describes then the development of bio-power and bio-politics in the 17th and 18th Centuries as transformation from "rasion d'État (state reason)/government of police" to "liberalism/government of political economy." After the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), a competitive space of states opened up in Europe. There

emerged the theory of "rasion d'État" (state reason), which, according to Foucault (cf. Foucault, 2004a: 293-318=2007: 285-310),[1] was intended to respond to problems such as enhancement of national strength, maintenance of a state and order among states. The governance by state reason aimed to "regulate its subjects unlimitedly" within the government of police. Against this tendency, the principle of "droit" (laws and/or rights) was asserted in order to restrict the regulations of the state. This latter argument developed into theories of natural law and social contract in the 17th Century (Foucault, 2004b: 7-11=2008: 6-10).

In the mid-18th Century, "coordination" of governance began to be sought, not by an "external principle" of droit, but by an "internal principle" of political economics. As far as political economics aimed to enrich the state through coordination of population and resources, we can say it was within the framework of state reason. But the characteristic of political economics was in that it attempted to judge the success or failure of governance under the criteria of whether or not it is in accordance with "nature" and "effectiveness". This made it possible for government to self-restrict according to the nature of objects (subjects) of governance (Foucault, 2004b: 15-19=2008: 13-17). Furthermore, this self-restriction led the government to "govern as least as it can" or "least government" according to the nature of things, instead of maximum government as in the 17th Century (Foucault, 2004b: 29-31=2008: 27-29).

However, this internal self-restriction of the governance system, even if it is achieved by minimum governmental reason, must be formulated in terms of droit. Because of this necessity, the problem of limitation on exercise of public power against the sphere free of governmental intervention has arisen after the advent of political economics, until today, in place of the arguments on legitimate justification of sovereignty before and in the 18th Century. Two paths have been proposed. One intends to define natural or fundamental rights of individuals first, and then determine the limits of governmental intervention against them. This approach would be named "Rousseau's approach" or "the path taken by the French Revolution." The other starts from governmental practice itself and tries to crystallize de facto limitations of governmentality either from history and/or tradition, or in relation with the purpose of growth of national wealth, and then formulate those limitations in legal terms (Foucault, 2004b: 38-42=2008: 37-41). These two approaches may lead to different ideas of freedom. The former asserts that individuals have certain fundamental freedoms by nature; a subject of

[1] In this article, references to M. Foucault are indicated with the page(s) of the original texts and then with that of the English translation edition. As a general rule, citations are from English translations, except for some revisions I made for this article to fit its context.

such freedoms is called "homo juridicus". The latter grasps the sphere to which a ruler should not intervene (the independent sphere of the ruled people) as the freedom; a subject of non-interference (laissez-faire) is called "home œconomicus" (Foucault, 2004b: 43-44, 286=2008: 41-42, 282-283). The homo juridicus accepts a dogma of "restraint by social contract" (cf. Supiot, 2005). The homo œconomicus determines whether or not to keep a promise according to one's own interest, or to the standard of usefulness (Foucault, 2004b: 276-280=2008: 273-276).

Political economics admitted the fact that the economic space was complicated like a labyrinth, that homo œconomicus was embedded in contingencies, and that one's act could serve others in unintended ways. These facts were utilized to assert that an intention of totalitarian governance would not work and that it would be better as a whole to let individuals pursue the maximization of their interests. The economy/market was regarded as an uncontrollable sphere in this sense. Such a logic of economics led to a denial of logic of droit and politics, as well as to an idealization of homo œconomicus who would follow the logic of economics. There still existed attempts to confine the sphere of uncontrollable economics/market, in order to maintain the form of governmental reason itself. But they did not succeed, as Foucault says. Then appeared a new attempt to reconstruct the concept of "civil society," totally different from the concept in the former half of the 18th Century. The new concept consisted of a sphere of governance which practiced self-restriction without violating laws of economics nor laws of droit, and, or rather, in a way different from these laws. Such a civil society appeared as a sphere of "governance of liberalism/political economics" (Foucault, 2004b: 280-285, 296-301=2008: 276-281, 292-298).

This is how the "civil society" or the concept thereof changed in the mid-18th Century. I would like to review the details of this concept in the next section, focusing on an essay by Adam Ferguson, which is, according to Foucault, the most basic text of the time on this topic.

2. Civil Society as "Community of Emotions": the Case of Adam Ferguson

Adam Ferguson (1723-1816) is a figure in Scottish Enlightenment, who had an acquaintance with David Hume (1711-1776) and Adam Smith (1723-1790). His book *An Essay on the History of Civil Society* (1767) was read widely in Europe at that time, including German and French translated editions (Ferguson, 1995: xvi-xvii). Foucault

pointed out four characteristics of his argument on civil society.

First, Ferguson asserts that a civil society is a given, beyond which lies nothing to research. (Foucault, 2004b: 302=2008: 298). He rejects any attempt to assume a state of nature or to trace its transition to a social state, calling such attempts "wild suppositions" that ignore the records of history (Ferguson, 1995: 7-8). For human beings, society is as old as individuals; "Mankind are to be taken in groupes, as they have always subsisted. The history of the individual is but a detail of the sentiments and thoughts he has entertained in the view of his species: and every experiment relative to this subject should be made with entire societies, not with single men" (Ferguson, 1995: 10). In short, Ferguson approves no special theoretical operation to found a society, nor prehistories to social bonds.

Second, he grasps civil society as a natural, spontaneous principle which guarantees the integration among individuals, who are social beings from the beginning. Civil society is not constituted under a pact of subjection to establish sovereignty. The integration of civil society is brought about by individual satisfactions in the social bond itself (Foucault, 2004b: 304=2008: 300-301). And the principle of integration lies in "emotions," as he says:

> […] neither a propensity to mix with the herd, nor the sense of advantages enjoyed in that condition, comprehend all the principles by which men are united together. Those bands are even of a feeble texture, when compared to the resolute ardour with which a man adheres to his friend, or to his tribe, after they have for some time run the career of fortune together. Mutual discoveries of generosity, joint trials of fortitude, redouble the ardours of friendship, and kindle a flame in the human breast, which the considerations of personal interest of safety cannot suppress. The most lively transports of joy are seen, and the loudest shrieks of despair are heard, when the objects of a tender affection are beheld in a state of triumph or of suffering. (Ferguson, 1995: 22)

> Mere acquaintance and habitude nourish affection, and the experience of society brings every passion of the human mind upon its side. Its triumphs and prosperities, its calamities and distresses, bring a variety and a force of emotion, which can only have place in the company of our fellow-creatures. It is here that a man is made to forget his weakness, his cares of safety, and his subsistence; and to act from those passions which make him discover his force. (Ferguson, 1995: 23)

Even emotions such as malice, hatred, anger and so on, which bring about hostility, are necessary to the formation of civil society. Without them "[…] civil society itself could scarcely have found an object, or a form" (Ferguson, 1995: 28).

Third, in a civil society which is brought about through spontaneous bonds of emotion, political power also comes about spontaneously. The division of labor emerges spontaneously according to functions and missions among individuals in the society; Some become persons to order, the others to obey, thus emerges a political power (Ferguson, 1995: 63-64). Political power exists in civil society in advance of its legitimate creation, authorization and regulation. The legal structure thereof comes ex post facto (Foucault, 2004b: 307-308=2008: 303-304).

Incidentally, Ferguson examines "democracy" "aristocracy" "monarchy" and "tyranny," in accordance with Montesquieu, who considered forms of government from the viewpoints of "sentiments" and "maxims of action" (Ferguson, 1995: 67). But Ferguson emphasizes that he examines forms of government according only to "ideal limits" and that in "reality" human characteristics, external circumstances, moral sentiments as people may say, and so on are mixed up in different ways so that forms of government are infinitely diverse (Ferguson, 1995: 71-72). "Democracy, by admitting certain inequalities of rank, approaches to aristocracy. In popular, as well as aristocratic governments, particular men, by their personal authority, and sometimes by the credit of their family, have maintained a species of monarchical power. […] All these varieties are but steps in the history of mankind, and mark the fleeting and transient situation through which they have passed, while supported by virtue, or depressed by vice" (Ferguson, 1995: 72).

Civil societies vary infinitely and change constantly. This characteristic links to the fourth feature of civil society that it is the driving force of human history. This is so because civil societies are communities consisting of spontaneous subordination in which individuals connect to each other by natural bonds of favorable emotions such as love and friendship. There also exist "by nature" interests of homo œconomicus and egoism (selfishness), as the principle of such connections and separations (Foucault, 2004b: 308-311 =2008: 305-307). Thus, according to Ferguson, emotions drive the history of civil societies as communities of emotions.

3. "Natural Person" in a Civil Society: Rousseau's Works on Emotional Education

It would be safely presumed that Ferguson counted Rousseau as one of those who were on "wild suppositions," since *An Essay on the History of Civil Society* referred critically to *Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men* (1755: hereinafter *Discourse on the Origin*) (Ferguson, 1995: 10-11). But for Rousseau, the theme of *Discourse on the Origin* was to "explain" "what chain of wonders" caused moral and political inequality in human beings. In order to achieve this, it was necessary for him to reject all the "facts" and suppose a "state of nature" which excludes thoroughly the ideas we acquired in society and deduce conditionally and hypothetically (Rousseau, 1964: 131-13=1997: 131-132).[2] In such hypothetical reasoning Rousseau described human history up to the formation of civil society as a history of corruption and degradation. Then, in *On Social Contract*, Rousseau searched for and planned a new political community governed under the sovereignty of people by a social contract (cf. Omoda, 2013).

In contrast to this, *Emile* explores how a human being can live in a corrupted and degraded "civil society as it is." At the final stage of educating Emile, his teacher took Emile out to a two-year journey around Europe, in order to have him consider "where to live" as if he is a "natural man" (Rousseau, 1969a: 831=2010a: 644-645).

Emile's assignment was to observe countries and societies all around Europe, to obtain extensive knowledge of various governments, political customs and axioms of state, and to find the finest government (Rousseau, 1969a: 836-837=2010a: 649-650). The "measurement" (échelle) for the judgment was "our principles on state law" (nos principes de droit politique), that is, the theories developed in *On Social Contract* (Rousseau, 1969a: 837=2010a: 650). A summary of *On Social Contract* is inserted in the book V of *Emile* as the "measurements" to observe and evaluate various countries and societies, and not to have Emile construct an ideal political community after his coming of age.

Emile could not find an ideal country on this journey, but rather realized that there was no such country, and finally settled down in the country he was born (Rousseau, 1969a: 857-859=2010a: 666-668) and chose not "big cities," but a "country," where his future spouse Sophie and her parents live. Then he aimed, together with Sophie and her

[2] In this article, references to J.-J. Rousseau are indicated with the page(s) of the original texts and then with that of the English translation edition. As a general rule, citations are from English translations, except for some revisions I made for this article to fit its context.

parents, to revive and restore the "golden age" of the region they lived, which had been devastated at the cost of urban areas (Rousseau, 1969a: 859-860=2010a: 668).

This "golden age" to be restored resembles the beginning society formed by people in the primitive state ("the genuine youth of the world"), which was depicted at the beginning of part II of *Discourse on the Origin* (Rousseau, 1964: 171=1997: 167). These communities do not overlap perfectly, since agriculture is a main industry in the place Emile and his companions settled, whereas the original state in *Discourse on the Origin* is supposed to exist before metallurgy and agriculture. But they may overlap, when considered under the viewpoint of "sentiment."

In the part I of *Discourse on the Origin*, almost the only emotion human beings (natural persons) possess is "pity" (pitié). This is an emotion which Nature endowed to human beings, a sentiment suited to human nature (Rousseau, 1964: 156=1997: 154). "There is, besides, another Principle which Hobbes did not notice and which, having been given to man in order under certain circumstances to soften the ferociousness of his amour propre or of the desire for self-preservation prior to the birth of amour propre, tempers his ardor for well-being with an innate repugnance to see his kind suffer" (Rousseau, 1964: 154=1997: 152). Natural persons did not possess any other passions nor sentiments (Rousseau, 1964: 157-158=1997: 154-155). These other emotions are brought about artificially to society by customs. In part II of *Discourse on the Origin*, it is supposed that human beings began to band together by various coincidences, began to form families, and began to obtain abstract ideas, among which are the first sentiment of one's own existence, then secondly diversification into affection, jealousy, admiration, and so on. These sentiments have made human beings' ties closer and closer, making their bond tighter and tighter (Rousseau, 1964: 164-170=1997: 161-166). But the growth of these emotions and the strengthening of ties are to be understood, at the same time, as the first step to inequality and vice, that is, to corruption (Rousseau, 1964: 169-170=1997: 166).

Nonetheless, Rousseau viewed human beings who were on the first step to vices and corruption in the beginning society to be, in fact, in the finest condition.

> […] whereas nothing is as gentle as he in his primitive state when, placed by Nature at equal distance from the stupidity of the brutes and the fatal enlightenment of civil man, and restricted by instinct and by reason alike to protecting himself against the harm that threatens him, he is restrained by Natural pity from doing anyone harm, without being moved to it by anything, even after it has been done to him. For, according to the axiom of the wise Locke, "*Where there is no property, there can be*

> *no injury*." (Rousseau, 1964: 170=1997: 166)

> […] although men now had less endurance, and natural pity had already undergone some attenuation, this period in the development of human faculties, occupying a just mean between the indolence of the primitive state and the petulant activity of our amour propre, must have been the happiest and the most lasting epoch. The more one reflects on it, the more one finds that this state was the least subject to revolutions, the best for man, and that he must have left it only by some fatal accident which, for the sake of the common utility, should never have occurred. (Rousseau, 1964: 171=1997: 167)

Human beings were restrained from harming each other, not only because full-scale property was not realized there, but also because the harsh activities of "amour propre" (self-love) were controlled by the emotion of pity.

In the case of Emile, he could not find an ideal political community illustrated in *On Social Contract*. Nevertheless, he was educated to live as if he was a man in the primitive state, who would try with Sophie to restore the golden age in the land he was born, which was not his "homeland", but a "civil society as it exists." With regard to this, Rousseau gives caution about passions in *Emile* as follows:

> It is an error to distinguish permitted passions from forbidden ones in order to yield to the former and deny oneself the latter. All passions are good when one remains their master; all are bad when one lets oneself be subjected to them. What is forbidden to us by nature is to extend our attachments further than our strength; what is forbidden to us by reason is to want what we cannot obtain; what is forbidden to us by conscience is not temptations but rather letting ourselves be conquered by temptations. It is not within our control to have or not to have passions. But it is within our control to reign over them. All the sentiments we dominate are legitimate; all those which dominate us are criminal. (Rousseau, 1969a: 819=2010a: 634)

What is important is not emotions themselves, but whether we have control over them. If human beings fail to control emotions in a civil society as it exists, they immediately fall into dependence on others, no longer can retain their free existence, and thus become corrupt.

For Emile, "pity" was the controller of evil emotions and sentiments. His teacher

was very careful to help Emile control by pity his "amour-propre" (self-love), which was perverted from "amour de soi-même" (love to oneself), especially after his adolescence.

By the way, Emile did not succeed to restore the golden age and live in happiness with Sophie. In *Emile and Sophie, or the Solitaries* (a sequel of *Emile*), Emile and Sophie suffered the deaths of their child and her parents, and then moved to Paris, the city regarded as the least suitable place to live after the two-year journey around Europe described in *Emile*. Unfortunately, Sophie became pregnant after being deceived by another man in Paris. Emile decided to leave Sophie and throw himself into lonesome wonderings. Emile was educated to live in a corrupted society as a natural person or a human being in the original condition. It was his fate to become miserable, being rejected by a corrupted society.

Rousseau aims to have readers realize how our society is absurd and evil by intentionally breaking down his search on education (cf. Sakakura, 2018). It should be emphasized, however, that Emile's education half-succeeded, since he recognized the value of the education he received, even in the midst of misfortune, as follows:

> […] you, my dear master, […] Never have I known the value of your efforts better than after harsh necessity made me feel its blows so cruelly and deprived me of everything except myself. I am alone, I have lost everything, but I have myself left, and despair has not annihilated me. (Rousseau, 1969b: 882=2010b: 685)

Conclusion

I reviewed in this article why and how civil society transformed into the emotional community, according to Foucault's works. I also examined how this transformation was evaluated and confronted, as well as what problems the civil society rose and what responses were made, along with two figures in contrasting positions, Ferguson and Rousseau.

According to Rousseau, we are unable to constitute an authentic society or legitimate political community without a social contract for it. Therefore, a civil society as an emotional community without social contract is found at the peak of human corruption history as depicted in *Discourse on the Origin*. Such is the civil society described in *Emile* which the protagonist must live with. His teacher attempted to help Emile survive in the society, by teaching him to control emotions with other emotions. Though Rousseau internationally halfway breaks down this search in a sequel work, the

attempt in *Emile* seems to reveal one phase of modern education in regard with civil society.

According to Ferguson, to the contrary, we need no contract at all to let a society emerge; where there are human beings or individuals, there is a society. It is spontaneous emotions that connect individuals naturally, and that brings about a government or governance naturally. The modern liberalism government required civil society to exist as such. This sort of idea became radicalized into the Neo-liberalism government afterwards.

It should be noted, however, that Ferguson himself also describes such a civil society critically. As Sonoe Omoda points out, "on the other hand, he [Ferguson] recognizes shadows of civilization such as full (rotten) maturity of commercial society, loss of bravery virtue, laxity of national moral, decadence related to the pursuit of wealth and extravagance, and so on. […] Ferguson thus overpaints gloomy corruption and downfall above the glorious history of refinement from the primitive state to the civilization and its delicacy" (Omoda, 2018: 471-472).

Discussions on politics and emotions tend to develop as criticism of modern politics (and its theories). Against the background of the transformation of civil society in the 18th Century, though, it is revealed that it is in the Modern Era when sentiments came to the center of the political sphere and that emotions and politics became inseparable thereafter. Foucault says that politics is a function of various governing arts and that arguments triggered by governing arts bring about politics (Foucault, 2004b: 317=2008: 313). The modern government and its governing arts are correlative of civil society as an emotional community. Therefore, as far as the former is possible within the latter, modern politics is indivisible with emotions.

Furthermore, discussions on politics and emotions often criticize the support for "reasonableness/rationality" of modern politics (and its theories) and often tend to rethink politics (and its theories) from the viewpoint of "unreasonableness/irrationality" (cf. Yoshida, 2014; Yoshida, 2020). Perhaps we need to note Foucault's remark on this point:

> Undertaking the history of regimes of veridiction […] obviously means abandoning once again that well-known critique of European rationality and its excesses, which has been constantly taken up in various forms since the beginning of the nineteenth century. From romanticism to the Frankfurt School, what has always been called into question and challenged has been rationality with the weight of power supposedly peculiar to it. Now the critique of knowledge I would propose dose not in fact consist in denouncing what is continually […] oppressive under reason, for

> after all, believe me, insanity (déraison) is just as oppressive. (Foucault, 2004b: 37=2008: 35-36)

Probably we need to abandon criticisms based on binary schema of "rational/irrational," "reason/emotion," and so on. This may be necessary work to be done in education study, too.

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Politics of Emotions and Preventive Pedagogy against Authoritarianism: Theodor W. Adorno's Educational Theory and his Utopianism

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Abstract

The current affective turn in social sciences, the spread of emotional politics in social media, and the crisis of democracy and liberalism facilitate the reexamination of some traditional educational ideas regarding to children's emotion, their nature, and democratic education.

This paper focuses on Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno's critical theory due to the conceptual ambiguity of "enlightenment" in his works. His pessimism is known with *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, but his works on education stressed the importance of "enlightenment" as the social critique for developing democracy and autonomous personality in West Germany. Adorno demanded of education that the social critique would work as the antidote, vaccination, and critical self-reflection against authoritarianism. However, he did not systematize democratic education. Here, I focus on his negative utopianism. Adorno believed utopia would be togetherness of diversity and the state in which the rational dominant principle is unnecessary. Therefore, from education he expected the contribution to vigilance, resistance, and elimination of the cause of suffering, taking the sensitive suffering of reality as a starting point. Such education that avoids the perspective of *natura naturata*, such as the control of emotions, and aligns with suffering, hoping for what can be achieved in/by vigilance, resistance, and elimination of suffering, would be a form of *natura naturans.* I call Adorno's educational theory "preventive pedagogy."

Adorno's "preventive pedagogy" would provide a critical perspective on today's "dialectic of democracy" in which popular political fervor endangers the democracy that is its requirement. Furthermore, this perspective would be suggestive to consider education with post-foundationalism, agonistic democracy, deliberative democracy, emotional architectures, the Beutelsbach Consensus in Germany, education against propaganda tricks, solidarity, and pity.

Key words: Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno, democracy, authoritarianism, utopianism, enlightenment, Auschwitz, politics of emotions

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Introduction

The spread of social media and the disturbance of democracy and liberalism by the "politics of anger and hatred" [Yoshida 2020] are currently recognized. Traditional ideas that have dichotomized reason and emotion are criticized in the current "affective turn" in social sciences, and Japanese pedagogy is no exception [Okabe/ Ono eds. 2021]. The ideal relationship between emotion, democracy, and education, "by rational nurturing rational democratic society members while respecting the spontaneity and authenticity of children's emotions," also requires reexamination.

This paper focuses on the conceptual constellation of emotion, democracy, and education in Theodor Wiesengrund Adorno's critical theory. In the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, co-written with Max Horkheimer, Adorno analyzed the complicity of the rational and the irrational from the perspective of the improvement of civilization by the domination of nature. However, he criticized anti-Semitism and the culture industry, which appealed to the emotions of the masses, and expected the masses' enlightenment and education to resist the status quo and contribute to democracy. However, his theory of education primarily focused on resistance to antidemocratic realities. This paper contrasts the uniqueness of his thought with current discussions in philosophy of education concerning emotion and democracy.

1. Authoritarianism Disturbing Democracy

Adorno questioned the dominance of authoritarianism over democracy. This dichotomy between authoritarianism and democracy is common in political science, but Adorno, using Freudian psychoanalytic theory, focused on social psychology and the media.

Adorno criticized the personality type susceptible to authority ("Autoritätsgebundenheit" [GS9 − 2:367]), which includes both authoritarian and manipulative characters. This type is characterized by sado-masochism, stereotypical thinking, cruelty, narcissism, cynicism, obsession with control and manipulation, evasion of responsibility, identification with the inner group, and unconscious desire for destruction and its transfer to the outer group. Such personality is "particularly susceptible to antidemocratic propaganda "[GS9−1:149], and it is considered as an expression of ego weakness.

Adorno's analysis of the political "tricks" that rationally divert irrational impulses is noteworthy here. These tricks include the politician's "personalized" appeals (when politicians spend large time in speaking either about themselves or their audiences), the compatibility of the elimination of enemies with the compulsion to identify with allies, the "salami method" (the removing a piece from a complex), the repetition of fragmental and illogical statements, and the appeal to crisis and reform while affirming the current system of power. These tricks supply collective narcissism, sadism, and masochism to the weak ego that seeks an outlet for its impulses with the anxiety of isolation: "Propaganda, Hitler reasoned, has to adjust itself to the most stupid ones among those to whom it is addressed; it should not be rational but emotional." [GS20−1:271]. Both sender and receiver are aware of irrational feelings but dare to surrender to the trick.

2. Education for Democracy, against Authoritarianism

Based on Adorno's critique of authoritarianism, what kind of education would be required? Strength and development of the ego in a family and the education of a rational and intellect might be demanded. However, Adorno preceived the decline of the modern family as the basis for ego formation, and the primacy of instrumental reason as a problem of the modern age. Therefore, he hoped for the removal of the blind, opaque authority from schooling [EzM:131], and a social critique as the "enlightenment."

According to Adorno, schools and teachers wield opaque authority and power, and consequently, children form cliques, in which there is a hierarchy of physical strength, violence, and cunning [EzM:84−85, GS20−1:375]. Therefore, Adorno urged schools and teachers to eliminate this structural authoritarianism and then recommended respect for children's self-expression, inspiring friendship rather than collectivity, and tolerance for the emotions of self and others. However, he emphasized the need to develop a sense of disgust/shame to counter the problem of physical violence [EzM:131]. His recommendations for schools were generally intellectual and moderate, however, he affirmed the necessity for emotional and intellectual work to resist the violence.

Regarding "enlightenment", the following three specific methods were recommended for individuals approximately older than 10 years of age, which would contribute to democracy. (1) "antidote" (Gegenmittel) [EzM:27], which accuses individual interests of the disadvantages of authoritarians, (2) "vaccination" (Schutzimpfung) [EzM:27, NSV1:466], which spreads a list of propaganda tricks and

culture industry stereotypes, and (3) sociological political education that analyzes real, concrete social problems [NS V1:381−386]. He expected them to make people aware of their susceptibility to influence from propaganda [GS20−1:273] and to promote "critical self-reflection" [EzM:27, NSV1:465] in addition to social consciousness. Furthermore, this "enlightenment" causes shock and resistance to authoritarianism. This does not alter people's unconsciousness fundamentally, nevertheless, it can be expected as a counterinstance at the pre-conscious (das Vorbewusstsein) [EzM:103].

3. Adorno's Utopian Perspective and his Preventive Pedagogy

Why did Adorno affirm the ego-established individual, democracy, and "enlightenment"? Why did he not systematize democratic education, and why did he not call for his education to be thorough? The main reason would be Adorno's utopian perspective. According to his *Negative Dialectics*, "Utopia would be above identity and above contradiction; it would be togetherness of diversity" [GS 6: 153]. It cannot be grasped by reason, nor can it be promised to be realized by rational means. Utopia would be a state in which the rational dominant principle is unnecessary [NS IV10:215−216]. The rationally depicted and formed individual and democracy were not utopias for Adorno. If we set it as a goal and enforce it identically, we will fall into a "dialectic" and turn into the opposite, as in the former Enlightenment [GS4:86, GS4:223]. Adorno found the penetrating state of identity in "Auschwitz" [GS6:355]. Modern society is not the worst because in this non-identity remains even under the overwhelming compulsion of identification. However, its contradictions and distortions are negative suffering (Leiden). However, according to Adorno, this distress facilitates a contemporary "metaphysical experience" that is proof that the "togetherness of diversity" is not just an illusion.

Consequently, Adorno had great expectations for the practice of education. Of contemporary education, he expected not the rational realization of rational goals, but the contribution to vigilance, resistance, and elimination of what causes suffering, taking the sensitive suffering of reality as a starting point. The vigilance, resistance, and elimination of authoritarianism and heteronomy in modern society are considered as the realistic contemporary signs that the established individual, democracy, and utopia would not be impossible, and the embodiment of its emergent potential. Such a perspective of education could be described as a "preventive pedagogy for avoidance of evil" [Shirokane 2019]. Here we can also read here Adorno's concern with *Mimesis* as *natura naturans* (productive nature) [Früchtl 1986]. Education that avoids the perspective of

natura naturata (nature as product), such as the control of emotions, and aligns with suffering, hoping for what can be achieved in/by vigilance, resistance, and elimination of suffering, would be a form of *natura naturans*, or "togetherness of diversity," in addition to contemporary philosophy and art [GS6:26, GS7:35].

4. To Criticize of Emotion, Democracy, and Education Today, in Perspective of Adorno's Thought

Currently, social divisions due to social media and populism, contemporary capitalism in which globalism and nationalism coexist, and the similarities between Nazi Germany and modern society are discussed. What is evident in this situation is the "dialectic of democracy," in which "the people's political enthusiasm puts democracy, which is its requirement, in danger." Against this "dialectic," Adorno's "preventive pedagogy" suggests a critical perspective. Although his theory of education recommended concrete and moderate practices and recognized the significance of traditional culture, it may seem conservative and unsatisfactory because it did demand a fundamental change in education and its thoroughness. Furthermore, this perspective on nouvelle naturae, which entrusted the spontaneity and authenticity of "diverse things" to suffering in the current situation and to its elimination and what is produced with resistance, is insufficient as a bulwark against the domination of nature [Imai 2017]. However, for Adorno, democracy and education may have been a stage on which he could stake his unforeseen hopes in the midst of an evil reality.

Finally, we will contrast discussions of the philosophy of education with Adorno's perspective. His view of politics would be more similar the recent post-foundationalism [Tabata/ Tamate/ Yamamoto eds. 2019], which is interested in the avoidance of evils, or agonistic democracy than deliberative democracy that promises legitimacy and rationality of all constituents. These ideas suggest the possibility of citizenship education that does not force all people towards the goal of a "good citizenship."

Given the current development of social media and other "emotional architectures" [Wahl-Jorgensen 2019] with anonymity, his media-theoretical "enlightenment" is probably more effective than Adorno's critique of gerrymandering personality types. The Beutelsbach Consensus in Germany [Endo 2004], which encouraged students' analysis of political realities in view of their own personal interests, and the publishing a new edition of *Prophets of Deceit* [Löwenthal/Guterman 2021], that is a list of propaganda tricks to whose original research Adorno contributed. The contemporary

significance of education as an "antidote" or "inoculation" is evident. However, it is important to understand the difficulties of the "elimination of authoritarianism" in the complex dynamics within schools [Yamana 2015] and the tradition of Japanese postwar education which has produced "fun classes" [Matsushita 2003]. The spontaneity and authenticity of children's emotions should not be naively considered self-evident, and the actuality of the idea of *natura naturans* requires careful examination.

According to Shannon L. Mariotti, Adorno and Paulo Freire are similar regarding the social issues they analyze and their expectations of democratic education; however, Adorno's insight into solidarity is insufficient than Freire [Mariotti 2016:105−121]. Adorno maintained that negation of suffering can only be realized through solidarity [GS6:203−204]; however, he never systematized it. From his perspective, what would be expected of theories for the negation of suffering would be the "solidarity" of various theories rather than the rational thoroughness of a particular rational system. For example, Axel Honneth's theory of recognition [Honneth 2005], Jean-Luc Nancy's understanding of the human being as "singular plural" [Nobira 2019:119], and Jean-Jacques Rousseau's insight into absolute human "weakness" as the principle of equality and pity [Morita 2015:71], may be theories that contribute to such solidarity. However, caution is required against theories of solidarity and pity not to be enforced by education.

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Nuchidutakara (life is a treasure): The Spirit of Okinawa in Resistance to the Fascism of Democracy

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1. *Nuchidutakara* — The thought of as an oath to inherit the memory of war

Nuchidutakara has become a widely-known word that expresses the spiritual and ideological character of Okinawa. It is a popular idea that thoroughly embodies peace and rejects any spirit of sacrifice. The term holds a very important position considering the future state of Japanese society and world peace.

However, Okinawans have not always recognized and circulated this term as a symbol of the heart of Okinawa. According to Osamu Yakabi, an Okinawan modern and contemporary history researcher who carefully explored the coining of the term *Nuchidutakara*, "The word *Nuchidutakara* is hardly confirmed in texts written during and in early postwar times." (Yakabi 2009:199). After the introduction of the term *Nuchi* in the late 1960s, "In June 1987, a local newspaper reported that the description of the Japanese genocide in the Battle of Okinawa was completely removed from high school textbooks by the Ministry of Education" (ibid.:199). Two newspaper companies, the Okinawa Times and the Ryukyu Shinpo, immediately began a three-month long series. Related organizations also responded quickly to the "fight against the power that comes to crush" (Kinjo et al. 2019:129). They "broke the silence of 37 years and started talking about the deletion of massacres by the Japanese military in the textbook examination because they felt bitter that 'if we don't talk now, it will be miserable again." One of the most notable aspects of this struggle was that not only organizations and researchers but also readers who had subscribed to newspapers received the daily testimonies (Yakabi 2009:203). Furthermore, in the process of collecting testimonies from people and questioning about the experience of the Battle of Okinawa, researchers extracted the word *Nuchidutakara* and it was published in the Okinawa Times. This was the moment when

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the word first appeared in a newspaper (Yakabi 2009:204). Thus, *Nuchidutakara* is a new popular idea with less than 40 years of history that represents the Okinawans' earnest desire for peace and their oath of determination to inherit war memories in collaboration with researchers.

However, the word had already been used in the speech of the Crown Prince during his visit to the prefecture in 1983 to promote blood donation and in the speech of U.S. President Bill Clinton at the Okinawa Summit in 2000. The intended ideological nature has also been used in the language of the opposition（Kinjo 1987:20-22; Kano 2011:230). The Okinawa People's Thought Movement, which continues to this day, is in the midst of a battle to refine its ideological character, in which the words *Nuchidutakara* are not easily taken away by the authorities.

This report focuses on this point. Specifically, the author focuses on two thinkers from the Yomitan village who have led the Okinawans' ideas to this day, the sculptor Minol Kinjo and the Shinshu Otani monk Shoichi Chibana. Through an overview of how the ideological character of *Nuchidutakara* has been refined by these two thinkers, I examined the ideological conditions and significance of *Nuchidutakara* which protects people from war and enables them to live truly democratically.

2. Who coined the term *Nuchidutakara*?

The sculptor Kinjo adopted the term as his own way of life, but *Nuchidutakara* is not originally invented by him. Kinjo testified that he had first heard the words in the postwar streets as the voice of the people who had sacrificed a lot in the war (Kinjo 1987:21-22). However, he said that he learned the spirit of the term in his childhood just after World War II. Kinjo was raised by his maternal grandfather Makari Miyagsk (Kinjo 2001). His father had gone to war and died in battle on Bougainville Island when Kinjo was less than a year old. Kinjo said that his grandfather, who was a fisherman's boss, never exploited his fellow fishermen. He recalled, "If there are ten fishermen, some of them have been fishing for four or fifty years, and some of them have gone out to sea for the first time yesterday or today, but they have the same share. In fact, what I've experienced is that the deaf, who had just started fishing, worked in the sea together, but we divided all the fish and shellfish in the harvest into equal parts. I think it was the *Nuchidutakara* that supported this behavior, which is that life is a treasure." (ibid.:1-2) Thus, the term *Nuchidutakara* supposedly existed long before it was ideologized as the language and spirit of the people, but it was reconceived out of the language of the people

who lived during the war. According to what Kinjo has learned from his predecessors, *Nuchidutakara* can be understood as a spirit of equal distribution on the premise that there is no superiority or inferiority in life.

3. Word of Okinawa in resistance to the fascism of democracy

Yomitan village, the birthplace of Shoichi Chibana, contains the remains of the war, Shimukgama and Chibichirigama, known as the most important bases for Okinawa peace learning (Yakabi 2009:65-75). Two people who had immigrated to Hawaii were evacuated to Shimukugama. They realized that the U.S. military was not as cruel as the villagers had been taught by schools and Japanese soldiers (as being "the demons, the U.S. and the British") but that "they wouldn't kill them if they didn't even fight back." Therefore, the two of them left Gama and negotiated with the U.S. military, and as a result, the lives of 1,000 residents were saved (ibid.:71-72). On the contrary, a veteran soldier and two nurses accompanying him on the Chinese front were evacuated to Chibitirigama. They had only seen the atrocities committed by the Japanese army in China and they told the residents that they were the demons of the U.S. military. According to the testimony of the survivors, this account triggered a group suicide by yelling "*Tenno Heika Banzai*" (Shimonoshima 1984). Parents killed children and adults set fire to futons, thinking that it was better than being humiliated and brutally killed by U.S. soldiers. In fact, 85 out of 135 people were killed. Simukgama and Chibichirigama are considered indispensable for peace learning because they demonstrated that "imperialization education" was the cause of life and death, depending on where the residents of the same district evacuated to.

However, during Chibana's youth, there was no such place for peace learning in Yomitan village. Shoichi Chibana revived the memory of Chibichirigama that had been reduced to a garbage dump (Kinjo et al. 2019:129), along with non-fiction writer Tetsuro Simojima in 1983, and opened it up as a place to think deeply about peace. Chibana continues to narrate the memories of the places as a peace guide to this day. Chibana's reputation as "the person who burned the Japanese flag" (Chibana 1996) was based on his belief in peace and attempts to revive and inherit the memories of Chibichirigama's war so that there would never be another war. It is important to note that Chibana has kept the *Hinomaru* as a treasure in the Buddhist altar drawer to this day. This *Hinomaru* is the national flag of the country that Chibana had bought before Okinawa's return to Japan in 1972 (Ogasawara Islands returned to Japan in 1968), and waved many times to return to

Okinawa's homeland. It is therefore kept as a precious memory of Chibana's youth, who lived under the occupation of the *America Yu*. Chibana recounts that under American rule, which was marked by unjust oppression, only Japanese schoolbooks provided democratic things at the time (Asahi Shimbun Digital, 2011). Therefore, the *Hinomaru* became a symbol of Chibana's dream of breaking through the unjustly damaged situation and obtaining equal human rights. However, Okinawans who returned to the Japanese Constitution and the Japanese democratic state for the first time in 27 years viewed the *Hinomaru* as a symbol of fascism that completely betrayed the "nuclear-free mainland" (Chihana 1996:6) demanded in the movement to return to their homeland. Chihana learned from this experience that democracy and fascism were not counter-concepts that presented opposite societies to the people; whether it was prewar militarism or a democratic country, fascism could be realized under the right conditions.

Media control enables populism and creates a majority that cleverly incites popular sentiment and crushes a small number as a result of legitimate consensus (Chibana 2017). The use of the term *Nuchidutakara* by the side that imposed control eliminated the core of the idea and modified it to suit the principle of majority rule. That is why Chibana emphasizes the spirit of not abandoning the minority, that no one should be sacrificed, as a core part of *Nuchidutakara* that should not be exploited.

Then, through what kind of action do the Okinawans embody the idea of *Nuchidutakara*? The code of conduct that Okinawans follow to interact with others is also considered to be the feeling of *Chimugurisa*, which exists as the unique language of Okinawa.

4. Act of finding pride as a human being in the vessel of one's mind that can conceive of the pain of oneself and others

The translation of *Chimugurisa* into Japanese is similar to the meaning of the word *Kawaiso*（I'm sorry）. However, in this translation, the most important aspect of *Chimugurisa* is omitted. The word *Kawaiso* implies that one can break off relationships with others, such as "I'm sorry, but I can't do anything for you" or "I feel sorry for you, so I'll leave you alone." This feeling gives one the choice of how to deal with other people's wounds. On the contrary, *Chimu* means "heart" in Japanese and *Gurisa* means suffering, which together means "my heart aches." However, the word *Chimugurisa* also implies the feeling of empathy for other people's suffering. In other words, *Chimugurisa* does not include the choice of whether or not to suffer the pain of others. Others' suffering

and that of one's own are equally implied in "my heart suffers" without boundaries, and the spirit of "equal life" (Kinjo 2003:3) is embedded in *Chimugurisa.* Therefore, those who have a *Chimugurisa* mind overwhelmingly incorporate the suffering and sadness of other people's lives into their own compared to those who have a *Kawaiso* mind that allows them to freely choose the extent of other people's and their own suffering. It is no exaggeration to say that the process of life from the beginning to the end is the process of forming a vessel of mind filled with the pain of oneself and others. When those with such a vessel of heart shout *Nuchidutakara* for example, in a democratic country, they would not be allowed to say that there is a "life" that can change its value inside and outside the national boundaries.

However, Kinjo posits that it is not enough to have a Chimugurisa to truly live in the spirit of *Nuchidutakara* and advocates bringing in the traditional feeling of the Korean people called *Han* (resentment).

The term *Han* strongly incorporates ethnic Korean ideas that are different from those incorporated in the Japanese term *Urami* and refers to "emotional activities" in which feelings of sadness, suffering, and resignation are precipitated and deposited within oneself (*Hanpuri*) and created and sublimated into a new life (Unno&Gombeye 1987; Hanazaki 1981; Kinjo 2001; Kawase 2018). Kinjo sees the possibility of life in Han's work to solve his grudge. The empathy of *Chimugurisa,* which is accompanied by the suffering of others and one's own, enables a solidarity that does not isolate others, but if suffering only builds up like a dam, people will have no choice but to be overwhelmed by life. Also, if these sufferings are caused by discrimination or exploitation, the victim's resentment, despair, and anger will most likely transform into aggression and create a structure that engenders new sacrifices. If so, *Nuchidutakara* loses its original meaning. However, if the dam of pain is the source of a new and desired life, *Nuchidutakara* will mean exactly what it states. Kinjo said that "human pride" (Kinjo2001, Fukushima 2015, Kawase eds. 2018) can only be revered by people who have been hurt can be seen in *Han Toki*（solving）(Kawase eds. 2018). By adding the idea of *Jodo* to the term, Kinjo then reaches the word "You live *Jodo* by solving *Han*." The term *Jodo* refers to a new world of life that can be seen before the end of resentment. *Jodo* refers to a world that is worthy of being a society where everyone lives together. It refers to a world where the suffering of others and oneself is associated not only with each other but also with the pride and dignity that sublimates pain. As this *Jodo* is a state that can only be seen in the world of life, it can be said that the spirit of *Nuchidutakara* which should not be sacrificed by any person, can be an idea of peace that resists fascism in democracy.

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The Challenges for the Philosophy of Education in a "Data-Driven Society": Reconsidering "Data," "Information" and "Knowledge" for the Future of Education

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Purpose of the Discussion

What impact will the Fourth Industrial Revolution which is bringing about the new vision of society, such as so-called "Society 5.0" or "Data-Driven Society" have on the nature and concept of "education" and "human beings"? The new society will be characterized by an expansion of the Internet of Things (IoT), utilization of big data through artificial intelligence (AI), the development and spread of robotics, and other rapidly advancing innovations. How would education and learning in the new society be transformed or how should we transform them?

Considering the issue of education in the new society, we tend to focus on it as a method to develop human resources for innovation and new technologies. There is also a position, as is evident in the discussion of "Singularity" that reads the future of technology and human beings as conflicts or confrontations and attempts to conceive of education as countermeasures against them (e.g., "Education will never lose to AI.")

What these discussions have in common, however, is the concept of education to develop useful human resources in response to changes in the social structure. This is, so to speak, an "educational technology" approach. Though it is clear that education plays a functional role in responding to changes in society, this approach is based on the idea and concept of education that prevailed after the Industrial Revolution (Society 3.0), when education was organized and institutionalized on a global scale as a powerful device contributing to the development of nation-states and their economic and industrial

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growth. In the new society (Society 5.0), following the information society (Society 4.0), which is envisioned as a "human-centered society that achieves both economic development and solutions to social issues through a system that highly integrates cyberspace (virtual space) and physical (real) space," these ideas and concepts of education and human have become the dominant conception. Will the ideas and concepts of education and human be retained in this new society (Society 5.0)? The philosophy of education has its own challenges in dealing with the advent of a new society brought about by rapid technological innovation.

In particular, the innovation currently underway is forcing a fundamental redefinition of the concepts of "data," "information," "knowledge" and their interrelationships which have served as the foundation of human intellectual capacity. This in turn calls for a transformation of the modes of learning and education themselves.

This discussion aims to look at the transformation of the nature and concept of education and learning in the new society, and to clarify the theoretical and philosophical issues as well as the practical challenges. We will also focus on the reconstruction of the relationship and meaning of "data," "information," and "knowledge" in the new society, and deepen our discussion on how these changes will affect the practice and theory of education in the future.

Points of the Discussion

1. General discussion of current trends in AI and other innovations and their educational and humanistic implications.

2. Discussion on the reconstruction of the relationship between "data," "information," and "knowledge" in a "data-driven society" and its impact on the nature and concept of education.

3. Discussion on the challenges and implications of a "data-driven society" on educational academic research and philosophy of education.

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The Challenge for the Philosophy of Education in a "Data-Driven Society"

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Abstract

The world we live in is now a Cyber-Physical System (CPS), where the cyber and physical realms are interconnected. Human beings living in this system are constantly mobilising data simply by virtue of their existence and behaviour in the world. Can philosophy of education respond to this digital transformation in the view of humanity, which has the power to reconfigure the nature of human existence, leading to states such as the posthuman and the transhuman?

Keywords: Cyber-Physical System, Internet of Things, posthuman, transhuman, humanity

I. What a "data-driven society" brings

Rapid development of information and communication technologies in recent years has spurred the expansion of the Internet of Things (IoT), in which computers embedded in objects work together, as well as digitalization and AI networking, in which artificial intelligence is connected to the web. This has led to an explosive increase in the amount of data being circulated, accelerating analysis of accumulated big data and use of AI for this purpose. In such a "data-driven society," it is essential to effectively promote the collection, accumulation, analysis, and feedback of data to the real world, and expectations for innovation based on data are high (Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications -Japan 2018).

The world we live in is now a Cyber-Physical System (CPS), where the cyber and physical realms are interconnected. Human beings living in this system are constantly mobilising data simply by virtue of their existence and behaviour in the world. A

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characteristic feature of a data-driven society is that human existence and activity imply the production and accumulation of data, and its use or consumption.

A data-driven society contains data that in itself has the same value as land, labour, or capital. For example, data covering a person's lifetime create value. Such data range from maternity records to medical examinations, genetic information, and various learning and behavioural history data collected by schools and companies, etc. It is also necessary to decide in advance what will happen to such data at the end of life and what will happen to legacy data, for example whether the surviving family will redeem the data for cash or whether it will be made available to an institution. In addition, there is an urgent need to consider legal mechanisms to ensure that collected data is used appropriately for examinations or employment purposes. Individual optimisation is optimisation within a pre-conceived framework, and the increasing number of justifiable preventative interventions based on correlative predictions made by big-data analysis will emerge in a variety of settings in the future, including self-medication, nursing care, disaster prevention, and education.

Changes in industrial structure will once again call into question the value of public education. These include the convergence of information technology and manufacturing industries, the introduction of IoT into components, raw materials, products, and equipment, the networking of supply chains from raw material procurement to distribution and sales, factory automation, and mass customisation to enable mass production while meeting customer needs. In addition, new industries are emerging that make full use of information technology, such as fintech (IT and finance) and agritech (IT and agriculture). The reconfiguration of industrial structures and rapid changes in work styles make it difficult to predict changes in the labour market. It is also challenging to know what kinds of human resources will be required in the next stage and what minimum skills and competencies will be required.

People's lives are also undergoing major changes. The resistance to online forms of education and work that emerged during the COVID-19 pandemic was a stark reminder of how deeply ingrained social systems are in our habits; human lives have taken for granted the fostering of contact-based social experiences (Suzuki, 2022). The shift from a consumer lifestyle of owning things to a lifestyle of sharing things with others is likely to continue, even though the pandemic has temporarily stalled this trend. What do we own and what do we experience as we move back and forth between the cyber and physical worlds, and how do we perceive our position and self-consciousness through performances on the web, such as communicating anonymously or through avatars in the metaverse? These experiences in the CPS also transform one's view of life and death.

Today we access the storehouse of information, which can be called collective intelligence, as needed (on demand) and acquire a lot of information each time. This means that the processes of learning through memory and recall, feeding on experience, mastery through repeated practice, changing stages as things suddenly become clear to us, and so on, are all part of the process of learning from the earliest stages of life. It will mean a transformation of the intellect, the emotions, the will, and the body, and a change in human nature itself. Can philosophy of education respond to this digital transformation in the view of humanity, which has the power to reconfigure the nature of human existence, leading to states such as the posthuman and the transhuman? This is a question pertaining to the raison d'être of philosophy of education as an academic discipline.

II. Future challenges for pedagogy and philosophy of education

From the perspective of the new technological civilization brought about by technologies such as artificial intelligence, I would like to point out three issues in the philosophy of education that I think we will confront in the future.

(1) New turn in science and technology ethics and redefinition of humanity

Technological innovation, such as artificial intelligence, requires the wisdom to "fear rightly and use wisely" (Berberich/ Nishida/ Suzuki 2021). Technology will emerge as one of the most important issues for education in the future. The nature of ethics regarding the research, development, and use of science and technology is approaching a turning point. We require the kind of ethical thinking that predicts possible future situations and simulates how to deal with them. In other words, it has become necessary to anticipate situations that have not yet occurred, but may occur in the future as science and technology progress and spread, and to consider in advance how to deal ethically with such possible cases. While linking to certain kinds of strategic thinking and taking traditional ethics as its base, this thought process will also link to meta-ethics in the sense of requiring a new type of ethics that maintains an overview of ethics itself. At the same time, it will reinforce the aspect of providing suggestions for risk perception and situational judgment. Ethics education for the acquisition of ethical thinking and attitudes is also likely to change dramatically in the future.

Moreover, the development of AI technologies is enabling partial substitution for human intellect and physical functions. Such substitution carries the danger of weakening

functions that until now have been acquired by humans themselves, such as those relating to memory, recall, emotional cognition, and empathy. One example is increasing extrapolation of memory effects. We have already begun to take for granted the ability to acquire information by leaving it to external storage devices or accessing on-demand the encyclopaedic functions of so-called collective intelligence on the web. There is also a danger that "knowing," which is based on the intertwining of various aspects of such "knowing," such as retaining information, knowing things, and having a sense of reason, will be reduced to the act of acquiring data. We experience various things in the cyber world without activating our bodies. In the physical world, coordination between sensors and emotions activates our senses. Human beings have confirmed their nature as humans, in other word their humanity, by drawing a boundary between animals and machines.

Such boundaries often depend on stereotypes, preconceptions, and prejudices. From the point of view of contemporary post-colonialism, the definition of "humanity" based on a universal model of humanity, which can only be described as the Western view of humanity based on white male supremacy, has begun to show various discrepancies. When the human intellect, emotions, and body are altered by highly invasive technologies, for example, psychic avatars developed through combination of artificial intelligence and genome technologies, it is time to redefine "humanity" (Bostrom 2014; Suzuki 2020).

(2) Reviewing the concept of competence and skills and the significance of learning in the school space

At the same time, the question of "humanity" implies a rethinking of abilities and skills. Today, when we are constantly connected to a variety of information devices and use them in our daily lives, is it sufficient to think of human abilities and skills in the same way as before? In past school education, ability was generally regarded as the ability to perform a certain task, based on the ability to perform it visibly. In an age of digital transformation, when people are closely connected to one another and to objects, simply regarding abilities and skills as attributable to individuals may no longer be seen as adequate. If we are to adopt a world-view of human beings as actors in a so-called environmental intelligence made up of data and information, it will be necessary to grasp human abilities and skills from a new viewpoint.

In a sense, online learning, which has seen rapidly growing demand triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic, may offer suggestions for a new form of education. On the other hand, this is also an opportunity to reassess the significance of face-to-face learning,

where people share the same place and time. From a viewpoint of historical anthropology, the classroom can be seen as a stage where communication between teachers and students takes place, resonating through the interplay of various performances to form a shared "place" of learning. Field research and interviews in families and schools in Japan and Germany has clearly shown that through such communication and performances, rituals that are performed repeatedly and have become a kind of custom are passed on through mutual imitation by those who share the space. Schooling can be regarded as a process of updating, modifying, and editing according to individual circumstances. In this sense, school is a space in which students can experience diverse ways of learning.

Bearing in mind guidelines for learning, whether you study on your own at home or online with a teacher in the form of individualised learning, the path to understanding something is limited only to the process by which you come to know it. However, in the classroom, students have opportunities to see how other students have different ways of understanding the content of the class. We help our fellow students who seem to understand more slowly than we do, explaining things to them and asking them where they are stuck. Sometimes you think you understand something, but find a completely different way of thinking about it. It is no simple matter to identify what kind of abilities and skills are developed by experiencing these different ways of understanding. Elements deeply related to the fields of non-verbal and non-cognitive capabilities, such as physical and tacit knowledge, play an important role. These include non-verbal communication, anticipating others' intentions, mutual gestures, facial and bodily expressions, and tone of voice. The significance of such face-to-face learning, which could be called theatrical learning, or the significance of learning through practice, needs to be further elucidated in the future (Suzuki 2021; Wulf 2013).

III. The impact of the "data-driven society" on education and educational philosophy research

Big-data analysis and other new research methods are showing signs of a major transformation not only in the natural sciences, but also in the humanities and social sciences. There are high hopes for the potential of digital humanities, a field which introduces new technologies to research subjects in the humanities, such as old maps and documents. As the accuracy of predicting the future through data analysis improves, we can expect to see significant progress in correlation-based research in education-related fields. In this context, educational research will inevitably undergo a paradigm shift as a

result of digital transformation, with changes in the focus of research and the development of joint projects with other related disciplines, including the natural sciences. In this paradigm shift, researchers will increasingly be called upon to search for new paths to renewal of educational research while questioning the raison d'être of the philosophy of education.

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Can Chance be Tamed by Probabilistic Data?: On the Ontological Weakness of Education

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Abstract

Gert Biesta puts the "ontological weakness of education" opposed to "strong language," which aims to establish a strong and secure connectuion between educational inputs and outcomes that is the core of data-driven approach to educational practices and policy-making. To deepen our understanding of ontological weakness, this study examines the ontological significance of chance, which is seen as something that can be controlled through strong language for maximizing effectiveness of education. First, this study focues on Giorgio Agamben's critique of the superimposition of the realm of probability onto that of reality. In probablistic thinking, a certain real event then becomes the object of probabilistic calculation of why it occurred. The case is determined by causal consequences of various possible cases, and that the world is being so while it could be otherwise (chance) is made calculable. However, to replace and suspend real events with imagined possible cases and calculate the probability of their actualization to reality is, as Agamben claims in reference to Wittgenstein's notion of cases, to lose connection with reality. Second, this study points out that the concept of probability has historically belonged to the category of opinion, not knowledge. Given his theological perspective on the concept of probability, Pascal's argument about the wager that God either exists or does not suggests we should live believing in the existence of God, even though we are aware that we are powerless before God, equal to nothing. Finally, Agamben's remark about the irreparable in the appendix to his *The Coming Community* are helpful to look at the world with wonder, without looking for a necessary reason to be so or being disappointed that there is no reason to be so. Thus, how subjectification occurs in education emphasized in Biesta's argument should not be controlled, but seen as wonderful.

Keywords: Probablistic Thinking, Chance, Ontological Weakness of Education, Agamben, Case

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Introduction

Data-driven education or evidence-based education is a model in which statistical causal inference of large amounts of data is used to determine effective interventions. Data is used as the material for producing evidence through statistical causal inference. An individual's data is considered to be a case in a homogeneous set, a realization of one of a variety of potential outcomes. Randomized controlled trials, in particular, aim to generate counterfactuals through randomized sampling to probabilistically postulate effective interventions.

However, is it reasonable to attempt to tame chance through data probabilization for effective education? It is not enough to claim that educational relationships, which consist of mutually interpretive acts between teachers and students, are different from physical mechanisms. Furhter, statistical causal inference only seeks to increase the probability of intervention, not the certainty of it (Hacking, 1990). Taken together, we have the uncertainty of prediction; we can call this the uncertainty of knowing the effectiveness of interventions, or "the epistemological weakness of education."

In contrast, Gert Biesta's critique relies on "the ontological weakness of education" (Biesta, 2010, p. 361). Biesta puts the "ontological weakness of education" opposed to "strong language," which aims to establish a strong and secure connectuion between educational inputs and outcomes based on evidence-based education and numerical measures of educational effectiveness. Biesta believes that the purpose of education since the Enlightenment has been "subjectification." The condition of becoming a subject, he argues, requires educators to allow their students to act in new ways as they respond to "the event of being taught" and "the event of being spoken or addressed by the other, that is the world." Having developed this ontology of education, Biesta calls it a beautiful risk to dare to close one's eyes to the evidence and bring incommensurability into the educational environment (Biesta, 2017).

> The point is that all these possibilities only become real when trust is given, when we bring in this incommensurable element, something that is not based on any knowledge or evidence and may even go against all the knowledge and evidence we currently have. What is important from an educational point of view is that trust precisely open us a "space" where the child or student encounters its freedom and where they need to figure out what to do with this freedom. (Biesta, 2017, p. 92)

Biesta's conception of ontological weakness as in making students subject is different from the epistemological weakness argument that is similar to data-driven education. However, Lewis (2013, 2018) claims that Biesta's theory of being a subject based on ontological weakness also assumes that students will eventually actualize the possibility of being a subject. According to Lewis, neither progressivist pedagogy, which critiques conventional education, nor Biesta's concept of subjectification escapes the idea that investment, along with standards and actualization entail measurability, in that they seek to actualize the potentialities or capacities of children.

To deepen our understanding of ontological weakness, this study examines the ontological significance of chance, which is seen as something that can be controlled through strong language for maximizing effectiveness of education. Chance is what allows one to move from the actualization of what is possible (could be) to what is the case (fact), that has a sufficient reason as to why that is the case (must be), and it is what falls out of a strong language that aims for effective intervention.

1. Superimposition of the realm of reality with that of probability

Giorgio Agamben in "What is Real?" writes an interpretation of the physicist Ettore Majorana's disappearance as an attempt to awaken the illusion that probability represents reality, to show that reality cannot be grasped by probability calculations.

> Majorana seems to suggest that it is precisely the exclusively probabilistic character of the phenomena at stake in quantum physics that authorizes the investigator's intervention, that is, renders him capable of "commanding" the phenomenon itself to move in a certain direction. (Agamben, 2018, p. 12-13)

What is at stake there is the superimposition of the realm of probability onto that of reality. Probabilistic thinking calculates which of the various possible cases will probabilistically actualize to reality. A certain real event then becomes the object of probabilistic calculation of why it occurred. But is it reasonable to treat the real event as a probable case calculable in the realm of probability?

In addressing this question, Agamben takes up Simone Weil's *Sur la science* where the latter criticizes quantum physics and its probabilistic thinking (Agamben, 2018). According to Weil (1966), classical science has tried to represent the truth of a world in which various events are continuously and necessarily determined. In contrast, in

quantum physics, the world is considered as a discontinuity of atomic systems and should be represented through the calculation of probabilities. As a result, the connection with real events in the world is lost. From here, Agamben argues as follows. Calculating risk in the realm of possibility suspends the real world, and because it does so, it makes it possible to intervene and govern the real world (superimposition of the realm of reality with that of probability). However, to replace and suspend real events with imagined possible cases and calculate the probability of their actualization to reality is to lose connection with reality. What gets lost is the very wonder of what is happening.

> Modern science – and every single human being with it – directs its decisions according to a criterion that cannot directly refer to the case in question, but only a "probable case" that can coincide with the former only "randomly". (Agamben, 2018, p. 32)

Agamben has Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (hereafter abbreviated as *Tractatus*) in mind when he opposes the "probable case" to the "case" that modern science, which adopts probabilistic thinking, cannot directly refer to. In *Tractatus*, which begins with the claim that "The world is everything that is the case (*Die Welt ist alles, was der Fall ist*)," (Tractatus, §1) Wittgenstein denies that there is any value within the world. The real events of the world (the cases) are what actually happens in the logical space, in situations that could be otherwise. However, Wittgenstein does not argue the value of the world that is the case; instead, the mystery is that it is as is, "Not how the world is, is the mystical, but that it is." (Tractatus, §6.44)

Probabilistic thinking makes it possible to calculate and account for why the world is being so. Probabilistic thinking has a framework of thought that categorizes equally the cases that are possible (possibilities) and then calculates which of these probable cases can be actualized to reality and why. The case is determined by causal consequences of various possible cases, and that the world is being so while it could be otherwise (chance) is made calculable. "What we call a 'case' is the fiction according to which the probable and the possible 'fall' into reality, while the opposite is true" (Agamben, 2018, p. 33). However, can chance be tamed as something calculable?

2. Putting probability back into historical context

Before examining whether chance can be tamed as something calculable, let us put

the concept of probability back into its historical context. The starting point for probabilistic thinking is often said to be the analysis of the game of chance in Pascal's *Pensées*(1962). Agamben notes that *hasard* (luck) is used there, and *probabilité* (probability) is reserved for theology. According to Hacking (1984), "probability" originally meant the acceptability of "opinion" as distinguished from "knowledge," and the reliability of opinion was based on the testimony of authoritative others. In the 17th centry, "probability" came to mean the reading of the laws and probabilities of the world in which God's will was written.

McMyler (2011), who discusses the ontological significance of testimony in light of this historical background, positions knowing something through testimony as being relational and ethical, supported by authority and responsibility, as opposed to the epistemological tradition that has emphasized autonomy, where "knowledge" is a justified and true belief that individuals attain by themselves. As long as testimony is conceptually classified as so, the speaker shares responsibility for the truth of the beliefs held by the listener, and it is essential for the listener to find trustworthiness in the speaker. If these conditions are met, as McMyler suggests, the speaker's telling should be recognized as evidence in a broad sense.

When we return to the historical context, we find that for Pascal, the problem of "chance" is related to the bet on the existence of God. According to Omoda (2018), Pascal's point is that "human beings, who are in the middle of infinity and nothingness, perceive the tremendous chaos or bottomless abyss that lies between infinity and nothingness, and yet turn their attention to the gamble that is made beyond the infinite, that is, the gamble as to whether God exists or not" (Omoda, 2018, p. 256). Pascal's argument about the wager that God either exists or does not suggests we should live believing in the existence of God, even though we are aware that we are "powerless before God, equal to nothing" (Omoda, 2018, p. 255).[1] If this is the case, chance is not something that can be calculated based on probabilistic thinking. Pascal's wager was something that contributed to the decision to gamble in spite of the acknowledgement of uncertainty (weakness) that could not be incorporated into knowledge.

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[1] The issues raised by Pascal's wager were carried over into the debate between William Clifford and William James. Clifford pointed out the problem of a shipowner who believes that a ship carrying immigrants will not be wrecked based on their faith in God, stating that "(i)t is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything on insufficient evidence" (Clifford, 1877, p. 295). In contrast, James defends the rationality of religious faith, even when it lacks sufficient evidence. Currently, for example, McCormick (2015) points out that the value of knowing the truth on which "evidentialism" (Conee & Feldman, 2004; Shah, 2006) emphasizes, is only of ultimately pragmatic value when the matter in question is related to the meaning of life. Then, McCormick says, believing something without evidence or even against evidence can be justified if doing so is related to meaning of life.

3. The necessarily contingent

Again, can we tame the wonder of chance encounters as something calculable? As we have seen, Agamben cited the "case" in *Tractatus* as something missed by the superimposition of the realm of reality with the realm of probability. To elaborate this point, it is helpful to refer to the appendix of Agamben's *The Coming Community*, "The Irreparable", a commentary on section 9 of Martin Heidegger's *Being and Time,* as well as section 6.44 of the *Tractatus*.

In the first half of *The Coming Community*, Agamben argues that "the punishment of unbaptized children who die with no other fault than original sin… turns into a natural joy" (Agamben, 1993, p. 5). The meaning of their lives cannot be told under a narrative within the realm of perdition and salvation. Hope is found in the irreparable light that rains down on them.

By the word "irreparable," Agamben means that "things are just as they are, in this or that mode, consigned without remedy to their way of being." (Agamben, 1993, p.90). The fact (the case) that the world is thus and so, whether sad or joyful, unhappy or happy, is irreparable. Even if we attempt to ponder why the world is like so, why it is necessary for certain possibilities to actualize into reality, the mystery of it will never be intelligible. Nevertheless, if confronted with the fact that it could be otherwise (chance), we posit any power or (God's) will behind it and try to explain the reason, value, and necessity of why that case has come about.

Referring to the principle of sufficient reason, which states everything must have a reason or cause to be, that is everything has reason to exist rather than be nothing, Agamben put change or contingency, that is the possibility of not-being, into a new place within necessity, that is impossibility of not-being.

> Language opens the possibility of not-being, but at the same time it also opens a stronger possibility: existence, that something is. What the principle properly says, however, is that existence is not an inert fact, that a *potius*, a power inheres in it. But this is not a potentiality to be that is opposed to a potentiality to not-be (who would decide between these two?); it is a potentiality to not not-be. The contingent is not simply the non-necessary, that which can not-be, but that which, being the *thus*, being only its mode of being, is capable of the *rather*, can not not-be. (Being-thus is not contingent; it is necessarily contingent. Nor is it necessary; it is contingently

necessary.) (Agamben, 1993, p. 105)[2]

The case that things are as they are is of value neither because it has reason to be rather than being nothing, nor because the potentiality of opposing the potentiality of not-being has actualized to the case compared to when it is not actualized. If we focus on the value of existence only from the viewpoint of which possibilities of being have reason to be actualized, there will be no way to talk about the meaning of the life of an infant who has just been born and died. We tend to see what the case is as having some reason for being so, and talk about the reason or value of that existence in terms of actualization of the potentially of being. Probabilistic thinking seeks to control or command which possibilities of being has probable potentiality to actualize. The "necessarily contingent," that is the possibility of not not-being, is a conceptual device that suspends such probabilistic thinking. The following remarks from the last part of *The Coming Community* suggest looking at the world with wonder, without looking for a necessary reason to be so or being disappointed that there is no reason to be so.

> Seeing something simply in its being-thus ----irreparable, but not for that reason necessary; thus, but not for that reason contingent---- is love.
> At the point you perceive the irreparability of the world, at that point it is transcendent.
> How the world is ----that is outside the world. (Agamben, 1993, p. 106)

Conclusion

When confronted with the fact that a case could have been otherwise, we tend to

[2] The emphasis on "rather" here is connected to Bartleby's attitude of replying in Merville's story, "I would prefer not to," when asked, "you will not?" According to Agamben, Bartleby is questioning the superiority of will over potentiality. "Prefer not to" does not mean "refuse to do" what is asked of him ("nothing is further from him than the heroic pathos of negation" [Agamben, 1999, p. 256]), but it wedges the process that if one has the potentiality, one should exercise one's will and actualize it. Bartleby's reply is an experiment in which potentiality follows the principle of sufficient reason. According to Agamben, Merville's story can be formulated in a question of the following form: "Under what conditions can something occur and (that is, at the same time) not occur, be true no more than not be true?" Bartleby's experiment without truth "concern[s] not the actual existence or nonexistence of a thing but exclusively its potentiality. And potentiality, insofar as it can be or not be, is by definition withdrawn from both truth conditions and…the principle of contradiction." (Agamben, 1999, p. 261) The position of potentiality is related to contingency in which a being can both be and not be. Agamben names such contingency *de contingentia absoluta* (Agamben, 1999, p. 261) that suspend the actualization of potentiality of being true. From this contingency, the fact that is the case is not being than nothing, but rather or no more than not be.

seek the reason why it was the case. The case is taken as one of the "probable cases" which are accounted as the data calculable through probabilistic thinking. Probabilistic thinking seeks to command which possibilities of being has probable potentiality to actualize. A data-driven society accelerates superimposition of the realm of reality with that of probability. The more the predictability of what happens, the more chance will be tamed and contingency will be excluded form evidence-based policy making. However, as Agamben bases "the case" in the sense of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* by focusing on the necessarily contingent, it is possible to see with wonder how things are as they are.

It is in this context that "the ontological weakness of education" should be read. According to Biesta, the condition of becoming a subject requires educators to allow their students to act in new ways as they respond to others. Yet, for Biesta, it is why teaching is not a constraint of freedom for students who are being subject, and cannot and ought not be controlled. Subjectification does not lead to a tendency to actualize the possibility of being a subject. That students arise as being subject may by contingent. However, that is neither the actualized possible case nor the data calculable by probabilistic thinking.

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Knowledge with Sharing and Empathy: Lessons for the IT-Driven Modern World from Views on Knowledge in African Oral Culture

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Abstract

Today it is easy to acquire information with advanced information technology, but I argue that mere pieces of information gathered by internet keyword search are not knowledge. Then how can we turn information into knowledge? Conventionally, learning proceeds from basic to advanced material presented hierarchically in textbooks and reference books. But nowadays schools are playing a steadily diminishing role in teaching the knowledge needed to live. Given real-world demands, learning is becoming less hierarchical but more networked, requiring learners to judge and select from various sources, cutting across disciplines and including audio and visual as well as textual material.

In this paper, to consider the changing nature of learning and knowledge, I investigate the epistemology of traditional oral cultures in Africa. By doing so, I try to objectify and reflect on academic education and the classic Western epistemology underlying it, which we have taken for granted. Unlike written culture, where ideas are preserved in the texts, a predominantly oral culture constructs knowledge collectively, with speaker and audience responding to the context. While writing is predominantly cognitive and irrespective of context, the oral transmission of knowledge is sensory. In such a culture, an educated person is one who not only has a lot of information but also can interpret and apply it to meet the present situation. The speaker's moral authority is also essential to the audience's acceptance of what is said.

Today, with advancing communication technology and social changes, knowledge is less likely to be acquired exclusively by reading. Other media and sensory learning are gaining in importance. Based on these trends, I argue that we have entered a secondary oral culture. Accepting that knowledge is constructed through multifaceted interactions among presenters and recipients in writing, listening, and seeing, I point out the importance of fostering the moral quality of individuals to better enable them to judge and select knowledge.

Keywords: oral culture, writing culture, networked knowledge, epistemology, value judgment

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Introduction

How can humans say that they "know" something? Today, acquiring information has become very easy and we can easily feel like acquiring knowledge. Meanwhile, school subjects and academic disciplines have not kept up with the rapid changes in society, and increasingly we cannot learn what is required to live in modern society from textbooks and reference books. In other words, passive learning according to existing systems is not enough; what is required is an ability to generate knowledge independently. But how can one logically structure easily available information and convert it to knowledge? Many of us may end up being mere collectors of scraps of information.

In this paper, I reflect on academic education and the classical Western epistemology underlying it. To objectify these concepts, which we take for granted, I will discuss the epistemology of traditional African societies based on oral cultures. The reason for this exercise lies in my experience as a researcher on education and knowledge in African societies. I frequently visited countries that are said to be "underdeveloped," with a slow pace in spreading school education, and I questioned why the formal school system dominates the world as if it were the only way to teach and learn. Even when there were no schools, even before the culture of writing took root, people transmitted knowledge from generation to generation. Perhaps some societies have different perspectives on ways of knowing. Even though institutions like schools may qualify students for employment and social success, they may not impart knowledge that is rooted in daily life.

With the spread of the internet and new modes of communication brought about by information technology, in Japan it is now said that 21st-century problem-solving skills are needed to survive in a knowledge-based society. In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic has dramatically hastened changes in the environment for learning. As students could not attend school, self-directed learning using tablets and other devices became common. In light of questions about the value and nature of school-centered education, I have come to believe that African societies' ideas about knowledge may have useful implications for understanding how knowledge is acquired in contemporary Japan.

1. Knowledge generated in relationship

(1) Value judgments as the basis of knowledge generation

Earlier, I stated that knowledge is different from mere information. Then what

exactly is knowledge? Floridy, a philosopher of information, states that *data* is a list of meanings without interpretation; *information* involves interpretation, but without a judgment as to whether the connotation is right or wrong; *knowledge* is this semantic information linked with judgments about values (Floridy 2011, xiii).

In the genealogy of Western epistemology, cognition has been considered a mental process that consists of three elements: an object in front of an individual; an individual, who recognizes the object and comprehends what it is; and reliable reasoning as the basis of such recognition. Of these, the last corresponds to value judgments, the basis of the semantic system of knowledge, according to Floridy. In fact, much of the controversy in Western epistemology stems from differences about where to look for such reasoning. Authoritarian epistemology posits the existence of divine or supra-scientific authority as the premise for any subjective judgment. Rationalism based its judgments about reasoning on scientific evidence, while empiricism believed that the accumulation of experience leads the subject to reasoning (Todayama 2002). Although it is not the purpose of this paper to pursue these arguments in depth, I would like to point out that the various schools of thought agree that it is the human subject who judges the correctness of cognition and what constitutes knowledge. At the bottom of such judgment is reasoning. The challenge today is uncertainty about where individuals should look for reasoning as the basis for judgment.

(2) Networked knowledge generation in an IT-driven society

With the advancement of information technology, today it is easy for people to collect information online by typing keywords according to their spontaneous interests. Pieces of information gathered this way do not become knowledge unless there is a proactive decision to relate and unify them under a single semantic system. At the same time, the computer algorithm may present information according to the ranking (popularity) of search results for the typed keywords, without following the logic of any academic field or established structure. Such conjunctions of information, devoid of any established disciplinary structure, would not have happened in the past. In other words, in the modern world, knowledge can be formed in a networked manner by combining information from a variety of sources, using the searcher's interests as an entry point. The package of knowledge created in this way may well provide an opportunity to overcome the limitations of conventional frameworks of logic.

Further, in today's world, the sources of information can be music, videos, or cartoons as well as text. Transmission of information through these media is accelerating,

with circulation and interpretation of information happening almost simultaneously. These transmissions are lifelike and highly interactive; the meanings attached to the information and the modes of presentation constantly change in response to reactions of the audience and the environment.

Seeing such changes, we must accept that acquiring knowledge happens now not only by reading written texts but also by other methods that are increasingly important. Examining the nature of knowledge in traditional oral cultures may provide insights into how knowledge is generated in contemporary society.

2. Differences in knowledge generation and transmission in oral and written cultures

(1) Communication in oral cultures

In general, speaking is to convey a message to another person in the same physical space, face-to-face, in real time. It is also a process that collectively constructs a common understanding: not only does the presenter influence the receiver but also vice versa. Oral messages are transient and ad hoc. Because of this simultaneity, oral communication takes on a sensory nature.

The sound and rhythm of speech, the beauty of expression, and the speaker's charisma can elevate oral expression to the level of art. In oral societies, it is not uncommon for sharing and transmitting knowledge to take the form of theater. Taking the ancient Greek art of rhetoric and poetry as an example, Goody (1987) argues that no two performances, even of the same play, are exactly the same, since the characteristics of oral expression depend on the environment and the audience who share the same experience. But the introductions, episodes, and method of linking moral implications with the performance are consistent. Also, unlike written expressions, which can be read much later, oral messages can be recalled in detail for only a limited time. Therefore, to promote the recipients' understanding and memory, oral expressions often use sensory signals, such as rhyme or repetition of similarly-structured sentences, which give a rhythm to the utterance (Goody 1987, 211–220).

(2) Communication in written cultures

While communication in oral cultures is simultaneous and co-creative, in written cultures it is unrestricted in space and time, since utterances can be noted and stored. As

a result of careful examination of the structure and grammar of the written language, systematic methods for classifying and analyzing language are developed, and trained professionals are sought to deal with this complex system. Through writing, words are accumulated from the past to the present, and the vocabulary grows.

Writing also enables people to think about concepts that are not directly connected to their own lifeworld. Abstraction allows people to reconstruct memories and ideas logically in accordance with set objectives. The possibility of autonomous discourse, free from the context of the lifeworld, creates the opportunity for scientific progress and for structures such as governments and companies to manage activities between physically distant individuals (Ong 1982, 77).

While oral expressions are dialogical, collective, using all five senses, written ones are introspective, with cognition predominating over the other senses. If, as mentioned above, the accumulation of abstract and logical thought and the exchange of ideas through documents enabled the emergence of modern systems of politics, economics, and education, then it can be said that the foundation of modernization was written culture. On the other hand, it is a mistake to consider oral culture a lower developmental stage of society. Writing would not exist without speech; even in the most modern societies, aspects of orality remain. Writing and orality are not mutually exclusive but coexistent.

3. Theory of knowledge and education in traditional African societies

With a few exceptions, such as the Ethiopian Orthodox and Muslim clergies and Mediterranean traders, traditional agrarian and pastoral societies in Africa did not accumulate knowledge in writing, nor did they have an academic system to teach it to the next generation. Education in traditional societies is practical, experience-based learning, whereby people acquire the skills, values, and codes of conduct necessary to be part of a community through the various stages of life (Ishengoma 2005, 16). Furthermore, in many African ethnic groups, aphorisms and stories with educational significance are passed down orally.

(1) Oral narratives and education

> In many African countries . . . aphorisms are used only by the truly educated and cultured, who give speeches full of imagination and metaphor. Aphorisms contain the philosophy, humor, symbolic meaning, and religion of the person who uses them.

> They are imbued with a deep knowledge of the world around them, of materiality and spirituality, and of social reality. . . . Education in traditional societies takes place through oral communication, not written. And aphorisms are a means of conveying social and moral teachings.
> (Appiah, Appiah, and Agyeman-Duah 2001, xii)

Aphorisms do not convey information in the literal sense. For example, there is an Akan saying, "The snake does not fly, but it catches the hornbills that live in the sky." When this saying is used in conversation, it does not matter whether a snake actually caught a hornbill nearby or not. The symbolic content of the saying is that "if you are resourceful, you can achieve what you are not skilled to do." However, to understand this requires knowledge of the culture and lifestyle of the Akan people. If we do not know that, to live in the rainforest, it is very important but difficult to catch birds as a source of protein, then we would not understand the message behind this saying.

Now, after knowing the background and taking in the moralistic meaning of the aphorisms, the most important task of the speaker is to apply it to the situation faced by the listeners and present an interpretation of why it happened. The event confronting them might be a simple quarrel within a family, or a case where someone has suddenly been struck by misfortune without obvious cause. Through education by the seniors, people in oral cultures acquire the ability to find the meanings of such events, applying the suitable aphorisms and considering the relationships among the spiritual, material, environmental, and human worlds.

(2) Epistemological difference between Representation and Presentation

Biesta and Osberg states that school education in the modern era has been based on an epistemology that presupposes that knowledge is to be represented (2008, 15–20). Truth is singular, and knowledge is the precise demonstration of the only way to explain what exists. The purpose of education is to develop an ability to constantly and repeatedly represent this relationship between existence and explanations.

By contrast, in traditional African societies, what exists in front of people can have multiple meanings, and a speaker will choose how to explain a phenomenon in a particular context. An educated person is the one with the ability to grasp the implications of a phenomenon and convey them to others convincingly. In other words, being educated is the ability to make a *presentation* based on interpretation rather than a *representation*. The essence of interpretation is condensed in aphorisms, but they are too

short to make sense on their own. Compelling interpretation requires extensive knowledge and insight to fill in the gaps.

Abdi states that an educated person in traditional African societies is often someone who has not been to school but who can think and explain with a good mix of moralistic wisdom, interpretive wisdom, and rational ideas based on the context in which the community is situated (Abdi 2008, 319).

Conclusion

As early as the 1980s, Ong foresaw that information technology would usher in an era of "secondary orality" (Ong 1982, 2–3, 133). Technology-enhanced media are the product of a sophisticated science developed within a written culture capable of accumulating, refining, and logically extending specialized knowledge. In this sense, communication using such technology is still an extension of the written culture. At the same time, the dissemination of knowledge today cannot be understood solely through the models of how knowledge is formed in existing systems. Precisely because information is so readily available, one should consider the nature of networked knowledge not only on its surface but also in terms of the underlying epistemology.

In cyberspace, relationships are constantly changing. An audience in one moment can be a presenter in the next moment. Opinions presented by influential figures are forwarded, retweeted, and "liked." At the same time, these spreaders interpret, add meaning, and sometimes even convert the originator's intentions. People with common interests may take collective action, but they remain anonymous to each other, and the group is constantly reshaping itself like an amoeba.

Online search engines provide information according to a site's popularity ranking. Can "popularity" be a valid criterion for judging information to be true in an IT-driven society? Can information recommended by algorithms be accepted as knowledge? In ancient oral cultures, knowledge was passed on with a moral message. The speaker of aphorisms and folk tales had to be a good performer but also a respected personality in the society. In contemporary secondary oral cultures, does the presenter have the character to bear the weight of what is presented? Does the recipient have the ability to distinguish between meaningful knowledge and misinformation? Intrinsic qualities of morality and justice hover over both the receiver and the presenter of communication but are difficult to acquire in cyberspace. Where do we learn the ability to judge the correctness of information and assemble our own knowledge packages? That may be the

role of schools today. The social function of schools in transmitting knowledge is in question. But school still has a role to play in this information age by becoming the place where future generations develop morality and the ability to make judgments.

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