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Kant's Theory of Education from the Perspective of the Concept of "Resistance": Beyond the Theory of "Discipline"

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The theory of Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), who lived in the Age of the Enlightenment in the 18th century and who exemplified both the culmination and the overcoming of the Enlightenment, can be considered to form the basis of modern pedagogy, as Kant set the goal of enlightenment, education, and self-cultivation as the realization of maturity (Mündigkeit) and autonomy. In previous research, his pedagogical work *On Education* (*Über Pädagogik*, 1803), edited by Friedrich Theodor Rink, has been examined from the perspective of the theory of individual moral development and from the perspective of aporia in the relationship between autonomy and education, as guidance of children by an educator. However, these studies have paid no attention to the concept of "resistance" (Widerstand)[1], which Kant mentions repeatedly in this work. In recent years the concept of "resistance" has assumed a pivotal role in pedagogical theories—for example, in the theory of Gert Biesta (2017: 13–14)—but Kant had already paid attention to the pedagogical meaning of this concept. Furthermore, in Kant's educational theory, "resistance" represents the nexus that binds the text *On Pedagogy* with his concept of enlightenment as "emergence from immaturity," and that also offers insight into the relationship between moral autonomy and "constraint" (Zwang)[2]. This paper will therefore seek a new framework of *On Pedagogy* and the knot between Kant's educational theory and moral autonomy, as well as enlightenment, by rereading and reconstituting his theory from the perspective of the "resistance" concept.

To achieve this objective, the previous research will be analyzed in section 1. In sections 2 and 3, the concept of "resistance" will be focused on, and Kant's argument about this concept will be extracted from his text *On Pedagogy* to clarify its meaning. Here, its connection to his educational theory will be also examined in reconsidering the concept of "lawful constraint" (gesetzlicher Zwang). Section 4 revisits the characteristics of "resistance" from its uses in Kant's moral and historical philosophy, and section 5

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summarizes these considerations and presents five characteristics. In the "Conclusion," the possibility that this "educational theory of resistance" could be regarded as connecting Kant's theory of enlightenment and pedagogy will be considered.

1. Analysis of previous research on Kant's theory of education[3]

Research on Kant's text *On Pedagogy* has, above all, often been performed from two perspectives: the theory of moral cultivation and the contradiction between education and autonomy. When the text is studied from the first perspective, the sequential progression of education in *On Pedagogy*—"care" (Wartung), "discipline" (Disziplin) or "Training" (Zucht), "cultivation" (Kultivierung), "civilization" (Zivilisierung), and "moralization" (Moralisierung)—and the transition from an animal existence to a human and moral existence, as well as from an existence in nature to a social existence, are examined with emphasis. The research of Akira Mori tries to grasp Kant's educational thought—especially that in his work *On Pedagogy*—from his entire critical philosophy and in relation to the development of the theory of *Deutsche Bildung*. Mori states that, in Kant's educational theory, the way to the formation of a moral and free-acting subject constitutes the main theme: "a series of nature (animal nature) → discipline → morality (personality) thus forms one of the main outlines" (Mori 1955: 243). These stages of development or education also "can be traced through his pedagogical account that unfolds across the *Methodenlehren* [Doctrine of Method]" (Munzel 2003: 61) in his critical philosophy. This relationship to Kant's critical philosophy is often referred to from the perspective of his theory of educational stages. Kant's educational theory can also be examined by using the moral development theories of Lawrence Kohlberg and John Rawls as models for extracting Kant's distinct theory of moral development (Formosa 2014: 163–175).

The second perspective of the research focuses on the contradiction between autonomy and education. According to Kant's formulation, autonomy means that the will becomes the universal law, which is given direct to the will by itself. In contrast, education is about directing a person toward a particular course of reason or life, which results (whether consciously or unconsciously) in prevention of the person's autonomy, thereby giving rise to contradictions between education and autonomy or enlightenment. In short, in the formulation of Saoji Yano, "guiding" towards "autonomy" contradicts autonomy itself" (Yano 1994: 116). Jun Yamana indicated also the possibility that Kant's text on enlightenment itself could be read as guiding a person towards maturity, which might hinder the attainment of "maturity" (Yamana 1989: 97). He demonstrated, from this perspective, a possible interpretation of the reason for Kant's definition of enlightenment

as merely "exit from immaturity" and the ambiguity of the description in his text *On Pedagogy*. This paradoxical characteristic is the problem of the geographical boundary between the inner self and the outer world, which could also be interpreted as introducing the problem of the educational relationship between closeness and distance in relation to the child and the problem of the limits of educational intervention (Løvlie 2014: 116). Yano grasps these as a polarity between which education continues to swing, and he states that "dissolving this polarity and thinking of education with only one of two poles would certainly eliminate the paradox, but at the same time this would also result in disappearance of the specific domain of "education" in its modern sense." (Yano 1994: 128)[4].

In response to this polarity between education and autonomy, recent research has sought to point out the relationship between these two elements without contradiction. For instance, Paul Guyer investigates Kant's emphasis on the need for examples in moral education in terms of their roles and clarifies three roles of them in moral education, namely bringing "consciousness" to a priori moral law and related concepts, teaching the "contents of particular duties," and teaching "moral possibility" (Guyer 2014). Not only are these uses of examples consistent with Kant's critique of the use of examples in moral theorizing (Guyer 2014: 124–128), but also this education by means of examples seems to be able to contribute to moral cultivation without being the yoke of autonomy. Hiroshi Suzuki, in his examination of *On Pedagogy* through the lens of Kant's pre-critical and critical philosophy, suggests that there is a complementary relationship between moral autonomy and constraint, as Kant's concept of freedom has two dimensions, namely "the freedom of spontaneity that is assumed to be inherent, and moral freedom that is to be acquired through education" (Suzuki 2017: 198).

Regarding this paradox as a problem of enlightenment or autonomy, excluding the intervention of others, leads also to a discussion about the pluralism within Kant's philosophy and his concept of enlightenment (Hinske 1980: 57–63; Utsunomiya 2006: 30–55). Kant's pluralism is characterized by the maxim of "extended mode of thought," to "think oneself in the position of someone else" (IX57; cf. VII200), which belongs to the maxim of enlightenment, and which is also connected to Kant's cosmopolitanism. Yuzo Hirose suggests that "geography education" functions as a concrete method of education for the cosmopolitan who "can examine their own thoughts and ideas by opening themselves to concrete others and placing themselves in the position of others, without regarding their own thoughts as absolute" (Hirose 2017: 351). This focus on Kant's pluralism indicates the possibility that the subject and others are associated for the purposes of enlightenment and maturity.

However, in research from this last perspective, the main focus has been on studies of moral and historical philosophy and anthropology, and the text *On Pedagogy* has received insufficient consideration. This oversight consequently results in a lack of clarity regarding the relationship between the "exit from the immaturity" and *On Pedagogy*. Consequently, this paper will re-examine *On Pedagogy* with reference to the perspective of the abovementioned recent research. The investigation will focus on the concept of "resistance," which has been overlooked in previous research. It will explore how Kant presents, in *On Pedagogy*, the position of pluralism as to "think into the place of the other" (VII200), as well as a critical reflection on the exit from immaturity and the method of cultivating moral autonomy.

2. "Resistance" as an element of the theory of "discipline"[5]

So how is "resistance" described in *On Pedagogy*? Kant's first reference to this concept can be seen at the beginning of the "Introduction," where he discusses the function of "discipline," which "prevents man from being turned aside by his animal impulses from his destiny, which is humanity" (IX442).

> If he is allowed to have his own way and is in no way *resisted* in his youth, then he will retain a certain savagery throughout his life. (IX442, emphasis by quoter)
>
> It is a common error made in the education of princes, that, because they are destined to become rulers, no one really *resists* them in their youth. (ibid., emphasis by quoter)

Kant asserts here that "resistance" plays a pivotal role in the process of discipline, and that the absence of resistance in childhood will result in children retaining "a certain savagery." In accordance with the formulation of Mori, the step from "nature (animal nature)" to "discipline" cannot be achieved without "resistance." Kant gives "education of princes" or education "by all too much motherly affection" (IX442) as an example of education without "resistance." In particular, Kant compares the education of high society with public education and speaks highly of the latter. In the education of high society, "resistance", which is supposed to be given in public education, is not present, and therefore children continue to be "bold" (IX 465) and to have "savagery" (Wildheit), which is "independence from the laws" of humanity (IX442). Hence, "resistance" assumes a role in the phase of "discipline" as subjecting children to the law and restraining their animal impulses.

The next reference to "resistance" can be observed in the following metaphor of a "tree."

> But a tree which stands alone in the field grows crooked and spreads its branches wide. By contrast, a tree which stands in the middle of the forest grows straight towards the sun and air above it, because the trees next to it *resist*. (XI448, emphasis by quoter)

The metaphor of the tree serves to illustrate the relationship between the subject and others through "resistance." The tree standing in the middle of the forest—which represents the subject in society—can grow straight only with the "resistance" of the surrounding trees—in other words, the others in society.

So how should education be conducted to give children this "resistance"? First of all, Kant asserts that parents are permitted to provide their children with "resistance"—particularly "natural resistance"—in their role as educators. "Natural resistance" means refusal to comply with demands that are derived solely from selfishness and unnecessary sensible desires (IX479-480). This can be regarded as a concrete form of "discipline" by "resistance."

What kind of attitude is then required of children? Kant does not make a direct statement on this, but he does make an interesting description about sexual desire.

> If one directs one's inclination towards the other sex, one always still finds some *resistance*, but if one directs it towards oneself, then one can satisfy it at any time. The physical effect is extremely harmful, but the consequences as regards morality are far worse yet. Here one transgresses the boundaries of nature, and inclination rages without arrest because no real satisfaction takes place. (IX497f., emphasis by quoter)

The assertions made here apply not only to sexual desire. Desires or inclinations directed toward oneself also illustrate desires or inclinations directed exclusively toward oneself—in which case the inclinations can definitively be fulfilled—or toward other beings, who do not "resist" the subject but try to satisfy his or her desires, and over whom the subject has the advantage. In other words, this indicates the case in which the subject directs his or her inclinations only toward the realm from which any possible "resistance" is excluded. This does not carry a moral connotation; rather, inclinations should be directed externally, and children "must find resistance" (IX464). It is required of children, for their morality, to overcome their immanence and to be exposed to possible "resistance" in the world. Moreover, in another passage, Kant ascribes the encounter with "resistance"

to the process of character formation (IX487), and in the citation above he clearly relates it to moralization. But why can this encountering of "resistance" contribute to the cultivation of "morality"? This relationship between "resistance" and "moralization" must be revealed if we are to comprehend the whole role that "resistance" plays in Kant's educational theory.

3. "Resistance" and "lawful constraint" toward "moralization"

The following argument by Kant concerning the paradox of enlightenment and education provides valuable insights into the relationship between "resistance" and "morality."

> One of the biggest problems in education is how one can unite submission under lawful constraint (gesetzlicher Zwang) with the capacity to use one's freedom. For constraint is necessary. How do I cultivate freedom under constraint? I shall accustom my pupil to tolerate a constraint of his freedom (Zwang seiner Freiheit), and I shall at the same time lead him to make good use of his freedom. (…) He must feel early the inevitable *resistance* of society, in order to get to know the difficulty of supporting himself, of being deprived and acquiring—in a word: of being independent. (IX453, emphasis by quoter)

In this formulation, Kant makes reference to the concept of "resistance" in relation to freedom. However, this formulation gives rise to questions. First, how are freedom and constraint juxtaposed as "constraint of his freedom," while in the first passage they are opposed to each other? Secondly, how does "resistance" contribute to the moralization of the subject?

In the passages that follow this citation, Kant sets out three points that are crucial for the cultivation of freedom. The first and second points are to leave the child free, unless "it is in the way of others' freedom," and to show the child that "it can only reach its goals by letting others also reach theirs" (IX454). Cultivation of freedom demands the regulation of our unrestricted freedom, as unrestricted exercising of freedom may infringe upon the freedom of others and hinder the achievement of one's own aims. It is the "inevitable resistance of society" that is encountered when our unrestricted freedom infringes upon the freedom of others. When the responsibility to ensure that children are prepared to enter society falls on education, then, in education, children should know how to use freedom insofar as it does not infringe on the freedom of others. As stated in the third point, such constraint as will "lead him to the use of his own freedom" should be given by the teacher, with reasonable explanation, when the child exercises his freedom

unrestricted (IX454).

Here, constraint (Zwang) indicates not the kind of constraint that hinders moral autonomy under some form of authoritative force (which can be justified only under the order of "might makes right"), but rather one that is justified by its recognition of the freedom and rights of others. This latter constraint can be interpreted as "reciprocal constraint" (wechselseitiger Zwang) (VI232–234). This refers to the constraint or coercion, which, as Chris W. Surprenant writes, exists "when an individual coerces another in a manner that is consistent with the "coexistent freedom" of both individuals" (Surprenant 2014: 53). This constraint, in other words, "is used to compel one individual to recognize the right of other" (ibid. 56) and brings about the transition from the nature state to civil society, so it is the constraint that "is used to prevent someone from acting in a manner that violates the autonomy of another individual or himself" (ibid.). "Reciprocal constraint" is indeed an external restriction on one's freedom, but not every constraint makes autonomy impossible, and a demand that "individuals could never be free unless they had access to all possible options or, at the very least, to the option that they would have chosen from that range of all possible options" is "quite clearly unreasonable" (ibid. 54). The restriction of some options for action under constraint does not render autonomy impossible. In his philosophy of law, Kant asserts that the law (Recht) is entitled to impose constraint, and that "the constraint" imposed by this law, insofar as it is opposed to the exercise of freedom as a hindrance of freedom, is right. In this case, the law is seen "as being a hindering of a hindrance of freedom, and as being in accord with the freedom which exists in accordance with universal laws" (VI231).

The concept of "lawful constraint" in the citation of *On Pedagogy* can also be interpreted in the same way as "reciprocal constraint," which enables the autonomy of both subjects and others, and not as a constraint on natural conditions. This latter kind of constraint follows the principle of "might makes right" and markedly restricts the options, rights, and freedoms of others. As Hiroshi Suzuki shows, the "moral freedom" that is acquired through education and includes accordance with the will of others in the meaning of choice exercises the constraint of moral law, and this constraint does not contradict freedom as autonomy but enables it (Suzuki 2017: 179–201).

Encountering "resistance" is of great significance in the application of this lawful constraint to oneself, insofar as it demonstrates that the unrestricted exercising of freedom infringes on the freedom of others and it relies not on reciprocal constraint but on unrestricted freedom under the conditions of nature. The encounter with "resistance" makes known the necessity of "lawful constraint" and requires resistance against one's own inclinations, so that achieving both one's aims and moral freedom will be possible.

Therefore, "resistance" highlights the difficulty of freedom, promotes it, and leads to moralization. In education without "resistance," individuals may extend their freedom to those who never resist, yet in reality they stay within their immanency.

Education, which can be understood as cultivation of the ability to make use of one's freedom, can be paraphrased as letting the child know that we live in "society, where the world must be big enough for the child, but also big enough for others" (IX469). In acting within society, it should be assumed that there exist others who have equal degrees of freedom and rights. Therefore, individuals should be subjected to constraint to ensure that their freedom and that of others are secured and not unjustly infringed upon. This interpretation corresponds to Kant's statement that public education is superior to the education of high society without "resistance" in enabling the child to learn both "to measure one's powers" and "restriction through the rights of others" (IX454). The focus should be directed toward oneself—one's own freedom or desire—to acquire "lawful constraint."[6]

From the above, the concept of "resistance" in *On Pedagogy* can be summarized as follows: "Resistance" is a crucial moment, not only in the process of removing one's savagery, but also in the process of "moralization" in giving a clue to restrict one's own freedom in harmony with the freedom of others. It is necessary for children to direct their desires to the outside and to interrupt their immanence. In these processes, they find out about "resistance" and learn to recognize and value the freedom and rights of others, and they internalize lawful constraint, thereby promoting the "moral freedom" that is to be acquired through education.

4. "Resistance" in moral and historical philosophy

So far, we have discussed "resistance" in relation to discipline and moralization, but according to Kant's theory of development there are a further two steps in between, namely "cultivation" and "civilization." The research by Mori, to which I referred in section 1, also shows that, besides the series of "nature (animal nature) → discipline → morality (personality)," there are a further two series, namely "nature → skill" and "nature → society" (Mori 1955: 243). Therefore, the connection of "resistance" to these steps needs to be clarified. However, Kant does not discuss this in depth. In this section, therefore, we broaden our perspective and look at the way the concept of "resistance" is used in moral and historical philosophy.

First, in moral philosophy, "resistance" appears as inclinations and sensible desires:

> Such constraint [of moral imperative], therefore, does not apply to rational beings as such (there could also be holy ones) but rather to human beings, rational natural beings, who are unholy enough that pleasure can induce them to break the moral law, even though they recognize its authority; and even when they do obey the law, they do it reluctantly (in the face of *resistance* from their inclinations), and it is in this that such constraint properly consists. (VI379, emphasis by quoter)

It is inclination that resists when "finite" rational beings make moral law the determining ground of their will. The inclinations that are combined with sensible desires, pleasure, or subjective causes resist the will. This is also the reason why human beings are "finite" rational beings, and because "a perfectly good will" transcends finiteness and always corresponds to moral law, duty or imperative does not make sense to this will (IV412–414, V32). Rational beings can have morality insofar as their inclinations exist as resistance. Duty and human morality appear only in the realm where resistance against inclinations exists and subjects act reluctantly against these inclinations.

Similarly, in historical philosophy, "resistance" from others is understood to have a positive meaning. In the fourth proposition of the text *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim* (*Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht*, 1784), Kant sees the medium that nature uses to cultivate all of its predisposition in "antagonism," and antagonism lies in the "unsociable sociability" of human beings (VIII20). This sociability refers to the inclinations of human beings both to establish a society and to be alone at the same time. Because of this, they "resist" and anticipate "resistance" from others (VIII21). However, "it is this resistance that awakens all the powers of the human beings, brings him to overcome his propensity to indolence (…). Thus happen the first true steps from crudity toward culture, which really consists in the social worth of the human being; thus all talents come bit by bit to be developed, taste is formed, and even, through progress in enlightenment, a beginning is made toward the foundation of a mode of thought," which forms society into "a moral whole" (VII21). Kant describes these things that surround the human formation that is established by "antagonism" from "unsociable sociability" by using the metaphor of a tree in *On Pedagogy*:

> [j]ust as trees in a forest, precisely because each of them seeks to take air and sun from the other, are constrained to look for them above themselves, and thereby achieve a beautiful straight growth (…). (VIII22)

Given these concepts of "resistance" in moral and historical philosophy, "resistance" in

educational theory can be further explained as follows. "Resistance" inserts the freedom of "others" into the maxim assumed by the subject, and it directs the subject to reflect on his or her own desires or inclinations by coming from "outside" to the subject, who uses his or her own freedom in an unrestricted way. This directs the discussion to one's own inclinations and makes it known that the will, which is to follow the moral law, is confronted with "resistance of inclinations," and the subject can go toward "moralization" in resisting this second resistance. Thus, as stated in historical philosophy, this resistant relationship between individuals enables them to overcome the propensity toward indolence and turns the subject toward a moral, autonomous, and civil existence that respects the freedom of others and follows "lawful constraint."

As I already mentioned above, in Kant's historical philosophy, or in his theory of education, there are two stages that precede "moralization" in the transition to a civilized condition: "cultivation" and "civilization." In historical philosophy, Kant says that "resistance" awakens all the powers of human beings, after which they cultivate their talents and taste. If this is true, then it can be said that "cultivation" and "civilization," which cultivate skillfulness and prudence, could be led by "resistance." Indeed, "resistance" requires critical reflection on one's inclinations, desire, and freedom, insofar as it appears to interrupt one's own freedom, but if the subject lacks the physical ability or intelligence to act freely, then resistance will direct the subject to develop a "technical" and "pragmatic" presupposition (VII322).

"Cultivation" is mainly "didactic," and the "resistance" discussed in this paper cannot itself contribute directly to the process of cultivation. However, one of the moments that invite the subject to engage in this process is "resistance." This means that one learns to know that, in every competition in society, "no one enjoys any advantages, because one feels resistance everywhere, and because one can only make oneself noticed by distinguishing oneself through merit" (IX454). Moreover, one learns from this "resistance" in the competition to "measure one's powers." If one thinks that the reason for "resistance" lies in the lack of his ability, then one will be tempted to cultivate one's ability.

As regards civilization, Kant says in his historical philosophy that "all culture and art that adorn humanity, and the most beautiful social order, are the fruits of unsociability" (VIII22), and it can be supposed that "resistance" that is caused by "unsocial sociability" can lead to the cultivation of "prudence." If we are confronted with such "resistance," for example, to an extent that we can only reach our goals by letting others also reach theirs (IX454) (as discussed already in the third section), then the possibility that this will lead to the cultivation of "worldly" prudence, which is "the art

(…) of how to use human beings for one's purposes" in human society (IX486), cannot be denied. When one encounters this kind of "resistance" again, after having acquired "prudence," then one will be led to moralization. Thus, being directed toward the development of the ability to act freely precedes the stage of reflection on one's own inclinations.

5. Characteristics of "resistance" in Kant's pedagogy

From the discussion above, the characteristics of the concept of "resistance" in Kant's educational theory can be outlined as follows.

First, "resistance" manifest itself as an interruption of the unrestricted exercise of freedom. Secondly, "resistance" directs subjects towards the overcoming of crudity and savagery and the acquisition of "skillfulness," as well as "prudence." Thirdly, "resistance" directs subjects beyond "cultivation" and "civilization" and towards reflection on their own inclinations and desires that infringe on the freedom of others, as well as reflection on the range in which they direct their desires and on their own freedom in relation to the freedom of others. When "resistance" directs the discussion towards the "resistance of inclinations" in oneself, in other words, when it "turns to the subject,"[7] then "resistance" invites subjects toward "moralization."

Fourthly, this "turn to the subject" establishes lawful constraint and enables a transition from the freedom of spontaneity that is assumed to be inherent to the "moral freedom" that constrains one's inclinations. This can be achieved because the moral reexamination that "turn to the subject" brings about makes one's own inclinations visible. The subject who is directed towards himself or herself encounters "resistance" both outside and within as inclinations.

Finally, the subject is required to find out about the "resistance" that comes from "outside." The demand to find out subjectively about this "resistance" seems incompatible with the argument that "resistance" should be given from "outside." However, "finding resistance" means here to direct one's own desires towards the outside, as articulated by Kant in *On Pedagogy*. In other words, to "direct oneself to the realm where resistance could be encountered." The encounter with "resistance" cannot be anticipated beforehand; it can be encountered only through trials and experiences in this realm, and without the transition to this realm we cannot encounter it.

From these characteristics, it is evident that Kant's "resistance" is not merely a moment of "discipline," but is also a significant moment that invites subjects to every stage of his educational theory of development. This concept is of particular educational

significance, especially in directing individuals towards "moralization"—that is, moving them towards "moral freedom" by leading them to a society with others.

Conclusion: "Resistance education" and "enlightenment education"

In this paper, we have discussed "resistance education," which can be seen as the new framework of Kant's pedagogy. In the text *On Pedagogy*, Kant emphasizes the importance of "resistance" that comes from "outside" for moral autonomy and of "turn to the subject," which restricts the unrestricted use of freedom and imposes "lawful constraint." This leads to the process of becoming human—in other words, of leaving savagery and moving from animal nature to personality in two ways. The subject, on the one hand, is required to move to a place where freedom is restricted through the freedom of others and thus through reciprocal constraint. On the other hand, encountering "resistance" demands the transition from dependence on one's own inclinations to autonomy, in which the subject can resist his or her inclinations.

Moreover, focusing on this concept of "resistance" yields an answer to the critique that Kant's autonomy is isolated. His autonomy is by no means a monological act by an isolated subject. As mentioned in section 1, Kant's enlightenment also means moral enlightenment from the perspective of pluralism, which has, as one of its maxims, the requirement to "think in the place of the other" (VII200). For enlightenment education, Kant emphasizes "resistance" in *On Pedagogy*. This is because "resistance education" requires one to bracket one's own thoughts in an encounter with the "resistance" of others and to reflect on oneself in the place of others; this establishes "reciprocal constraint."

This "resistance" is also important for the sake of enlightenment in the sense of emancipation—of exit from immaturity. This process should begin with one becoming aware of one's immaturity and leaving one's own position, reflecting on one's own thinking from outside to determine what restricts one's use of understanding. In this sense, "resistance education" goes beyond a negative educational stage of discipline that removes savagery and can be seen as a moment of "enlightenment education" that combines the perspectives of pluralism, enlightenment as emancipation, and moral autonomy.

There are many themes that have remained undiscussed in this paper. One of them is consideration of the question 'What kind of "resistance" can lead to moralization?' Even though the subject encounters "resistance" after having cultivated his or her ability, it is up to the subject as to whether this will lead him or her to "turn to the subject". We therefore have to consider the transition from "resistance" to moral reflection and the way

in which we can give the "resistance" that leads to moralization. To clarify the concept of "sublime" could help to answer this question. According to Kant's text *Critique of Judgement* (*Kritik der Urteilskraft*, 1790), "sublime" is "an object (of nature), the representation of which determines the mind to think of the unattainability of nature as a presentation of ideas" (V268). The experience of this "sublime" can also be interpreted as an experience in which the subject is directed toward the moral law in him or herself by encountering resistance from others that comes from outside the subject or his or her framework of understanding. This schema overlaps with the schema in pedagogy. Therefore, a clue for further clarifying the "resistance" that leads to "moralization" could be found by considering this concept from the perspective of the "sublime."[8]

Note

1. In this paper, the term "resistance" in quotation marks refers to its usage in Kant's educational theory, whereas use of the term without quotes refers to the more general meaning of the word. I translate the German word "Widerstand" (which can be also translated as "opposition," depending on the situation) consistently as "resistance" to emphasize that Kant uses the same German word.
2. The German word "Zwang" means "constraint," "compulsion," or "coercion," and these words are used in the translation of Kant's works in accordance with each context. However, in this paper, to emphasize that Kant uses the same German word "Zwang," I translate the word consistently into "constraint."
3. The Japanese paper contains some insufficient descriptions of previous research. They have been corrected here.
4. In this paper, I generally agree with the point that education swings between autonomy and heteronomy, insofar as Kant's "maturity" is understood as an unattainable ideal. In this sense, not only education, but also enlightenment, is regarded as swinging between the two poles of autonomy and heteronomy. Kant's statements about "the greatest problem of education" (IX453) will be discussed later.
5. In the Japanese paper, the Japanese word "kuniku" was used as a translation of both "Zucht" and "Disziplin" in some sentences. This could cause confusion and needs correction, even though Kant uses both words in parallel. In this paper, "training" is used as the translation of "Zucht" and "discipline" as the translation of "Disziplin."
6. Kant's statement in the citation above, therefore, can be interpreted that there is a difficulty, because educators have to educate children to use their own freedom in such a way that constraint is included within the freedom.

7. This concept of "turn to the subject" is put forward by Theodor W. Adorno in *Education for Maturity* (*Erziehung zur Mündigkeit*, 1971). With this concept, Adorno describes the important act of fighting against anti-Sarmatism to enable people to become aware of the mechanisms within themselves that cause racial prejudice, because even if one were to show them the facts of what the Nazis did, they would normalize these acts as an exception (Adorno 1971: 26–27). Therefore, in this paper, I use this concept of turning discussion to the subject itself to describe the reflection on one's own inclinations that is caused by "resistance." However, whereas Adorno's "turn to the subject" relates to the social and political problem and structure that operate within the subject and cause prejudice, Kant's "resistance" relates to the moral problem. I therefore use this concept in this paper in the meaning of turning the discussion toward the subject and leading to moralization.

8. As mentioned in the introduction, Gert Biesta also discusses the educational role of "resistance" in relation to his concept "to exist in and with the world in a grown-up way" (Biesta 2017: 13–14). He also considers the concept of "emancipation," which backs up Kant's enlightenment concept (Biesta 2017: 59–81). However, Kantian pluralism in his enlightenment concept is not taken into account here. In another paper, I will try to compare and examine the differences and significance of the concept of "resistance" from this perspective.

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Note: References to Kant are to *Kant's Collected Works* (*Kant's gesammelte Schriften*), edited by the Prussian Academy of Science (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1900–). Citations from Kant are followed by the volume number in Roman numerals and the page number in Arabic numerals. Translations are my own, but I used the *Cambridge Edition of the Writing of Immanuel Kant* (1992–).

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